CA Unpub Decisions

In superior court case No. SCD204961, Ryan Michael Morrison entered negotiated guilty pleas to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459 & 460, subd. (a))[1] and arson of an inhabited dwelling ( 451, subd. (b)). Under the plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to dismiss six other felonies and five allegations that Morrison was armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The parties stipulated to an eight-year prison term. After denying Morrison's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the trial court sentenced him in accordance with the plea bargains.

Phillip C. Sanders appeals the dismissal of his action against Narcotics Anonymous World Services, Inc. (NAWS). Sanders does not challenge the trial court's finding he is a vexatious litigant, but he contends the court erred by ordering him to post security to proceed because NAWS did not meet its burden of showing there is no reasonable probability he will prevail on his breach of contract claim. (Code Civ. Proc., 391.1.) Court affirm the judgment.

Jane R.-G. appeals a judgment declaring her minor son, A.G., a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivision (a) and removing him from her custody. Jane contends the court erred by: (1) failing to consider less drastic alternatives to removal; and (2) refusing to order more than four hours of visitation per week. Court affirm the judgment.

Mother, T.D., and presumed father, James M., appeal the judgment terminating their parental rights to their daughter, Kelly M., contending the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Court affirm.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d), our Supreme Court transferred this case back to us without a decision with directions to vacate our previous decision and reconsider it in light of its decision in Peoplev. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 (Olguin). Our Supreme Court took Olguin in order to resolve a conflict in published cases from our division of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 378.) Court hereby vacate our previous opinion as directed.

Cross-defendant and appellant Juanita Roibal-Bradley (Bradley) appeals after the trial court granted a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Bradley complains that the settlement agreement was not agreed to personally by all parties, and that the enforcement motion was therefore improper. Court reverse.

In case No. RIF115888, defendant pled guilty on April 2, 2004, to spousal abuse (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a))[1]and was granted three years probation. On September 14, 2005, the court found defendant in violation of his probation for failing to report to his probation officer and failure to attend domestic violence classes. Probation was reinstated but defendant was required to spend 240 days in jail. The judgment is affirmed.

Daniel F. Carbery and Rebecca G. Carbery had been married for nine years when Daniel[1]filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. Two trials were held, the first resolving most property division issues and the second resolving the issues related to the family residence located in Los Banos, California. Daniel first attempts to revisit issues resolved in the first judgment. Court conclude the first judgment is final and reject these arguments as untimely. Daniel also complains because the value of the Los Banos residence has continued to fall since the second judgment was issued. He asks us to require the trial court to utilize an unspecified method to protect homeowners in a falling market. Court reject this argument because it was not raised in the trial court. Accordingly, Court affirm the decision of the trial court.

Appellant Susan Herron (Susan) appeals from an order denying her motion to set aside a stipulated judgment entered between her and her ex-husband, respondent Jack Lee Herron (Jack). The court wrongly found her fraud claim was time-barred. No substantial evidence showed Susan knew or should have known of Jacks alleged fraud more than one year before she filed her motion. Court reverse.

Defendants contends the court abused its discretion when it revoked and terminated his probation. He also claims prejudice because the court imposed the high term without ordering the preparation of a probation report. Court affirm.

Plaintiff Johann Keil (appellant) appeals from an order granting plaintiff Catherine Keils (respondent) motion to disqualify attorney Steven R. Haney and the law firm of Haney Buchanan & Patterson (collectively Haney) from representing appellant in the underlying legal malpractice action. Appellant also has requested we take judicial notice of a letter from the State Bar of California finding insufficient grounds for disciplinary action on a complaint filed by respondent against Steven R. Haney and another attorney with the Haney firm presumably involving their conduct in this lawsuit. Court shall grant the request for judicial notice, but affirm the disqualification order.

Chevron Products Company (Chevron) terminated Jeanne Millecam from her position as a contract analyst at Chevrons Richmond refinery as part of a reorganization and workforce reduction. Millecam appeals from a summary judgment entered on her claims of disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code,[1] 12940 et seq.), retaliation for taking medical leave under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) ( 12945.2), intentional infliction of emotional distress, termination in violation of public policy, and unlawful business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200). She contends the trial court erred in disregarding the existence of triable issues of material fact. She further contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for a further continuance of the summary judgment hearing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h). Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Dwan Anwar Phillips of the first degree murder of Mark Cotton and found true special allegations that during the commission of that offense, he had personally used a firearm, had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) and (d).) The trial court sentenced appellant to prison for 25 years to life on the murder count plus 25 years to life for the allegation that he had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death, staying the sentence on the remaining firearm allegations.
Appellant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting over a hearsay objection evidence of a telephone call the victim made to his mother shortly before the shooting. He also argues that the court should have stricken the two lesser firearm allegations rather than merely staying the sentences on them. Court affirm.

This case involves allegations by several plaintiffs of racialharassment, discrimination, retaliation and infliction of emotional distress based on racial slurs made in the workplace. Although the court resolved most of the causes of action by summary judgment or adjudication, causes of action involving two of the plaintiffs for racial harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act[1] (FEHA) and intentional infliction of emotional distress were decided in defendants favor following jury trial.
Leo Bryant (Bryant) and Ronald Amey (Amey) seek reversal of the judgment following the jury trial on their claims for racial harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Their primary claim with respect to the trial is that the court erred in excluding evidence under Evidence Code section 352 of offensive comments by their supervisor, respondent Robert Wyche (Wyche), made at other times, other locations, or about other protected groups. Bryant and Amey also contend the court erred by summarily adjudicating their causes of action for retaliation, discrimination in violation of public policy, and failure to prevent discrimination. The third plaintiff, Eric McKneely (McKneely) contends the court erred by granting summary judgment with respect to all the causes of action he alleged. Court shall affirm.