CA Unpub Decisions

The juvenile dependency court entered orders terminating mothers parental rights. Mothers sole argument on appeal is that the dependency courts orders were entered in the absence of strict compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) concedes there were ICWA errors. Court conditionally vacate the dependency courts orders, and remand the cause with directions to assure compliance with the ICWA.

Jeffrey David Ingles appeals from the judgment (order of commitment) entered after the trial court found that he was a mentally disordered offender. (MDO; Pen. Code, 2962 et seq.) The trial court committed appellant to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment as a condition of his parole. ( 2966, subd. (b).)
The judgment (order of commitment) is affirmed.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant Grant Albert Wolfenden, III, of assault with a deadly weapona beer bottlebased on an altercation at an Indian casino on April 22, 2006. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court sentenced him to prison for the upper term of four years and defendant timely filed this appeal. Court shall modify and affirm.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea, Rose F. (the minor) admitted she committed felony grand theft, and the juvenile court dismissed a burglary allegation. She was placed on probation but, after multiple probation violations involving theft and possession of alcohol and the use of marijuana and other drugs, the court committed the minor to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (now the Division of Juvenile Facilities) for a term or period of commitment not to exceed two years.
Court shall direct the juvenile court to correct its error in calculating the minors precommitment credit and to further correct the commitment order to reflect a maximum period of confinement of two years, not two years and one day. In all other respects, Court shall affirm the order.

A jury found defendant Jawan Warrack guilty of failing to properly register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, 290; further section references are to the Penal Code). Finding that defendant had a prior serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law, the court sentenced him to state prison for a term of four years (double the middle term of two years).
On appeal, defendant contends that, although his attorney made an unsuccessful Romero motion (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (hereafter (Romero)) prior to trial, the attorneys failure to renew the Romero motion when presented with the opportunity to do so after trial resulted in prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel. Court disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jodie Lynn Talk drove a van head on into a car parked in front of a gas pump. One of the victims, Dana Wingo, related there was considerable animosity between her and defendant due to defendants jealousy over her boyfriend. Wingos boyfriend was getting ready to pump gas when defendants van struck the car.
Defendant pleaded no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to a middle term of three years, imposed various fines and fees, and awarded 85 days credit (57 days local time and 28 days conduct). The judgment is affirmed.

On December 8, 2006, gang enforcement officers observed defendant Christopher T. Elliot driving a car at a high rate of speed. After defendant failed to make a complete stop at a stop sign, the officers activated their lights and sirens. Defendants car fled at a high rate of speed with the officers in pursuit until his car struck a fence. Defendants car continued to flee but slowed to approximately 10 miles per hour. Defendant jumped out of the moving vehicle and fled on foot. The vehicle hit a cement wall and came to a stop. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no other arguable error in favor of defendant.

Driving at an unsafe speed and with a blood-alcohol level of 0.16, defendant Willie Vernon made an unsafe turn on a freeway off-ramp which resulted in a crash that killed one passenger and seriously injured two others. Defendant pleaded no contest to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code 191.5, subd. (a); further undesignated references are to this code), and admitted that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on two victims ( 12022.7, subd. (a)) and had a prior strike conviction ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)) in exchange for dismissal of all remaining counts and allegations, dismissal of two unrelated pending cases pursuant to a Harvey[1]waiver, and a sentencing lid of 18 years in state prison. The judgment is affirmed.

Pedro D. appeals a judgment terminating his parental rights to Destiny D. on the basis of abandonment. (Fam. Code, 7822.) Pedro contends the evidence was insufficient to show that he voluntarily left the child with her mother, Regina V., or that he intended to abandon her. Pedro also contends the juvenile court improperly considered the child's best interests.

Seven-year-old A.T. and her mother, S.V., appeal an order dismissing a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.[1] The mother contends that the court applied an incorrect legal standard to determine the truth of allegations that A.T.s father (M.T.) abused her sexually ( 300, subd. (d)), and that substantial evidence does not support the courts decision. A.T. contends that the court applied an erroneous legal standard to determine the truth of the allegation that A.T. has suffered serious emotional damage and that it erred in failing to apply an available legal theory to exercise jurisdiction based on that allegation. ( 300, subd. (c).) Court conclude that the court did not err with respect to either allegation, and Court affirm the order of dismissal.

Appellants A.P. and C.H. (the children) were named in a juvenile dependency petition alleging that their older sister, M.H., was sexually molested by the father of M.H. and C.H. (father).[1] At a jurisdictional hearing, all parties with the exception of the children, i.e., the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), father, the childrens mother (mother), and M.H., purportedly agreed that the petition would be dismissed and the social worker would instead undertake a program of supervision. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[2] 301.) The juvenile court approved the arrangement on the record, after which it directed the deputy county counsel to prepare an appropriate agreement for the parties signature, and an order for the courts signature. Neither the order nor the agreement appears in the record, and presumably were never documented.

A jury found appellant and defendant Perry Lamar Sterling guilty of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, [1] 11379, subd. (a), count 1), and possession of methamphetamine for sale ( 11378, count 2). Defendant admitted the enhancement allegations that he had previously suffered two narcotics-related convictions within the meaning of section 11370.2, subdivision (a) and had served four prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to a total term of 11 years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that 1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for possession of methamphetamine for sale in count 2, and 2) the court committed prejudicial error regarding the late disclosure of a prosecution expert witness. Court affirm.

Appellant and defendant Charles Richard Hampton was charged with inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse (Pen. Code,[1] 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), dissuading a witness ( 136.1, subd. (a)(2); count 2), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), false imprisonment ( 236; count 4), and resisting a police officer ( 148, subd. (a)(1); count 5). A jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of spousal battery ( 243, subd. (e)(1)) in count 1, the lesser included offense of simple assault ( 240) in count 3, and resisting a police officer ( 148, subd. (a)(1)) in count 5. The trial court dismissed count 2, and the jury found him not guilty of count 4. The court granted defendant probation for a period of 48 months. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the retreat provision of the self defense instruction (CALCRIM 3470). Court affirm.