CA Unpub Decisions

Respondent Raj Naidu filed a complaint against appellant California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) alleging he suffered discrimination and harassment based on his race and religion. The case was tried to a judge who found respondent had suffered discrimination and harassment and who awarded him slightly over $1 million in damages and attorney fees. The CPUC now appeals contending the judgment must be reversed because (1) it is not supported by substantial evidence, (1) the court erred when it relied on certain evidence, (3) the damages awarded were excessive, (4) the court erred when it granted equitable relief, and (5) the court erred when awarding attorney fees. Court conclude the trial court did not commit any prejudicial errors and will affirm.

Appellants Ronald Hills, Ivan Rene Moore, Rene Moore Music, Inc. (RMMI), and Kimberley Martin-Bragg filed an action against respondents Strategic Acquisitions, Inc., Pro Value Properties, Inc. (Pro Value), Peter Baer, Daphne and Steve Johnson and others[1]that arose from the aborted purchase, by appellants, of real property owned by Pro Value. The trial court denied specific performance, entered judgment for respondents and awarded respondents attorney fees. Court modify the award of attorney fees and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Rebecca Argudo, Alanna Rebecca Argudo and Joseph Alexander Argudo, respectively the widow, daughter and son of decedent Joseph Danny Argudo, brought a wrongful death action against Dietmar Rodriguez, Sr., and Dietmar Rodriguez, Jr., who respectively were the owner and inhabitant of a residence on Hurley Street in La Puente, and against Bolivar Rodriguez. Dietmar Rodriguez, Sr., and Bolivar Rodriguez were dismissed by the plaintiffs with prejudice during the trial. A jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent Dietmar Rodriguez, Jr. The Argudos appeal from the judgment. Court affirm.

This dispute arises out of a 1998 license agreement between plaintiff ECC Systems, Inc. (ECC) and defendant Mallinckrodt Inc., through its subsidiary, defendant Nellcor Puritan Bennett, Inc. (Mallinckrodt). ECC patented medical technology for storing and delivering compressed gas, known as the OxyPac. ECC alleged that Mallinckrodt failed to complete the development and marketing of the OxyPac and instead developed, patented, and marketed its own competing device, the Helios, which used liquid oxygen instead of gaseous oxygen. ECC appeals from an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained defendants demurrer without leave to amend to ECCs third amended complaint, granted defendants motion to strike, and denied ECCs motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint.
We affirm the order of dismissal because the causes of action for slander of title and negligent interference with contract fail to state viable claims and the remaining causes of action are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. A bankruptcy courts finding in prior litigation that the OxyPac technology was not commercially viable at the time the parties license agreement was terminated collaterally estops ECC from establishing the required element of damages in this action. We also conclude that the denial of ECCs motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint was not prejudicial error because the proposed causes of action were not viable, suffering from the same defects as the causes of action in the third amended complaint. The order of dismissal is affirmed.

A jury convicted Jose Anthony Orozco of two counts of attempted premeditated murder, with a finding as to one count that he had personally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury, and with a finding as to the other count that he had personally discharged a firearm. The jury found that both attempted murders had been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial court sentenced Orozco to state prison for an aggregate term of 55 years to life, plus 20 years. Court affirm.

Kelly McClain, doing business as A+ Teaching Supplies, a sole proprietorship, leased a commercial shopping center unit from Octagon Plaza, LLC. The lease agreement required written consent from Octagon before McClain could assign the lease. McClain subsequently incorporated A+ Teaching Supplies as a limited liability corporation. McClain and her husband then formed a corporation, RKF Investments, Inc., and transferred ownership and control of A+ Teaching Supplies to RKF Investments, Inc. McClain never sought Octagons consent. Octagon sued McClain for failing to seek consent before assigning the lease. The trial court concluded that when McClain changed her sole proprietorship to a limited liability corporation and transferred control to another corporation, an assignment took place. The court held that McClains failure to seek prior written consent from Octagon breached the lease, allowing Octagon to terminate the lease. McClain appeals. Court affirm, because McClain breached the unambiguous language of the lease requiring prior written consent to an assignment.

A modification decision.

Dr. Anton Ambrose sued Farmers New World Life Insurance Company (Farmers) for breach of contract and related claims. He alleged that Farmers failed to pay him the full $500,000 death benefit to which he was entitled when his wife, Beulah Ambrose, passed away after her life insurance application was approved but before her policy was formally issued and delivered. Farmers moved for summary judgment, arguing that a provision in Mrs. Ambroses life insurance application limited Farmers liability to $50,000 if Mrs. Ambrose died before issuance and delivery of her policy. The trial court granted Farmers motion and entered judgment against Dr. Ambrose. Court reverse.

Giuseppe Fernandez, while renting a car at the Hertz Corporations LAX facility, left his briefcase unattended and it was stolen by another patron whose identity was unknown to both Fernandez and Hertz. By the time Fernandez reported the theft to Hertz, the thief had left the premises. The issue posed is whether Hertz has a duty immediately to attempt to identify the thief (by viewing Hertzs surveillance tapes), to capture the thief (or to cause the police to capture him), and to attempt to recover the briefcase. We conclude that Hertz did not have such duties. Even if Hertz had such duties, no act or omission of Hertz caused Fernandez any damage. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of Hertz on Fernandezs negligence cause of action. Court also affirm prior orders sustaining demurrers without leave to amend to causes of action for negligent and intentional misrepresentation, concealment, deceit, and violation of Penal Code section 135.

Benjamin Mitchell appeals from the judgment entered after his plea of guilty to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a), possession of a controlled substance, and his admission that he had suffered a prior conviction for a violation of Penal Code section 211. He also admitted to a violation of the probation previously imposed on him. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to 32 months in state prison. Court appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.

The juvenile court found that defendant and appellant D.H. came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because he committed three felonies: second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211), attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 664/211), and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)). The juvenile court declared D.H. a ward of the court and ordered him to camp community placement for six months. On appeal, D.H. contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that he unlawfully drove or took a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). D.H. also contends that the minute order for his adjudication must be corrected to reflect the six year, four month maximum period of physical confinement (Welf. & Inst. Code, 726, subd. (c)) that the juvenile court announced orally rather than the seven year, four month period that the minute order reflects. Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the issue of whether the six year, four month maximum period of physical confinement that the juvenile court announced orally was error. Court affirm the order adjudging D.H. a ward of the juvenile court. The minute order for the adjudication is modified to reflect a maximum period of physical confinement of six years, two months.

Plaintiff, Kiriacou Antoun, appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to his contract breach and declaratory relief complaint without leave to amend and an ensuing judgment. Defendants, Preecha and Suwanee Sirisut doing business as 7 Eleven Food Store No. 209679 (the Sirisuts), demurred to plaintiffs complaint which arose out of their refusal to pay the costs of defense of another lawsuit. Court affirm the judgment.

D.B. appeals from a trial court order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, in the dependency proceedings concerning her daughters S. and T. Court affirm.

Trisha T. (mother) and Christopher S. (father) (together parents), parents of six-year-old Ezra S. and four-year-old Ezekiel S., appeal from the juvenile courts order terminating their parental rights to Ezra[1]under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[2] Mother and father contend that the juvenile court erred in failing to find the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) (section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)) parental visitation exception to the termination of parental rights. Court affirm the juvenile courts order.