CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted appellant Jesus J. Cazares of carjacking (Pen. Code, 215,[1]subd. (a); count 1), false imprisonment by violence ( 236; count 2), unlawful taking or driving of a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a); count 3) and misdemeanor battery ( 242; count 4). In a separate proceeding, the court found true allegations that appellant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a) (section 667(a)) and two strikes,[2]and had served a prison term for a prior felony conviction ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The court imposed a prison term of 31 years to life, with the determinate portion of the sentence consisting of 25 years on count 1, five years on the prior serious felony enhancement alleged in connection with count 1 and one year on the prior prison term enhancement. The court imposed concurrent terms of 25 years to life on each of counts 2 and 3, and stayed execution of sentence on count 3 pursuant to section 654.

After appellant B.G. (mother) severely injured her infant nephew, the juvenile court removed her two children from her custody. On appeal, mother contends (1) the juvenile court erred by denying her motion to strike the testimony of a child abuse expert, Dr. Fields, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the courts order to remove one of her children from her custody. Court will affirm the juvenile courts orders.

Advanced Scientific Applications, Inc. (ASA), an Internet service provider, filed a complaint for unlawful tying under the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 16700 et seq.), predatory pricing under the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17000 et seq.), and unfair competition under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq.) against Pacific Bell Telephone Company and SBC Advanced Solutions, Inc. (collectively, Pacific Bell).[1] A demurrer was sustained without leave to amend as to the predatory pricing cause of action. Summary judgment was later granted with respect to the remaining causes of action. ASA assigned all of its interests with respect to the litigation to its chief executive officer, president, and sole shareholder, Shahram Manighalam (Manighalam). Manighalam appeals. Court affirm.

Defendant Troy Rynell Martin appeals from a judgment of conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, with a prior conviction for the same crime. Defendant raises three arguments on appeal, each of which Court reject.

Appellant was convicted of molesting his 11-year-old stepdaughter F. He contends the trial court misinstructed the jury and should have declared a mistrial after the jury announced it was unable to reach a verdict. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

R.S. (father) appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating his parental rights and freeing his son R.P. for adoption. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile courts refusal to apply the continuing benefit exception to termination of parental rights to his son. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), all statutory citations to this code unless noted; see former 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) He also contends the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. [ICWA].) For the reasons expressed below, Court affirm the order.

R.C., mother of Jo. M., appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court adjudicating her son a dependent and subsequently terminating jurisdiction and changing custody to Ju. M., the father. She contends the notice of hearing did not satisfy due process requirements and the hearing was conducted by a commissioner without authorization. Court agree that the notice was inadequate; accordingly, Court reverse and remand.

Rocky Pulizzi appeals from a judgment committing him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 6600.
Pulizzi asserts the following claims on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to file an amended petition in September 2006, when the revised Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) went into effect allowing an indeterminate term, rather than a two-year commitment; (2) Pulizzi was denied effective assistance because of his counsels failure to exercise peremptory challenges as to three jurors; (3) the amended SVPA violates equal protection; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutions expert witnesses to testify because of discovery violations; (5) the court lacked jurisdiction to extend Pulizzis commitment to an indeterminate term; (6) the amended SVPA was applied retroactively in this case; (7) the amended SVPA violates due process; (8) the amended SVPA violates ex post facto and double jeopardy principles; and (9) the amended SVPA violates the First Amendment.

A jury convicted defendant Phillip Chacon of (1) four counts of aggravated sexual assault upon a child (counts 1, 2, 3, & 4) (Pen. Code, 269) and one count of lewd conduct upon a child by means of force, duress, menace, or fear (count 5) ( 288, subd. (b)) Victim I, (2) five counts of lewd conduct upon a child by means of force, etc., (counts 6, 7, 8, 9, & 10) Victim II, and (3) two counts of lewd conduct upon a child by means of force, etc., (counts 11 & 12) Victim III. The trial court sentenced defendant to 12 consecutive terms of 15 years to life (180 years).[2] On appeal, defendant contends that (1) no substantial evidence supports three of the five convictions as to Victim II and both convictions as to Victim III, (2) no substantial evidence supports the element of force, etc., as to Victim III, (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to Victim IIs testimony about sex acts that she had not disclosed at the preliminary hearing, (4) the trial court erred when instructing the jury on the principle of unanimity (CALCRIM No. 3500) as the principle affected Victims II and III, (5) the trial court erred by admitting over objection evidence of an uncharged sex offense (Evid. Code, 1108), (6) the trial court erred by instructing the jury in the language of CALCRIM No. 1191 (evidence of uncharged sex offenses), (7) the trial court erred by admitting evidence and instructing the jury (CALCRIM No. 1193) about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), (8) his consecutive sentences for counts 1 through 4 were not mandatory, (9) his sentences for three of the five convictions as to Victim II and both convictions as to Victim III violate federal and state ex post facto principles because the underlying acts were not shown to have occurred before the effective date of the applicable sentencing law, and (10) the trial court improperly imposed a $70 AIDS education fund fine and related $133 penalty assessment. The People concede defendants 9th contention to the extent of count 11 or 12 and 10th contention. Court agree that the concessions are appropriate. Court agree with defendants 1st contention (in part) and defendants 2nd contention. Court otherwise disagree with defendant. Court therefore reverse with directions.

The Santa Cruz County Sheriff, Steve Robbins (the Sherriff), demoted Sergeant George B. Jack for his conduct during an internal investigation of a female subordinates gender harassment claim against him. George appealed to the Santa Cruz County Civil Service Commission (the Commission), which reinstated Georges Sergeant rank, and reduced the penalty to a 30-day suspension. The Sheriff filed a petition for writ of mandate, and requested the superior court vacate the Commissions order. (Code of Civ. Pro., 1094.5.) The trial court denied the petition, finding the Commission did not abuse its discretion. On appeal, the Sheriff asserts we should reverse the trial courts decision, because the Commission abused its discretion in reducing Georges penalty and reinstating his Sergeant rank.

Defendant David Alvarado Garcia was convicted after jury trial of two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts upon his girlfriends daughters, A. and M., who were both under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)). The trial court found true the allegations that defendant had one prior conviction for lewd conduct ( 667.61, subds. (a) & (d)) and two prior convictions that qualified as strikes ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The court sentenced defendant to 150 years to life in prison.

Appellant/cross-complainant Eric W. Conner (Conner) appeals from the trial courts order granting Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 motions to strike filed by respondents/cross-defendants Janet Spitler (Spitler) and law firm De La Housaye & Associates (DLH). Conner also appeals from the courts attorney fees awards. Court deem the appeal of the motions to strike abandoned and affirm the order awarding fees to respondent DLH. Court dismiss the appeal as to the order awarding fees to respondent Spitler.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of rape in concert (Pen. Code, 264.1), first degree residential robbery (Pen. Code, 211, 212.5, subd. (a)), and first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460, subd. (a)). He argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by failing to give a sua sponte instruction on consideration of his oral statement with caution. Court find that the instructional error was not prejudicial to defendant, and affirm the judgment.