CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Damon Brown appeals from a judgment revoking his probation and sentencing him to three years in prison. His appointed counsel on appeal has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, requesting the court to make an independent review of the record. After being advised of his right to do so, defendant has filed no supplemental brief. Having conducted an independent review of the record, we find no issue of colorable merit and shall affirm.

This appeal arises out of the termination of a franchise agreement. Appellants Jay Bharat Developers, Inc. (Jay Bharat), Jay Bharat Resorts, Inc., Bipin Morari (Morari), and Chandrakant Patel (Patel), the franchisees, challenge a trial court order granting the motion for a preliminary injunction of respondents Jim Minidis (Jim), Lynn Minidis (Lynn),[1]Red Brick Pizza Worldwide, Inc. (Red Brick Pizza), and Red Brick Pizza, Inc., the franchisors. They essentially assign three errors to the trial courts order. First, appellants contend that the trial court erroneously followed Burger King Corp. v. Hall (S.D.Fla. 1991) 770 F.Supp. 633 (Burger King) and refused to consider appellants alleged evidence of fraud in evaluating the merits of respondents request for an injunction. They claim that the trial court should have found that respondents termination of the franchise agreement was proper before granting their request for a preliminary injunction. Second, appellants argue that respondents unclean hands precluded the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Third, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.8,[2]appellants assert that the trial court should never have entertained respondents motion given that the litigation had been ordered into arbitration before respondents sought injunctive relief. Court are not convinced by appellants arguments. Accordingly, Court affirm.

George Kao sued attorney Wayne Dryden for legal malpractice. The case was tried to the trial court which entered judgment in favor of Dryden. Court affirm.

The current lawsuit concerns the alleged theft of documents from respondent Fred DiBernardos law office. Court hold that such conduct does not constitute protected speech or petitioning under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, also known as the anti SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statute. Court affirm the trial courts order denying appellants anti SLAPP motions.

Stanley Viltz brought this action against the Compton Community College District (the College) alleging she suffered employment discrimination because of her race and age and that the College retaliated against her because she complained to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). The trial court granted the Colleges motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment in its favor. Court affirm.

Krista G. appeals from a trial court order denying her a hearing on her Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights, in the dependency proceedings concerning her children Jessie, Rex, and Scott. Court affirm.

The juvenile court erred when it returned Z.B. to the custody of his parents, without retaining jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition is granted in part and denied in part. The temporary stay order is hereby vacated.

An information charged defendant Conway Joseph Phillips with five offenses arising from an attack on a single victim. The jury convicted him of misdemeanor sexual battery (Pen. Code, 243.4, subd. (d)(1); unspecified section references that follow are to the Penal Code), felony false imprisonment ( 236), and assault with a deadly weapon ( 245, subd. (a)(1)) and found a charged weapons enhancement to be true ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)), but was unable to reach a verdict on two charges of sexual assault. ( 220.) The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of three years eight months. On appeal, defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence of uncharged sex offenses and the constitutionality of a related jury instruction. He also asserts that presentence credits were improperly calculated. None of these contentions has merit, and Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Timothy Marvin Santos, whose motion to suppress the traveling methamphetamine lab found in his truck was denied, contends the police did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop him for driving with a cracked windshield because the crack did not obstruct his vision. He complains the prosecution violated its duty to preserve evidence when the truck operator sold the truck (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413] (Trombetta)), and the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to hold a second suppression hearing after the truck and its new owner were found about three years later. The windshield remained cracked but the cracks had grown. Defendant also complains of the courts failure to give a unanimity instruction.
In his 85-page opening brief, defendant has thoroughly explored every possible legal issue involving the cracked windshield. But even if we were to accept his arguments that the police officer exaggerated the number and size of the cracks, that the prosecutor sold the truck in bad faith, and that the tow truck driver and the new truck owner truthfully represented that the crack did not obstruct the drivers vision, the dispositive fact remains that the cracked windshield was observable by the three percipient witnesses. That fact alone gave the officer a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant to investigate whether the crack obstructed his vision. And that fact alone moots his Trombetta claim as well as his challenge to the denial of his second suppression motion. Court also reject defendants instructional challenge and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Derrick Dewayne Jones appeals his conviction for robbery (Pen. Code, 211; further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code) and the true findings regarding his prior convictions. ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1192.7, subd. (c), & 667.5, subd. (b).) He contends the trial court prejudicially erred in rejecting the jurys request for a readback of defense counsels closing argument and that such a rejection infringed on defendants right to counsel. These points are not well taken and Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Rodney J. Laver pled guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)), misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11550, subd. (a)) and resisting arrest (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1)), and admitted two prior convictions (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) in exchange for dismissal of other pending charges and a three-year sentencing lid. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on four years formal probation pursuant to specified terms and conditions. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, Court find no arguable error in favor of defendant.

Randlett T. Lawrence (plaintiff) sued Lantz E. Arnell for personal injury. The trial court issued terminating sanctions against Arnell. Following a prove-up hearing held on May 15, 2007, a default judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff on December 4, 2007.[1] Arnell contends: (1) Plaintiff did not file a statement of damages as required by Code of Civil Procedure, 425.11, subd. (c).[2] (2) Arnell "did not beat [plaintiff] or harm him in any way." (3) "[Plaintiff] brought this action in bad faith violating both state and federal constitutional provisions" because plaintiff entered Arnell's driveway in violation of Arnell's privacy. (4) "This is a case involving a conspiracy to disrupt commerce by violence, extortion and attempted murder." (5) The trial court abused its discretion because the default judgment "was obtained because [Arnell] could not give documents that were not in his possession or control;" and "there was no attempt to resolve the financial disclosure issues or to court or to find less invasive ways to get the same information." (6) "Examples [of] extrinsic fraud in this case involve [Arnell's] attorneys [sic] failure to represent their client allowing [sic] terminating sanctions they could easily have prevented, and false statements made under oath by [plaintiff] during the prove[-]up after terminating sanctions." (7) The trial court committed intrinsic fraud by refusing to hear Arnell's motion for reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment. Court affirm.

Following a bench trial, the court convicted Brandon Butcher of residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459[1]) and petty theft with a prior ( 484, 666). The court sentenced Butcher to prison for two years for the burglary. The court also sentenced Butcher to 16 months for the petty theft, but stayed that sentence under section 654.
Butcher's sole issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports a finding he had the intent to steal or commit a felony upon entering the apartment. Court affirm the judgment.

David Van Tran entered a negotiated guilty plea to attempted murder (Pen. Code, 664/187, subd. (a) (statutory references are to the Penal Code)) and admitted he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Tran also admitted that in the commission of the offense at least one principal was armed with a firearm ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Under the plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to dismiss other charges, and the parties agreed to a sentencing range of 16 years to 20 years in prison.The trial court sentenced Tran to 18 years in prison: the midterm of seven years on the attempted murder count; a 10 year gang enhancement and one year for firearm enhancement.
The judgment is affirmed.