CA Unpub Decisions

Robert R. appeals from the order terminating parental rights to his son, Damien R. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the adoptability finding and the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Court find no error and affirm the order.

This matter has been transferred here from the Supreme Court (S149804) with directions to vacate our previous decision (People v. Beswetherick (December 20, 2006) H029404 [nonpub. opn.]) and to reconsider the cause in light of People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36.[1] In our earlier opinion, we affirmed a judgment after the trial court denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him in accordance with a negotiated disposition. We held, in part, that appellant's challenge to the trial court's authority to impose an upper term had been rejected in People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238. Subsequently, Black was abrogated by the United States Supreme Court in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856]. (French, supra, 43 Cal.3d 41.) Court hereby vacate our previous decision. Court address the challenge on the merits as well as reiterate the remaining part of our prior opinion.

Defendant Darryl William Brown pleaded guilty to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) and making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, 422). Defendant also admitted the following enhancement allegations: (1) he suffered two strike convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12); (2) he suffered a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (a)(1)); and (3) he served three prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent prison terms of 25 years to life for each conviction, and a consecutive five-year term for the prior serious felony enhancement. The trial court dismissed the three prior prison term enhancements. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to hold a Marsden hearing. Court find no error and affirm.

Defendant Gregory Chatten Stockman was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) and committed to a state mental hospital. He appeals from an order revoking his outpatient status and from a separate order denying him a trial on his petition for restoration of sanity. He contends that revocation of outpatient status requires a showing of dangerousness, and that the revocation order is not supported by substantial evidence. He also contends he had a right to a trial on the issue of restoration of sanity despite a stipulation foreclosing such a trial at the time requested. Court reject defendants contentions and affirm.

Earl Beck died from non-Hodgkins lymphoma and asbestos-related lung disease. Plaintiffs, the heirs of Earl Beck, filed suit against Huber, Hunt & Nichols of California, Inc. (Huber) and 40 other defendants, seeking damages on theories of survival, wrongful death and loss of consortium. They appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court granted Hubers motion for summary judgment. Court reverse, finding the evidence Huber submitted in support of its motion was insufficient to shift the burden to plaintiffs to produce evidence to show the existence of a triable issue of fact.

Evelyn Iokua (Iokua) appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for auto burglary (Pen. Code, 460, subd. (b)). Court affirm the judgment.

Jan M., mother of S.M., appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. She claims the court abused its discretion by refusing to grant her an evidentiary hearing on her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]because she made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. She also claims the court should have refused to terminate parental rights because she maintained regular contact with S.M. and their relationship outweighs the benefits of adoption. Court find no error and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Daryl Lynn Jenkins challenges his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm; being a convicted person in possession of ammunition; and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. He is adamant that under the longstanding rule of Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822, 827 (Kellett) and the plain language of Penal Code section 654 (section 654), the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the current charges because they should have been joined and prosecuted in an earlier proceeding. Court agree and accordingly reverse the judgment.

Hector A. (minor) appeals the juvenile courts finding that he aided and abetted in the unlawful driving or taking of a car in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The minor contends that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and intended to act in a manner to encourage, promote or facilitate the crime. Court agree with the minor and, accordingly, reverse.

Appellant Eloise Dickinson Cano (Cano) appeals a judgment in favor of respondent City of Los Angeles (City). Cano contends that the City is responsible for the injuries she sustained after falling in the parking lot at El Pueblo de Los Angeles (parking lot). Specifically, she claims that a ditch to the left of the handicap space contained poles and chains used to secure the parking lot at night and constituted a dangerous condition. According to Cano, we must reverse the judgment because the special verdict form was inaccurate. She contends that it should have asked the jury to find that the dangerous condition was created by a City employee, a finding that would dictate liability under Government Code section 835, subdivision (a). In the alternative, Cano argues that we must reverse the judgment because the findings embodied in the special verdict establish that she was entitled to an award, and because the special verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence.

In this juvenile dependency appeal, Angela A. (mother) challenges an order designating her sister, Katherine A. (Katherine), as legal guardian of Raquel A. (minor). Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by selecting legal guardianship instead of long term foster care as the permanent plan. Court find no error and affirm.

Lamont Terrell Craig (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction in a court trial of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5). Defendant admitted having suffered two prior felony strikes within the meaning of Penal Code sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate state prison term of eight years. Defendant contends that there was insufficient identity evidence to support his conviction.

Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) appeals from the trial courts order (1) denying CSCs petition to vacate an arbitration award in favor of Childrens Hospital Los Angeles and Cerner Corporation and (2) confirming the award. Court affirm.

Mark J. Saladino, a public administrator for the County of Los Angeles (the Public Administrator), challenges a probate court order appointing respondent Elke Harrington (Harrington) administrator of the estate of Johanna A. Heath (the decedent). The Public Administrator contends that Harrington did not succeed to a portion of the decedents estate, as required by Probate Code section 8462, subdivision (a), by virtue of her mothers assignment of a portion of her interest in the estate to Harrington. Rather, succession occurs only by operation of law.
We agree with the Public Administrator. Accordingly, Court reverse the probate court order appointing Harrington as the administrator of the decedents estate and direct the probate court to enter a new and different order appointing the Public Administrator as the estates administrator.