CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant, S.L., the mother of the child, M.C., appeals from the juvenile court's orders terminating her parental rights "Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 395, 366.26" Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 395, 366.26). She contends the notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was inadequate. Court affirm the juvenile court's orders.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.[1] Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we shall affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On March 8, 2009, a patrol officer stopped a vehicle for speeding. Defendant Andrew Anthony Quintana was one of five passengers in the vehicle. He was seated in the backseat behind the driver. When the officer contacted the driver, he smelled a strong odor of alcoholic beverages in the car. The driver was assessed and arrested for driving under the influence.
After the driver's arrest, the officer had the five passengers exit the car. The officer then sought the assistance of backup officers in searching the car, incident to arrest and for a tow inventory, as he intended to have the car towed. In plain sight, on the floor of the car where defendant had been sitting, officers saw a magazine to a handgun. The butt of a handgun was seen sticking out from under the seat where defendant had been sitting. The magazine contained seven rounds of ammunition and fit the handgun, which was a .380-caliber semiautomatic pistol.

A jury convicted Michael Terrell Moore of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)), and deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)). As to the murder conviction, the jury found true an allegation Moore personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to the attempted murder conviction, the jury found true an allegation Moore personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to both convictions, the jury also found true two lesser firearm enhancement allegations: that Moore personally used a firearm during a felony (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during a felony (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced Moore to a total term of 75 years to life plus life in prison.

Stephanie V. appeals following the dispositional hearing in the dependency case of her daughter N.V. and son A.V. (together, the children). Stephanie contends the juvenile court erred by excluding evidence regarding the refusal of the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) to grant placement approval of the home of maternal grandmother Christy H. Stephanie concludes the court erred by denying her request that the children be placed with Christy. Court affirm.

Mansa Musa Muhummed appeals a judgment following his jury convictions on multiple counts of torture, felony child abuse, infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant, and felony false imprisonment. On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred by denying his Marsden[1] motion and his counsel's request to be relieved; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior uncharged conduct; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for torture; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support two of his convictions for felony child abuse; (5) the evidence is insufficient to support one of his convictions for felony false imprisonment; and (6) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct.

Defendant and appellant Leonard Delawrence Jones contends his jury conviction should be reversed because the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury he could not be found guilty of attempted murder or voluntary manslaughter if he fired a gun in defense of others. Court affirm.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1996, defendant and appellant Francisco Amezcua Mendoza pled guilty to possession of cocaine base for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5.) The trial court placed him on three years of supervised probation. Thirteen years later, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Penal Code section 1016.5,[1] on the basis that he was not advised adequately of the immigration consequences of his conviction. The court denied the motion.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying the motion to vacate the judgment because: (1) his plea should have been invalidated since there was evidence that he spoke Spanish and the plea form was not translated for him; (2) the record establishes the court failed to advise him that he could be excluded from admission to the United States; and (3) the court abused its discretion in finding that he had not acted diligently in bringing the motion. Court affirm.

M.M. (the grandmother) and L.M. (the grandfather) adopted T.M. (the mother). When the mother was 13, she gave birth to a daughter, C.M. (sometimes the child). The mother, being not only a minor herself but also developmentally delayed, was unable to care for C.M. properly. Accordingly, the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed this dependency proceeding. The mother's parental rights were terminated, and the child was placed with the grandparents, who were hoping to adopt her.

Appellant B.C. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdictional order regarding her four children.[1] She argues that the order should be reversed because the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) failed to comply with the requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) Court conditionally reverse and remand the matter to the juvenile court for a determination of ICWA compliance.

Appellant N.S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court's denial of reunification services. Court affirm.

In 2006 Lucia Lopez received two anonymous, typed letters accusing her of engaging in human trafficking. They threatened that if she did not send a blank money order for $5,000 to a designated post office box her conduct would be reported to the police. It was later determined the box belonged to defendant and a videotape showed him picking up mail from it after the first letters were sent to Lopez.
After Lopez received the letters she sought the assistance of the police. Officer Jon Cartwright helped her draft a letter in response, asking for more time and that the sender call a specified number, which belonged to Cartwright. The response was to again demand $5,000. Defendant sent a total of six such letters to Lopez. Police set up surveillance of defendant's business and one day saw him removing envelopes from the trunk of his car and placing a bag with something heavy in it. When defendant drove away, police conducted a traffic stop and found an envelope addressed to defendant in Lopez's handwriting in defendant's pocket. They also found a typewriter in the trunk. It was determined the letters had been produced by this typewriter.

After a court trial defendant Ignacio Diaz was convicted of selling or offering to sell cocaine (count 1, Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and resisting a peace officer (count 2, Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)). On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of evidence on the second charge, contending that the officers were not lawfully performing their duties when they detained him. We will affirm the judgment.
Defendant has also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which this court ordered to be considered with the appeal. In the petition, defendant contends that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his illegal detention. Court resolve the petition by separate order filed this day.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.