CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Wanda G. Cleveland (defendant) pleaded guilty to 11 charged counts of insurance fraud by knowingly preparing a writing with the intent to present the writing in support of a fraudulent claim (Pen. Code, 550, subd. (a)(5)[1]), one count of insurance fraud by presenting a false or fraudulent claim ( 550, subd. (a)(1)), grand theft ( 487, subd. (a)), and willfully filing a false tax return (Rev. & Tax Code, 19706).[2] As to the insurance fraud by presenting a false or fraudulent claim and grand theft counts, defendant admitted taking a total amount of money of a value exceeding $150,000. ( 12022.6, subd. (a)(2).) As to the insurance fraud by presenting a false or fraudulent claim count, the grand theft count, and three of the insurance fraud by preparing a writing counts, defendant admitted taking a total amount of money of a value between $100,000 and $500,000 within the meaning of section 186.11, subdivision (a)(3). The trial court placed defendant on probation subject to various terms and conditions, including the condition that she pay restitution to one of the victims in the amount of $152,000, and to the Franchise Tax Board in the amount of $22,436.05.
The trial court also granted the prosecutions motion for a preliminary injunction concerning, as relevant here, certain real property to be used for restitution. In granting the motion, the trial court found that defendants and Clevelands residence at 10418 Gridley Road in Santa Fe Springs California (Gridley Road property) is a community property asset and ordered the Gridley Road property be forfeited by defendant and Cleveland and sold by the People to satisfy the restitution obligations of defendant and Cleveland. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the preliminary injunction and in finding that the transfer of the Gridley Road property by Cleveland to defendant was a fraudulent conveyance so that the property was community property. Court affirm.

Defendant Richard Miranda Alva appeals from a judgment entered following his conviction by a jury trial of two counts of residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459).[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant had suffered two prior convictions of a serious felony ( 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served six separate prison terms for a felony ( 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendants motion to dismiss one of his prior strike allegations (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)) was denied. He was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 30 years to life: (1) a term of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law on the first count of residential burglary enhanced by a five-year term for a prior serious felony conviction, and (2) a concurrent term of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law on the second count of residential burglary enhanced by a five-year term for a prior serious felony conviction. The court dismissed the remaining six prior prison term enhancements.

Douglas Gerst, a Los Angeles police officer, was suspended for 10 days after a Board of Rights found him guilty of firing a firearm in violation of the Departments shooting policy and utilizing deficient tactics while on duty which led to an officer involved shooting. Gerst petitioned for a peremptory writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5,[1]which the trial court granted, ordering the City of Los Angeles and its Chief of Police (together, the City) to set aside the suspension. The City appeals, contending the trial court (1) applied the wrong standard in determining whether the weight of the evidence supported the Board of Rights findings, and (2) abused its discretion in finding that the weight of the evidence did not support the Board of Rights decision. Court conclude the trial court was correct and affirm the judgment.

T.J., the mother of 22-month-old S.J., appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The sole issue is whether the judgment should be reversed because the juvenile court violated state law interpreting the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) by failing to inquire about the American Indian ancestry of T.J. and Cornell P., S.J.s alleged father. Because T.J. never affirmatively states that she may have Indian ancestry, any defect in the juvenile courts inquiry was harmless. Court affirm.

Appellant Re. V., Sr. (father) appeals from the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders as to his infant son, R.V., Jr. (R.). He contends there is insufficient evidence to support that courts findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Court conclude otherwise, and affirm.

In this case, defendant Carlos Humberto Melendez[1]filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis to vacate his conviction of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a))[2]on grounds of mistake of fact and ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant argued his attorneys affirmatively misadvised him there would be no adverse immigration consequences of his negotiated plea. Crimes of domestic violence, misdemeanors as well as felonies, constitute offenses of moral turpitude under federal immigration law, triggering deportation or removal. (See 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).) The trial court denied defendants petition and his subsequent motion to reconsider the petition. On appeal, defendant contends he was entitled to coram nobis relief. Because the petition fails to state a prima facie case, Court dismiss the appeal.

Beth M. appeals from an order denying her motion for monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 against the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Court affirm the order.

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, appellant Jesus Felix Sotelo pled no contest to possession for sale of a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351. Sotelo appeals the denial of his motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m), claiming that an illegal patdown search rendered invalid his subsequent written consent to search his truck. Court affirm.

Jerry Lee Ponce appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of nolo contendere to the infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)), making criminal threats ( 422), and his admissions that he previously had suffered a conviction for a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had previously suffered a serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced Ponce to 12 years, 4 months in prison. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joe Michael Perea appeals from the judgment entered following his negotiated plea of no contest to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (a)) and admission of personally using a firearm in committing the offense ( 12022.5, subd. (a)). Prior to sentencing, defendant unsuccessfully sought to have his plea withdrawn. Court dismiss the appeal.

G.O. (mother) appeals an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights over her children, Carolina S., Peter R. and Cruz R.[1](collectively, the children) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[2] Mother argues that she was denied her constitutional right to due process because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), due to mothers mental illness, improperly deprived her of her court-ordered visitation rights, after the juvenile court had terminated reunification services. Mother contends she was thus deprived of a meaningful opportunity to establish the statutory exception to termination of parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) (the parental-relationship exception). The record does not support mothers contention. Court therefore affirm.

Joey Randy Holloway appeals a judgment after conviction by jury of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving under the influence with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more, with admissions that he suffered a prior strike conviction and served a prior prison. (Veh. Code, 23152, subds. (a) & (b), 23550; Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667.5, subd. (b).)We appointed counsel to represent him in this appeal. After counsel's examination of the record, she filed an opening brief raising no issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
On July 14, 2008, we advised Holloway that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished to raise on appeal. Court have received a response from him contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not seek a bail reduction or release; did not file a written motion requesting the trial court to strike the prior strike allegation; did not convey a plea offer from the prosecutor; and did not allow him to testify. Pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124, Court present a factual and procedural summary of the case, and a brief discussion of Holloway's contentions.

In this latest appeal, Marilyn T., mother of the minors, appeals from orders setting a review hearing for a contested hearing and briefly excluding her from the courtroom. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to this code].) Appellant argues the juvenile court failed to control the proceedings by continuing the case instead of considering her evidence on both jurisdiction and the minors current condition and welfare.

Robert and M. Alicia Robinson filed a complaint against their former attorney, Louis Goebel, alleging Goebel was wrongfully attempting to collect on a judgment against them, and seeking damages and declaratory relief. Goebel moved to strike the complaint under the anti SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.) The court ruled the complaint was not governed by the anti-SLAPP statute, and thus denied the motion.
Court conclude Goebel met his burden to demonstrate the Robinsons' claims arise from protected activity, and the Robinsons failed to meet their burden to show they had a probability of prevailing on those claims. Accordingly, Court reverse the order. We direct the court to vacate the order denying Goebel's anti SLAPP motion and issue an order granting the motion and dismissing the Robinsons' complaint.