CA Unpub Decisions

The children, L.B. and C.B., were brought to the attention of respondent due to drug abuse by mother and father. Respondent filed a petition with the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 on the childrens behalf. After a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared the children to be dependents of the court, removed them from mothers custody and placed them in foster care.
The visitation order as to L.B. is reversed, and the juvenile court is directed to fashion a new visitation order as to L.B. specifying when visitation with mother is to commence and prescribing guidelines for such visitation. In all other respects the dispositional order is affirmed.

Juan Torres appeals from the judgment entered on August 4, 2008, following the trial courts finding that appellant was in violation of probation after a contested hearing. The trial court sentenced appellant to the three-year prison term that had been previously imposed and suspended. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

This is a perjury case gone awry. A jury found defendant Susan Renee Lesniewski guilty of perjury. (Pen. Code, 118, subd. (a).)[2] She was charged with making seven false statements under oath, but, as the People concede, at least two of them were true. She was given an oath that required her to swear that her testimony may be the truth, which did not require that she testify truthfully. (Italics added.) Court shall conclude that the failure of the oath to require the oath taker to testify truthfully violates the substance of the oath requirement ( 118), and not the form of its administration ( 121), and thereby compels the reversal of the judgment of conviction.

Plaintiffs Nancy Barnes and Palermo Union School District appeal from the trial courts denial of Barness petition for writ of mandate and from the courts order granting in part and denying in part Barness motion to augment the administrative record. Court shall affirm the judgment because plaintiffs have not met their obligation to furnish this court an adequate record on appeal.

J. H. and L. H., parents of the minor, appeal from orders of the juvenile court denying their petitions for modification and terminating their parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 388, 395; undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellants contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying their petitions for modification and substantial evidence did not support the juvenile courts finding that the minor was likely to be adopted. Court affirm.

After pleading guilty in 2005 to possessing methamphetamine and driving under the combined influence of drugs and alcohol, defendant Matthew Gordon Casamajor was placed on formal probation for five years. The trial court imposed numerous conditions of probation and ordered defendant to pay fees and fines, including a criminal laboratory fee of $150 ($50 fee plus a penalty assessment of $100) pursuant to Health & Safety Code section 11372.5 and a drug program fine of $450 ($150 fine plus a penalty assessment of $300) pursuant to Health & Safety Code section 11372.7. The judgment is modified.

Patricia Baldwin appeals from a "judgment on determination of child support arrearages," contending the trial court, in calculating child support payments that Jeffrey Baldwin owed her, improperly relied on (1) an inference relating to Jeffrey's past payments, and (2) a defense of laches. Jeffrey contends in a cross appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration. Court affirm.

A modification decision.

Steve Sandoval entered a negotiated guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,[1] 192, subd. (a)), and admitted he personally used a deadly weapon, to wit, a knife ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and committed the offense in association with a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (d). Sandoval also admitted he had a prior serious felony conviction ( 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a prior serious/violent felony or strike conviction ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Under the plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, including murder, and allegations. The parties stipulated to a 22-year prison term. After denying Sandoval's motion to withdraw his plea, the trial court sentenced Sandoval to 22 years―the low term of three years for the manslaughter count doubled under the "Three Strikes" law plus a 10 year gang enhancement, five years for the prior serious felony conviction and one year for the personal use of a knife allegation. The judgment is affirmed.

In 2006, Matthew and Samuel Lingo (together the Lingos) filed a lawsuit against William Davison and Elizabeth Fierro to set aside a deed that purported to convey from Davison to Fierro an interest in certain real property (the Property) to which Davison held record title. After Davison died, the lawsuit was settled by a written settlement agreement containing a clause that is at the center of the present dispute. Fierro contended the clause allowed her to be reimbursed by Davison's estate for certain payments she made related to the Property, and the Lingos contended the clause assigned those costs to Fierro without any right to reimbursement. The court agreed with Fierro, and this appeal followed. The judgment is affirmed.

The juvenile court declared 17-year-old Daniel P. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) after sustaining allegations that he committed one count of transporting more than 28.5 grams of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 11360, subd. (a)) and one count of possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359). The court committed Daniel to the Short Term Offender Program for 90 days to be followed by release to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service for deportation proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 738.

A modification decision.

In this matter we have reviewed the petition and the opposition thereto, which we conclude adequately address the issues raised by the petition. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance would cause undue delay in resolving this action. We therefore issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Code Civ. Proc., 1088; Palmav.U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-179; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223, disapproved on another groundin Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4.) The People seek a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order dismissing a recommitment petition filed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act or SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.). Court grant the mandate petition, finding that the real party in interest cannot now claim that the extensive delays in the proceeding violated his due process rights where his and his attorneys actions are largely responsible for those delays. Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.

Appellant Jaime Humberto Garcia was charged with 29 counts of lewd and lascivious acts against minor A. (Pen. Code 288, subd. (a)),[1]and two counts of lewd and lascivious acts against minor T. ( 288, subds. (a) & (c)(1)). The offenses were alleged to have occurred between April 1996 and April 2005. A jury found Garcia guilty of 17 lewd acts against A. It acquitted him of 12 other counts alleged against A. and of both the alleged lewd acts against T. The trial court denied Garcia probation and sentenced him to 35 years in prison. On appeal, Garcia contends (1) the trial courts finding that he was statutorily ineligible for probation pursuant to section 1203.066, subdivision (d)(1), violated the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws; and (2) that his due process rights were violated (a) when the court made probation contingent on his acceptance of the guilty verdicts; (b) by the courts failure to consider California Rules of Court, rule 4.414, factors; and (c) by the courts refusal to order a revised section 288.1 report. Since we agree with Garcias claim that application of section 1203.066, subdivision (d)(1), violates the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws, we do not address his additional claims. Court vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.