CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant T.B., a minor, was initially adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation in March 2008, following his admissions that he committed three misdemeanors: possession of a weapon on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a))[1], attempted vandalism (§§ 594, subd. (a), 664) and resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). He was continued as a ward of the court in October 2008, following his admission that he violated his probation by testing positive for THC, failing to meet the requirements of a substance abuse counseling program in which he was participating and failing to participate in anger management counseling.

Following a mistrial, defendants Gregory Scott Haidl, Kyle Joseph Nachreiner, and Keith James Spann again faced charges alleging assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury and eight sexual offenses including one count of rape by intoxication, one count of oral copulation by intoxication, and six counts of sexual penetration with a foreign object by intoxication. This time the jury convicted defendants of multiple counts of sexual penetration with a foreign object by intoxication (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (e)), and the trial court sentenced defendants to the midterm of six years in prison. On appeal, defendants seek reversal of their convictions, claiming the trial court erroneously excluded evidence, erred in handling jury questions during deliberations and in instructing the jury, and erred in imposing a mandatory, lifetime sex offender registration requirement. Defendants' contentions are without merit, and Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Huy Quoc Nguyen was convicted of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated). The jury found defendant discharged a firearm while committing the crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and committed the crime for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). He was sentenced to seven years to life for the attempted murder and a consecutive 25 years to life for the gun enhancement. The court struck the requirement of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5), which states that when there is a true finding a defendant committed the crime for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) he will not be eligible for parole until having served at least 15 years.

Cross-complainant John E. Stouffer (son) appeals from a judgment for cross-defendant Emily Stouffer (mother) on his trespass cause of action. Son contends insufficient evidence supports the jury's special verdict finding that mother did not enter his house. But the special verdict form, properly construed, shows the jury found mother co-owned the house. Substantial evidence supports this finding. Thus, the jury reasonably found mother did not enter â€

Mohammed K. Ghods, an attorney, filed a lawsuit seeking $250,000 in damages arising from a broken photocopier. He sued the leasing company, Citicorp Vender Finance, Inc. (Citicorp) and the copier dealer, Select Office Solutions, Inc., (Select). The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of Citicorp after sustaining its demurrer to Ghods's third amended complaint (TAC) without leave to amend. On appeal, Ghods claims this was error because he alleged facts sufficient to support his claims, or the court should have given him leave to amend to correct any perceived deficiencies or uncertainties. We conclude the trial court gave Ghods ample opportunity to remedy the defects in his complaint, and the demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend. The judgment dismissing the case against Citicorp is affirmed.

Dymond Framing and Lumber Corporation, and Dymond, Inc. (hereafter collectively and in the singular â€

Cassandra W. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her now 12-year-old son, Richard B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated.) She contends there was inadequate compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C., § 1901 et seq.) and that the court erred in finding that the benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply. Court disagree and affirm.

Defendant Jose Enrique Resendiz appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder with the special circumstance that the murder was committed while defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang and that the murder was carried out to further the gang's activities. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(22).)[1] The jury also found true the allegation that defendant committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) In addition, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm, intentionally discharged a firearm, and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole consecutive to a term of 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant raises issues relating to the cross-examination of a witness, the admissibility of evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and jury instructions. We conclude the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding an element of the special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and the gang enhancement (former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) findings. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for retrial of these findings. If the prosecutor elects not to retry the matter, the trial court shall resentence defendant.

The trial court convicted defendant Carlos Sanchez-Barajas of felony child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a))[1] with personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant was placed on probation for four years with the condition that he serve one year in county jail. Defendant subsequently moved to modify the terms of probation to avoid mandatory deportation by the federal government. Defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of the motion. Court will affirm the court's order denying defendant's motion to modify probation.

Defendant Larry D. Jones was charged, via information, with grand theft of property valued at over $400 (Pen. Code, §§ 484-487, subd. (a)),[1] petty theft with a prior conviction (§ 666), five prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i); 1170.12), and three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). A jury convicted defendant of grand theft, and the trial court found true the alleged strike convictions and prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to 28 years to life in state prison, consisting of 25 years to life for the grand theft conviction and consecutive one year terms for each of the three prison priors. The petty theft count was dismissed. On appeal, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the grand theft conviction. Defendant also claims his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to request inclusion of jury instruction CALCRIM No. 1860 and in failing to object to the owner's valuation of the stolen property. Court will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Lorenzo Arteaga was charged by felony complaint with failing to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290.015, subd. (a)).[1] The complaint further alleged that defendant had 11 prior strikes. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) The court granted defendant's request to represent himself and he entered a not guilty plea. On the date set for the preliminary examination, the court declared a doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial (§ 1368) and continued the matter. At the continued hearing, the court appointed counsel to represent defendant over his objection. (People v. Robinson (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 606, 616.) Appointed counsel requested that the court appoint two doctors to examine defendant. The court granted the request.

Defendant David Ha pleaded no contest to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a))[1] and admitted the allegation that a person not an accomplice was present at the time of the burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years.

April R. (mother) appeals from an order suspending visitation with her son, Joshua D.[1] Mother contends the court: (1) abused its discretion by suspending visitation; (2) erred by â€

Following termination from his position as a janitor, 67-year old Luis Turcios (Turcios) filed suit against his employer Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. (Pearson) for, among other things, age discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). Pearson filed a petition to compel arbitration based upon a dispute resolution agreement Turcios had executed. (§ 1281.12.)[1] The trial court granted the petition, sending the matter to arbitration. The arbitrator granted summary judgment to Pearson, finding that the arbitration was time barred.