CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Michael M. Caminero (Caminero) filed a malicious prosecution complaint against respondent Jenny Chung (Chung) and others. The trial court granted Chungs motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16)[1]and awarded her attorney fees as a prevailing party ( 425.16, subd. (c)). Caminero appeals. He contends that he established a probability of prevailing on the favorable termination element of his malicious prosecution claim and, as a result, the trial court erred in granting Chungs motion. He also challenges the courts award of attorney fees to Chung as the prevailing party. Court reverse. Court conclude the trial court erred in granting the motion to strike because Caminero demonstrated a probability of prevailing. In light of our conclusion, Chung is not a prevailing party under section 425.16, subdivision (c) and is not entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to that statute.

In this action defendant and appellant Lamar Anton Perryman was charged with inflicting corporal injury resulting in traumatic condition (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)

) and an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence ( 12022.7, subd. (e)). He entered a plea of no contest to both allegations. He was sentenced to a state prison sentence of 15 years, the trial court selecting the upper term of five years for the principal crime, doubling it due to a prior strike and increasing it by the upper term of five years for the great bodily injury enhancement. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and was granted a certificate of probable cause.
Counsel for defendant filed an opening brief in which he raised no issues and asked this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel represents that defendant has been apprised of his right to file a supplemental brief. Defendant has not filed a brief. We have conducted the review requested by counsel and have identified certain possible issues for which we have asked counsel for both sides to file briefing. They have done so and we have reviewed those issues and found that the trial court acted within its allowed discretion. Court affirm.

A jury convicted Ramiro Araiza Chavez of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, committing assault likely to cause great bodily injury, and making criminal threats. The victim, who testified at trial, was Chavezs girlfriend and the mother of his young child. Chavez appeals, claiming due process violations and ineffective assistance of counsel. He also argues that he should have been granted a new trial because his girlfriend recanted her trial testimony. Court affirm.

Elias Atallah brought an action against Equilon Enterprises LLC, dba Shell Oil Products, U.S. (Equilon), and others who are not parties to this appeal.[1] Atallahs claim for intentional misrepresentation was tried to a jury that returned a verdict for $1.7 million in favor of Atallah. Although the jury found that Equilon had acted toward Atallah with oppression, malice or fraud, the trial court found that there was no evidence of Equilons net worth and therefore refused to allow the jury to consider the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. The trial court denied Equilons motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and also denied Atallahs motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.
Equilon appeals from the judgment, principally on the ground that the evidence does not support the verdict. Court find no merit in any of Equilons contentions. Atallah also appeals from the judgment to the extent that it operated to deny Atallahs claim for punitive damages. Court find that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment and remand with directions to conduct proceedings to determine the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded. Following such proceedings, Court direct the entry of a judgment that is consistent with the jurys verdict, the views expressed in this opinion and the additional proceedings mandated by our order.

Plaintiff and appellant Donald Ray Myles II appeals from a judgment the trial court entered in favor of defendants and respondents the County of Los Angeles (County), the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department (Sheriffs Department) and Los Angeles County Sheriffs Deputies Paul Schuerger (Deputy Schuerger) and Armando Orellana (Deputy Orellana) (sometimes collectively defendants) after granting their motion for nonsuit. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him a continuance before trial. He also contends that the trial erred in granting the nonsuit because he presented substantial evidence supporting the imposition of liability against the County and that he should have been permitted to reopen his case to cure any evidentiary deficiencies.
Court affirm. Appellant has failed to provide an adequate record to meet his burden to show any abuse of discretion in denying his continuance request. Moreover, his failure to present any evidence identifying the sheriffs deputies who allegedly shot him was fatal to his claims against the County and the individuals. Finally, appellants stipulating to the trial courts hearing the motion for nonsuit on the basis of the evidence he presented precludes him from contending that he should have been permitted to offer additional evidence.

Appellant Gilbert Cole appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of count 1, first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459) and count 2, second degree robbery ( 211). Appellant admitted that he had suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). Appellant was sentenced to state prison for two consecutive terms of 25 years to life plus a consecutive five year term pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Court affirm.

Defendant Antonio Marshall was charged with possessing cocaine base and marijuana, both for the purpose of sale. The jury, however, convicted him of the lesser offenses of simple possession of cocaine base (Health. & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and possession of not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana (Health. & Saf. Code, 11357, subd. (b)), a misdemeanor. Defendant waived the right to a jury trial on the recidivist allegations and admitted suffering a prior conviction under the three strikes law for residential burglary (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) for residential burglary and receiving stolen property. The trial court granted defendants Romero[1] motion as to the strike and dismissed one of the prior prison term enhancements in the interest of justice. It imposed a four year prison term consisting of the upper term of three years for the cocaine possession offense, plus the one year prison term enhancement. A suspended fine was imposed for the misdemeanor offense.
Court modify the judgment to reflect the additional mandatory fees that must be imposed, but affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Appellant William S. Trisler worked for respondent Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) for 65 days before his employment was terminated. He sued MTA for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate and retaliatory discrimination. After his retaliation claim was dismissed, the balance of the case was tried to a jury, which found in favor of MTA. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred by (1) dismissing his retaliation claim, (2) denying his motion for new trial, (3) denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and (4) awarding attorney fees to MTA. Court disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted Jurray Willie Casey (appellant) of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a))[1](count 1) and shooting at an occupied vehicle ( 246) (count 2). As to each count, the jury found the gang allegation to be not true. The jury found with respect to both counts that a principal personally used and discharged a firearm and caused death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1). The judgment is modified to strike the sentence enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) in counts 1 and 2. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Ashley Ayres appeals from a judgment entered after the court granted summary judgment. Ayres, who was injured while snowboarding at Mountain High Resort (Mountain High), sued Mountain High Holdings, LLC (the owner and operator of Mountain High) for her injuries. In granting summary judgment in favor of Mountain High Holdings, the court found Ayress claims were precluded under the primary assumption of the risk doctrine. In part, Ayres contends the primary assumption of risk doctrine does not apply. Court affirm.

Mario Alonzo Meza appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial resulting in his convictions of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Pen. Code, 269, subd. (a)(1)),[1]two counts of forcible rape ( 261, subd. (a)(2)), two counts of forcible oral copulation ( 288a, subd. (c)(2)), forcible sodomy ( 286, subd. (c)(2)), and continuous sexual abuse of a child ( 288.5, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to an aggregate term in state prison of 72 years to life. On appeal, he contends that: (1) his convictions were the product of improper witness intimidation; (2) there was prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment. Court affirm the judgment.

This is an unlawful detainer action. The trial court granted the landlords motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment in favor of the landlord. The tenant appeals. Court affirm.

Defendants Kevin Lee Home Collections, Inc. and Kevin Lee appeal judgment on plaintiffs claims for breach of oral contract and negligence arising out of Lees provision of wedding planning services to plaintiffs. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiffs emotional distress damages on their breach of contract claim, awarding damages in excess of the prayer of the complaint, and in failing to continue the matter on the second day of trial. Court reverse the award of emotional distress damages for breach of contract, and affirm the award of damages for breach of contract.

Randall Smith Taylor appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions by jury of first degree murder with the lying in wait special circumstance (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15), count 1)[1]and attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder ( 664, 187, subd. (a), count 2).[2] The jury found the special-circumstance allegation and the firearm allegations within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) to be true. The trial court sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole on count 1 and to a consecutive life term on count 2. To each count, it added a term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement in section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Appellant contends that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for new trial made on the ground that the jury conducted its own investigation, and (3) the evidence offered by the eyewitnesses was so unreliable that it should have been stricken from the record. Court affirm.