CA Unpub Decisions

Stacy S. (mother) has filed a petition for extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) challenging an order of the juvenile court denying her family reunification services with her daughter, Siarra S., and setting the underlying dependency proceeding for a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.25. Court deny the petition.

Defendants Renecha Gulley and Earl Christopher were found guilty by separate juries of assault by a caretaker on a child under the age of eight with force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death (Pen. Code, 273ab)[1]and second degree murder. ( 187, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced both defendants to a prison term of 25 years to life for their convictions of assault causing death of a child. The trial court imposed but stayed a 15 years to life term on both defendants for their second degree murder convictions. Court award defendants credit for their pretrial custody time, but otherwise affirm the judgments.

A jury found defendant Gary Lee Elrite guilty of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288.5, subd. (a)[1]-- counts 1 and 2), two counts of lewd and lascivious acts against a child of 14 or 15 years ( 288, subd. (c)(1) -- counts 3 and 6), two counts of oral copulation of a child under the age of 16 ( 288a, subd. (b)(2) -- counts 4 and 5) and one count of producing, distributing or exhibiting obscene matter ( 311.2, subd. (a) -- count 7), and found all of the special allegations true, including an allegation pursuant to section 803, subdivision (f) (hereafter section 803(f)), a delayed reporting provision which extends the applicable statute of limitations for sex crimes against minors. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 22 years eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the People failed to plead that counts 2, 3 and 4 were brought within the applicable statute of limitations, (2) the trial court improperly applied section 803(f) to counts 1, 5 and 6 based on the second (i.e., the later) of two reports by the victims, and (3) application of section 803(f) in that manner violated principles of ex post facto and due process. Court direct the trial court to make a correction to the abstract of judgment and affirm the judgment.

The juvenile court found true the allegation that the minor, Anthony F., committed robbery and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in doing so. On appeal, the minor contends the court denied his motion to dismiss on a legally incorrect ground that the force necessary for robbery need not be motivated by an intent to steal. As we explain, this contention rests on a statement by the juvenile court taken out of context. Based on the courts ruling in its entirety, we will conclude the courts denial of the minors motion to dismiss was proper and will therefore affirm the judgment.

A jury found Robert Christian Chaidez guilty of residential burglary of the Mabes' inhabited dwelling home (Pen. Code, 459, 460, count 1), receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a), count 2), residential burglary of the Tiffany Morgan/Nicholas Majersky inhabited dwelling home ( 459, 460, count 4) and unlawfully taking and driving Morgan's vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, count 5). In bifurcated proceedings,

A jury convicted Steve Domingo Parraz and Richard Garcia (Buchanan)[1]of kidnapping for extortion (Pen. Code,[2] 209, subd. (a)), assault with a semi-automatic firearm ( 245, subd. (b)) and making a criminal threat ( 422); with respect to each defendant, the jury found these crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found in the commission of the kidnapping Buchanan personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and Parraz personally used a firearm within the meaning of sections 12022.53, subdivision (b), and 12022.5, subdivision (a). The jury also convicted Buchanan of possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)), transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)), possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378) and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). Parraz and Buchanan join in each other's appellate arguments. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).)

William Holland Johnson III was charged with two counts of robbery (Pen. Code,[1] 211). The first jury trial resulted in a conviction on count 1 of the information. After a second jury trial Johnson was convicted of count 2. Johnson was sentenced to prison on count 1 on March 19, 2007. Johnson was sentenced to a consecutive term on count 2 on May 17, 2007. Johnson filed separate notices of appeal from each sentence. Court have consolidated the appeals. The consolidated appeal challenges only the conviction of count 1. As to that count, Johnson contends the court erred in its response to a jury note. Court find the court's response to the jury note to be proper and affirm the conviction.

A modification decision.

Plaintiffs Adel Somo and Muntaha Somo appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant Chevron Products U.S.A. (Chevron) as well as orders denying their requests to file a motion for leave to amend and denying their discovery motion to compel. Plaintiffs, lessors under a lease for property on which Chevron operated a gas station, sued Chevron, the lessee, for damages relating to Chevron's contamination of the property and sought a judicial declaration that Chevron did not restore the property to a "clean condition" as required by the lease. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled as a matter of lease interpretation that Chevron had no contractual duty to remediate any contamination, and also that the statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs' tort causes of action for negligence, negligence per se, and permanent nuisance.

David Gold (David), individually and as executor for his mother's estate, brought a malicious prosecution action against Sherpaul Corporation and its managing officer, Paul Dziuban. Sherpaul and Dziuban moved to dismiss the complaint under the anti SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.), The court denied the motion. Sherpaul and Dziuban appeal. Court affirm.

Kathy Krane appeals from a judgment finding an April 16, 1991 will of decedent Charles Brigham Kempff was revoked by the decedent and admitting a March 25, 1988 will to probate. Krane, the daughter of the decedent's wife, Doris Kempff, had filed a petition to admit to probate the decedent's April 16, 1991 will. On appeal, Krane contends the trial court erred by (1) using a May 1993 will of the decedent to prove his testamentary intent and (2) concluding the doctrine of dependent relative revocation revived decedent's March 1988 will. She further contends there is insufficient evidence to show decedent removed his signature or directed someone else to remove his signature from the April 1991 will. Court affirm the judgment.

Petition for writ of mandate/prohibition from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego, County, Joel M. Pressman, Jr., Judge. Petition granted.

Terry W. appeals an order terminating parental rights to his son, Julian M., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Terry contends insufficient evidence supports the court's finding Julian was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time.

After pleading guilty to possession of marijuana for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11359, defendant was granted 36 months of probation (case No. RIF120279 or the marijuana possession case). However, a new felony complaint was filed against defendant on June 1, 2005, alleging that he threatened an executive officer in violation of Penal Code section 69 and was under the influence of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a) (case No. RIF123994). As a result of these new charges, defendants probation was summarily revoked in the marijuana possession case, and he was retained in custody. While defendant was in custody at the Southwest Detention Center, he was charged on May 24, 2006, in a third caseunlawful possession of pruno[1]while in custody in violation of Penal Code section 4573.8 (case No. SWF016524 or the pruno case). It was also alleged defendant had one prior conviction for domestic violence within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The pruno case was tried to a jury beginning March 7, 2007. On March 9, 2007, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court also found defendant violated his probation in the marijuana possession case. The court sentenced defendant to two years in state prison in the marijuana possession case. In the pruno case, the court imposed eight months, plus a consecutive term of one year as a result of the prison prior, for a total of one year eight months in state prison, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in the marijuana possession case.