CA Unpub Decisions

After four unsuccessful attempts to have his appointed counsel removed and new counsel appointed pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), defendant Jimmy Ray Bradley advised the trial court, on the eve of trial, that he wanted to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta). The trial court granted his request on the condition the trial would not be continued. Defendant agreed, but later asked the court to continue the trial so that he could prepare. The trial court denied his request, and thereafter defendant sought to have new counsel appointed. The trial court denied defendant’s request for new counsel, but advised him that it was willing to reappoint previously appointed counsel. Defendant stated that he would not “accept[]” previously appointed counsel, and thus, continued to represent himself. After jury selection commenced, defendant refused to return to court, and the trial proceeded in his absence.
The jury found defendant guilty of possession for sale of methylenedioymethamphetamine (MDMA or Ecstasy) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378)[1] and possession for sale of marijuana (§ 11359). It also found true allegations defendant had four prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), served one prior prison term (id. § 667.6, subd. (b)), and had three prior drug convictions (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)).

Defendant Korry Abramson was convicted of burglary and possession of a completed check with the intent to defraud. The trial court sentenced him to three years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court should have excluded reports of defendant’s prior misconduct under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the reports of defendant’s prior misconduct under the hearsay exception for writings previously made by a witness (Evid. Code, § 1237); and (3) the trial court should not have excluded other evidence that defendant believes would have supported his defense.
We will affirm the judgment.

Petitioner Patricia H. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief (Welf. & Inst. Code, §366.26, subd. (l);[1] Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s order, made at the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and implementation of a permanent plan for her two-year-old daughter A.H. Mother’s petition is opposed by A.H. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) has advised that it does not take a position with respect to the petition. We deny the petition on the merits.

Petitioner G.R. (mother) has three boys who were declared dependents of the juvenile court. At the conclusion of a contested 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for mother, ordered the two oldest children be placed with their biological father, and scheduled a hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for the youngest child, D.G. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26).[1]
Following that order, and in response to an earlier writ petition by mother, we concluded that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) had provided mother with reasonable reunification services. We directed the juvenile court to order the Department to provide mother with six additional months of reunification services. (G.R. v. Superior Court (Sept. 17, 2011, B229802) [nonpub. opn.] (G.R. I).)
After an additional reunification period, the juvenile court again terminated mother’s reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 permanent plan hearing for D.G. Mother has now filed another writ petition challenging this most recent order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) She again claims substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s findings that the Department provided her with reasonable reunification services. We disagree. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

Kathleen P. (mother) appeals from the order declaring her son, K.P., a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the jurisdictional finding was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Ronald Ervin Warren appeals from a post-sentence order denying his motion for additional conduct credits based on the newly amended Penal Code section 4019.[1] We affirm.

Matthew F. and J. F. appeal from the order entered December 22, 2011, terminating their parental rights to J.S., S.F., and C.F. pursuant to Family Code sections 7803, 7822, and 7825.[1] We appointed counsel to represent them on appeal.
Counsel filed briefs in which they informed us that they had found no arguable issues. On June 28, 2012, we notified appellants that they had 30 days within which to submit any contentions that they wished us to consider, and that the appeal would be dismissed in the absence of any arguable issues. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952.)
Appellants filed supplemental briefs in which they maintain their innocence of the crimes for which they are serving life sentences without the possibility of parole and in which they point out that they made substantial efforts to maintain contact with their children while in prison.
Our review of the record discloses substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding. Appellants' crimes are of such a nature so as to prove their unfitness to have future custody and control of the children, notwithstanding the absence of any prior criminal history and their substantial efforts while in prison to maintain contact with the children. (§ 7825.) Appellants' crimes involved "egregious underlying facts that have a direct bearing on parental fitness." (In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1538.) It is therefore immaterial whether the alternative ground of intent to abandon was established. (§ 7822.) The court properly exercised its discretion in terminating appellants' parental rights.
The order is affirmed.

Alisha R. appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights as to her sons Johnny N. and Steven R. She contends the court failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq., ICWA). She also argues the court erred in ruling that she had not demonstrated the applicability of the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights.
We find no basis for reversal on grounds other than ICWA, as to which we conclude that the notice provided was not in full compliance with the requisites of the statute. We reverse for the limited purpose of full compliance with ICWA, as explained below.

Robert T. Carson appeals a judgment preventing him from owning or possessing firearms for five years pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 8103, subdivision (f).[1] We conclude the trial court's finding that Carson is not "likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner" is supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Royse Stribling appeals his conviction by jury of two counts of attempted murder (counts 1-2; Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a))[1], arson of an inhabited structure (count 3; § 451, subd. (b)), battery (count 4; 242), child abuse (count 5; § 273a, subd. (a)), and resisting an executive officer (count 6; § 69). The trial court, in a bifurcated proceeding, found that appellant had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b) – (i); 1170.,12, subds. (a) – (d)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced to 31 years state prison. We affirm.

Defendant Rene Sajid Munoz appeals from his convictions for murder, attempted murder, and assault on a peace officer. For the attempted murder counts, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he acted with the requisite intent to kill. He also challenges the evidence supporting his convictions for assault on a peace officer. Defendant raises numerous challenges to the jury instructions on the kill zone theory of attempted murder, the defense of voluntary intoxication, and assault on a peace officer. He claims the jury failed to make findings that the victims in the attempted murder counts were peace officers. Finally, he points out inconsistencies between the minute order of the sentencing, the abstract of judgment, and the oral pronouncement of sentence by the trial court.
We conclude the convictions for attempted murder and assault on a peace officer are supported by substantial evidence. The instructional errors were harmless in that there is no reasonable probability a different verdict would have been reached absent the errors. The jury’s factual findings on the assault counts that victims Justin Darby, John Darby, Kelly Cook, and Kyle Heinbechner were peace officers apply also to the attempted murder counts as to these same victims. We remand the matter for resentencing on count 6 and any corresponding sentencing change resulting from that sentence, as well as clarification of the fees imposed. On remand, the abstract of judgment is to be corrected as directed by this opinion.

J.B. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her twin children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] She argues that the order violated her right to due process because the juvenile court did not comply with Family Code section 7862, which governs the procedure and quantum of proof necessary to terminate the rights of a parent in family court due to a mental disability. Mother also argues that her parental rights should not have been terminated under section 366.26 because the “beneficial relationship” exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applies. We affirm.

Pro per appellant James W. James appeals from an order dismissing his case without prejudice, pursuant to an enforceable settlement agreement. This appeal follows entry of judgment in which the case was dismissed. He argues that because the terms of settlement were in dispute or changed, the trial court had no power to dismiss the case. We disagree and affirm.

The City of Orinda (City) granted the application of Edward Vogt for a lot line adjustment between two contiguous properties. Lomas Cantadas Groundwater Protection Committee (Committee)[1] and Carol Karp (jointly Appellants) opposed the application, and petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate seeking to vacate the City’s decision, arguing that the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; hereafter, CEQA) required preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). The trial court denied the petition. We affirm.