CA Unpub Decisions

San Marcos Enterprises, Inc. (San Marcos) is a commercial tenant in a shopping center owned by Young Joo Park. After the parties became involved in lease disputes, San Marcos filed a complaint against Park, and then Park filed a cross-complaint against San Marcos. Each party sought damages and declaratory/injunctive relief for alleged breaches of the lease agreement. A jury trial was held on the damages claims, and a court trial was held on the declaratory/injunctive relief claims. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Luther John Espy of selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) and possessing cocaine base for sale ( 11351.5). The court sentenced Espy to prison for a total term of nine years.
Espy appeals, contending the prosecutor's statements in her closing and rebuttal arguments constitute prejudicial misconduct warranting reversal. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Edward King appeals a restraining order for protection issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). (Fam. Code, 6200 et seq.) Court affirm the order.

Ray D. Holliday (individually, Holliday) and Shirley Ruby Holliday (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment in favor of Warren Pumps LLC (Warren). They contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground the declarations of plaintiffs experts did not raise a triable issue of fact. Court affirm.

Appellant Ricky Paul Smith (Smith) was convicted of making a criminal threat. Smith represented himself at trial. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance to give him more time to obtain and utilize the services of a private investigator, and in sustaining objections to some of his questions on cross-examination of the complaining witness. Court affirm.

William John Coates (defendant) appeals his conviction of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288.5, subd. (a)), and committing a lewd act upon a 14-year-old child (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (c)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding the court also found true an allegation that defendant had a prior strike conviction. (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)(d); 667, subd. (b).) The court denied a motion to strike the prior conviction, and sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison.
Defendant contends: (1) the court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS); (2) evidence Code section 1108[1] is unconstitutional on its face and as applied: (3) the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of similar uncharged conduct, and the admission of this evidence resulted in a due process violation; (4) in violation of his federal constitutional right to due process, CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01, 2.50.1 and 2.50.2 permit the jury to find defendant guilty based upon a fact not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendants motion to strike his prior conviction; and (6) the no contact order should be modified or stricken because the victim is now 18.Court find no error, and shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Brusso Lenoir appeals from convictions for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, felony battery, and misdemeanor battery. The trial court placed him on probation for three years on the condition, among others, that he serve 365 days in the county jail. Defendants counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Court find no arguable issues and affirm.

A jury found appellant Walter Lee Cole guilty of assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury by a life prisoner (count 1 - Pen. Code,[1] 4500); felony assault (count 2 - 245, subd. (a)(1)); and possession of a deadly weapon while confined in a penal institution (count 3 - 4502, subd. (a)). A prior serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a) was found true, as well as a strike under section 667, subdivisions (d)-(e). Appellant was sentenced to nine years to life doubled to 18 to life as a second striker on count 1; three years doubled to six on count 2, then stayed pursuant to section 654; and three years doubled to six consecutive on count 3. An additional five years was imposed for appellants prior serious felony.

Defendant Joseph Anthony Rael, Jr., appeals a judgment entered upon his plea of guilty to vandalism and cultivating and selling marijuana. He contends on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution to a victims insurance company. The Attorney General concedes that restitution could not properly be ordered to the insurance company, but urges us to modify the order to require defendant to pay the restitution directly to the victim. Court order the restitution order modified to direct defendant to pay restitution directly to the victim.

Robert Chavez was involved in a fatal car crash after he attempted to evade police while drunk driving in a stolen jeep. A jury convicted Chavez of second degree murder and several other crimes. In February 2005, this court reversed the second degree murder conviction. After retrial, a jury again found Chavez guilty of second degree murder. Chavez challenges the conviction on three grounds. First, he argues that the trial court committed an instructional error by giving CALCRIM No. 520Murder with Malice Aforethoughtwithout defining a predicate unlawful act. Second, Chavez argues that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Third, Chavez contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by misstating the law and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury in his closing statement. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Larry Charles Watson of second degree robbery, felony evading a pursuing peace officer with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others, and misdemeanor resisting and delaying a peace officer in the discharge of his or her duty. The trial court subsequently found that Watson had been convicted of three prior strikes (two of which also qualified as prior serious felony convictions), and sentenced Watson to state prison for a total term of 61 years to life. Court affirm.

During a birthday party for defendant at the home he shared with his mother, a fight broke out. Someone introduced a shotgun into the mix and in a struggle for possession of that weapon it accidentally fired, fatally wounding defendants mother. At defendants trial for second degree murder, witnesses gave evidence that was internally inconsistent, inconsistent with their prior statements to police, and inconsistent with one another. Relying on evidence that it was defendant who retrieved the shotgun from the house after a fistfight with one of the party guests, the prosecutors theory of the case was that the natural and probable consequences of defendants act of getting the gun was dangerous to life and therefore supported a finding of implied malice second degree murder. The jury was persuaded and convicted defendant as charged. Granting defendants Penal Code section 1181, subdivision (6) motion, the trial court reduced the verdict to the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence of implied malice. On appeal, the People contend that the trial court erred in finding the evidence insufficient. Defendant also appealed from the judgment, but his counsel filed an opening brief, which did not raise any arguable issues and requested independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). After review of the record, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in reducing the conviction to involuntary manslaughter, and that no other errors affected defendants conviction. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Following his arrest for a parole violation, Terry Latham was transported to the police station. Officers found cocaine in the patrol car where Latham had been sitting. Latham was charged by information with possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)). It was specially alleged Latham had suffered one prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served one prior prison term for a felony (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant Paul Theiedus Williams of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211; undesignated section references are to this code). Sentenced to state prison, defendant appeals, contending the trial court (1) erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence ( 1538.5), and (2) erroneously instructed the jury in the language of CALCRIM Nos. 376 and 1600. Court reject defendants arguments and affirm the judgment.