P. v. Young
Filed 3/20/09 P. v. Young CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL THEODORE YOUNG, Defendant and Appellant. | E040521 (Super.Ct.No. FSB053901) OPINION |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Roberta McPeters, Judge. Affirmed.
Anita P. Jog, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Marissa Bejarano and Christopher Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d), our Supreme Court transferred this case back to us without a decision with directions to vacate our previous decision and reconsider it in light of its decision in Peoplev. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 (Olguin). Our Supreme Court took Olguin in order to resolve a conflict in published cases from our division of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 378.) We hereby vacate our previous opinion as directed.
In this appeal, defendant Michael Theodore Young challenges the condition of his probation that he keep his probation officer informed of any pets kept at his residence and to give 24 hours written notice of any changes in pets, hereafter referred to as the pet term.
In our previous opinion, we found the pet term was overbroad and we ordered that probation term stricken without prejudice to modification of the term of probation to include a term narrowly tailored to address the concerns regarding dangerous animals when probation officers conduct home visits. In all other respects we affirmed the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE[1]
On January 11, 2006, defendant sold cocaine to an undercover officer. Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine on March 29, 2006. (Health & Saf. Code, 11377.) On May 12, 2006, pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court gave defendant a three-year suspended sentence and placed him on felony probation for three years. One of the conditions of probation was that defendant keep his probation officer informed of his place of residence, cohabitants and pets, and that he give 24 hours written notice of any changes. Defendant objected to this condition, but the trial court overruled his objection. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In Olguin, our Supreme Court considered the same pet term that we consider in this appeal. There, a different panel of this court upheld the same pet term against the same challenges presented in this appeal: (1) the condition is not related to the crime he committed nor related to future criminality;[2](2) there is a fundamental privacy and liberty right to possess a pet under the United States Constitution; and (3) the pet term is overbroad, vague, unreasonable and burdensome.
The court in Olguin addressed the same claims that are presented in this appeal. (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 378.) It affirmed and upheld the validity of the pet term. Olguin is squarely on point and dispositive of defendants claims on appeal. We are required to follow the holding in Olguin. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
/s/ McKinster
Acting P.J.
We concur:
/s/ King
J.
/s/ Miller
J.
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[1]We repeat the facts and procedure from our previous opinion.
