CA Unpub Decisions

B.S. (father) appeals from the judgment of March 25, 2010, declaring his son, A.S., a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The dependency court found the child came within the court's jurisdiction under both subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) of section 300, based on sustained allegations that the parents have a history of engaging in abusive altercations in the child's presence and on January 13, 2010, father threw and broke the child's mother's cell phone.

Tanisha M., mother of two-year-old N.M., seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends, among other things, that reasonable services were not provided. Court deny the petition for extraordinary writ.

Defendant Carlos Johnson engaged in a crime spree from October 28, 2005, to December 14, 2005. As a result, he was convicted of 30 counts of second degree robbery, four counts of attempted second degree robbery, six counts of assault with a firearm, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, one count of misdemeanor resisting arrest and one count of receiving stolen property. The jury also found defendant was personally armed with a firearm in the commission of five of the offenses and personally used a firearm in 35 of the counts. In bifurcated proceedings, the court also found defendant had three prior strike convictions. Defendant appeals his conviction for one of the counts of assault with a firearm, claiming there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction. He also claims various errors in the sentencing and the abstract of judgment. Finding there is substantial evidence to support the conviction, we affirm. As to the sentencing and abstract errors, the People properly concede and we vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.

Court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, Court find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.

In this defamation case, Sharon Kramer appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding she libeled Bruce Kelman. The jury awarded Kelman nominal damages of one dollar and the trial court awarded Kelman $7,252.65 in costs. The jury found that Kramer did not libel GlobalTox and judgment against GlobalTox was entered. The trial court awarded Kramer $2,545.28 in costs against GlobalTox.
In a prior opinion, a previous panel of this court affirmed an order denying Kramer's motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. In doing so, we largely resolved the issues Kramer now raises on appeal. In our prior opinion, we found sufficient evidence Kramer's Internet post was false and defamatory as well as sufficient evidence the post was published with constitutional malice. We also found there was sufficient evidence to defeat Kramer's claim she was protected by the fair reporting privilege provided to journalists by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d)(1). Under the doctrine of the law case, these determinations are binding on us and compel us to find there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination Kramer libeled Kelman and was not entitled to the fair reporting privilege. Court find no error in the trial court's award of costs. Accordingly, court affirm the judgment.

D.H. appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, Miranda V., under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. D.H. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. Court affirm the order.

A jury convicted defendant of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (counts 1 & 2--Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] cohabitant beating (count 3--§ 273.5, subd. (a)), criminal threats (count 4--§ 422), and false imprisonment (count 5--§ 236). The jury additionally found true allegations attached to count 3 that defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, subd. (e), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and two separate allegations that he had personally used deadly weapons (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)). In a bifurcated proceeding thereafter, the court found true allegations that defendant had four prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 110 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying his petition to disclose juror information based on his showing of purported juror misconduct. Court affirm.

Plaintiff and respondent Ioan Creanga (the contractor) filed a mechanics lien action against defendant and appellant Florin L. Deac (the property owner or the owner). The parties pursued the action via binding arbitration. The trial court confirmed an arbitration award in favor of the contractor; the property owner has now appealed, urging that the arbitration award was obtained by fraud. Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Brent V. Dahlitz appeals his termination as a correctional officer by defendant and respondent California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department). Plaintiff first sought administrative review of his termination before defendant and respondent California State Personnel Board (the SPB). Then plaintiff petitioned for a writ of administrative mandamus, but the trial court denied plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the decision to terminate his employment was an abuse of discretion. Court affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Defendant William Joseph Bowen was charged in a first amended criminal complaint with: Felony driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) with a prior felony DUI violation within ten years of the current offense (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5, subd. (a) -- count 1);[1] felony driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more with three or more separate DUI violations within 10 years of the current offense; (§§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550, subd. (a) -- count 2); misdemeanor driving on a suspended license with a prior conviction (§ 14601.2, subd. (a) -- count 3); and misdemeanor driving on a suspended license (§ 14601.5, subd. (a) -- count 4). The People also alleged defendant had suffered three prior DUI convictions, two prior convictions for driving on a suspended license, one prior strike (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subds. (d), (e)), and one prior conviction resulting in imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).

A jury found defendant Christopher David Krohe guilty of six counts of forcible child molestation (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)) and three counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated trial, the trial court found defendant had served two prior separate prison terms and had one prior serious felony conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 76 years to life.

Defendant Saba Gorjiyazdi pleaded no contest to two counts of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)).[1] The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years with various terms and conditions, including that he serve one year in county jail and that he submit to warrantless searches. Following a restitution hearing, defendant was ordered to pay $287,705.20 to Mohammad Chaudhry, and $199,142.64 to Mohammad Siddique, the husbands of the two victims.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in its restitution award and that the warrantless search condition is invalid.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the orders awarding restitution and granting probation.

Pen. Code, § 459)[1] and guilty to petty theft with specified prior convictions (§ 666) and agreed to serve a total term of eight years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that the judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts that he agreed to the eight-year prison term only because the People had presented an amended information alleging a fourth strike conviction that the Honorable Paul M. Marigonda had prosecuted before his appointment to the bench, and Judge Marigonda intended to recuse himself due to his prior prosecution of the fourth strike conviction unless the People withdrew their amended information upon defendant entering into a plea agreement. Defendant claims that if defense counsel had properly argued that People v. Sincavage (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 224 (Sincavage) was inapplicable, Judge Marigonda would have declined to recuse himself and also would have proceeded to hear defendant's pending Romero[2] motion and to strike all of defendant's prior convictions in the interests of justice. Additionally, defendant contends that the matter should be remanded to allow correction of the abstract of judgment to reduce the section 1202.5, subdivision (a) theft fine of $76 to $10 and to separately list all fines, fees, and penalties imposed on each count.