CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Fairmont Specialty Group (Fairmont) appeals from a judgment forfeiting a bail bond. Fairmont challenges the trial courts denial of its motion to vacate the forfeiture. It claims that the court lacked jurisdiction to forfeit the bond in the first place. Fairmont also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Fairmonts motion for a second extension of the period before the forfeiture would become final. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate as there was no lack of jurisdiction to forfeit the bond. On the other hand, the court failed to properly exercise its discretion in ruling on Fairmonts motion to extend, and we remand for the court to properly exercise its discretion to determine whether Fairmont made an adequate showing of good cause.

Defendant Michael Brandon Bolick pleaded no contest to driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or more and causing bodily injury to another (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b)), and he admitted that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)) in the commission of this offense. The court initially imposed a five-year prison term, suspended execution of that sentence, and placed defendant on probation for five years with conditions that defendant serve a year in jail and abstain from consuming alcohol. Less than three months after completing his jail term, defendant was arrested for violating his probation by drinking alcohol. He admitted violating his probation, and the court revoked his probation and ordered execution of the suspended prison term. On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in revoking rather than reinstating probation, and he claims that his trial counsel was prejudicially deficient. We find no abuse of discretion and conclude that defendant has failed to establish that his trial counsel was deficient. Court affirm the courts order revoking defendants probation.

E. S. seeks writ relief (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile courts order terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider selection and implementation of a permanent plan for her daughter B. S. (born 2007). Court deny the petition.

Scott F. appeals the findings and orders entered at a nonstatutory hearing at which the juvenile court ordered the children placed with their mother. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) Court therefore deny his requests to review the record for error and to address his Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
The appeal is dismissed.

Juan G. appeals the findings and orders entered at the permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) Court therefore deny his requests to review the record for error and to address his Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.) The appeal is dismissed.

This is a joint appeal by Hawarden Development Company (hereafter Hawarden), and the County of San Bernardino (hereafter County), from the trial courts finding on a petition for writ of administrative mandamus filed by various environmental organizations, including the Center for Biological Diversity[1](hereafter plaintiffs), that substantial evidence does not support Countys finding in approving Hawardens proposed development, Blue Ridge at Lake Arrowhead, that the project is consistent with Countys General Plan (General Plan). The specific General Plan provision at issue states, Complete Cumberland Road from Cedar Glen to State Highway 18 near Santas Village as a condition of development of the adjacent area, and is set out in section III-39, entitled Lake Arrowhead Policies/Actions, Man-made Resources, Transportation/Circulation, of the General Plan, adopted July 1, 1989, and revised April 12, 1993.
The judgment is affirmed with respect to the appeal by County and Hawarden from the trial courts order granting the petition for writ of mandate. The judgment issuing the writ of mandate is modified to require County to prepare an EIR that complies with CEQA in addressing the issues of water supply for the Blue Ridge project and the impact on the Southern Rubber Boa. Plaintiffs to recover their costs on appeal.

Williams filed a personal injury lawsuit against the modular classroom manufacturer and general contractor, Aurora Modular Industries (Aurora), and the installer, 4 M, for negligence and products liability. The School District filed a subrogation action against these same defendants. The trial court consolidated Williamss and the School Districts two actions. Court conclude a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether any defects in the installation of the downspout were patent. Therefore the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the completed and accepted rule and the judgment is reversed. Plaintiffs due process challenge is thus moot.

Plaintiffs Alex Kodnegah (Kodnegah) and Royal Homes (Royal) (collectively Plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants Prestige Developers, Inc. (PDI) and Arthur J. Fleming (A. Fleming) without leave to amend. Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred when it determined that the fifth amended complaint failed to state a cause of action under any theory. Court find that we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because it was not timely filed. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

Defendant California Valley Associates (CVA) is the landlord of commercial real property, a Del Taco restaurant, leased by plaintiffs Robert Armstrong and Kolleen Armstrong (Armstrong). Armstrongs first amended complaint was for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The issue on appeal involves who is responsible for maintaining and repairing the restaurants kitchen septic system, which serves the leased premises.
After a court trial, the court issued a statement of decision and judgment, finding that CVA, as landlord, was responsible for repairing and replacing the kitchen septic system. Because the lease expressly and unambiguously makes the tenant responsible for the septic system, Court reverse the judgment.

An amended complaint was filed against Baker, Cuevas, and nine other defendants, alleging 22 counts. Baker was charged with residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459, count 2), unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a), count 3), receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d, subd. (a), count 4), receiving stolen property (Pen. Code 496, subd. (a), counts 5 & 7), arson (Pen. Code, 451, count 8) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1), count 21.) Cuevas was charged with receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a), count 9), residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459, count 12), transportation of steroids (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a), count 20), and grand theft of a firearm (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (d)(2), count 22.) It was further alleged as to each count that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (b).)
On that same date, defendant Cuevas waived his right to a preliminary hearing, pled guilty to counts 9, 12, 20, and 22, admitted the gang enhancement as to count 12, and waived his appeal rights, in return for a stipulated state prison sentence of six years four months. The parties stipulated that a factual basis for the plea was established by the sealed search warrant affidavit relied upon for Bakers plea. On April 16, 2007, he was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. He filed a notice of appeal but did not request a certificate of probable cause.

In December 2003, John F. Firestone, a landowner, directed his attorney to write a letter to the Temecula City Council, opposing the adoption of a multi-species habitat conservation plan (the habitat plan) affecting his real property. That letter prompted Ocean Atlantic Development,[1]a developer, to file a civil suit against Firestone [the OAD lawsuit]. After the OAD lawsuit was removed to bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court eventually granted Firestones special motion to strike the OAD lawsuit. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.) Firestone then filed a state malicious prosecution action [the Firestone lawsuit], the subject of the present appeal. Because Court decide there was probable cause on the part of the attorney defendants to bring the OAD lawsuit and, therefore, no prima facie case for malicious prosecution against them, we do not need to decide many of the other issues raised on appeal. Court affirm the superior courts order granting the attorney defendants anti SLAPP motions.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment awarding attorneys fees to real party in interest, Rachael van Haaster (Rachael), under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), the anti SLAPP statute. In a previous appeal (E039855), this court held that Rachael was the prevailing party in anti-SLAPP proceedings against plaintiffs and remanded for the trial court to make a determination as to attorneys fees to be awarded to Rachael. The trial court awarded Rachael fees of $114,010, plus an additional $2,200 for the fee motion. Plaintiffs challenge that award on the grounds that Rachael was not truly the prevailing party and the attorneys fees were not properly documented. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Monty Lyle Gill, defendant, was placed on formal probation following a conviction for vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (c)(1)), 10 years after a motor vehicle collision which left the victim in a persistent vegetative state. The accident, arising from a high speed race between defendant and a third party, occurred in 1996.
Defendant claims the prosecution and conviction were barred because a 1997 amendment to Penal Code section 194, which went into effect after the collision but before the victim died, changed an element (causation) of the crime of homicide for which prosecution was barred. Court disagree and affirm.

In a felony complaint, the San Bernardino County District Attorney charged defendant and appellant Deorsi James Larrea with (1) possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm under Health and Safety Code section 11370.1, subdivision (a) (count 1); (2) possession of methamphetamine for sale under Health and Safety Code section 11378 (count 2); and (3) unlawful possession of a firearm under Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1). The district attorney also alleged that defendant had previously suffered two prior convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c), and Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Thereafter, the district attorney filed an information with the same charges and allegations as contained in the complaint. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defendants motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, Court shall affirm the judgment.