CA Unpub Decisions

Mother, Angela T., appeals from a custody order and final judgment of the juvenile court (§ 362.4), awarding sole physical custody of the child, M.T., to father, Kyle B., and supervised visitation to mother, and terminating dependency jurisdiction over M.T. We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment.

The underlying action arises from a single vehicle rollover accident. Real Party in Interest, Joshua Ackerman (Ackerman), the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, sues for personal injuries on a theory that a dangerous condition was created during the construction of a development on neighboring property. A contractor on that project, Petitioner Murrieta Development Company, Inc. (hereafter Murrieta), moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) it owed no duty to Ackerman; and (2) Ackerman could not establish causation. The trial court denied the motion, and Murrieta filed this petition for writ relief.

The underlying action arises from a single vehicle rollover accident. Real Party in Interest, Joshua Ackerman (Ackerman), the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, sues for personal injuries on a theory that a dangerous condition was created during the construction of a development on neighboring property. A contractor on that project, Petitioner Murrieta Development Company, Inc. (hereafter Murrieta), moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) it owed no duty to Ackerman; and (2) Ackerman could not establish causation. The trial court denied the motion, and Murrieta filed this petition for writ relief.

A jury convicted defendant Jarrick Earl Denewiler of eight criminal counts involving two incidents of domestic violence. The court sentenced defendant to 13 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant challenges his convictions on count 4 for misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (b)) and on count 7 for criminal threats (§ 422). He also contends the court erred by denying his Marsden[2] motion and he challenges a statutory booking fee under the Government Code. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Charles A. Christian appeals from judgment awarding his former wife, respondent Virginia E. Christian,[1] $59,025.65 as her separate property interest in the family residence. Charles contends Virginia violated Family Code[2] sections 720 and 721 by acquiring an unfair advantage over him, and section 2640 violated his rights under the federal and state Constitutions.

Gabriel Michael Loya pled guilty to separate counts of possessing marijuana while incarcerated at California Rehabilitation Center (CRC)[1] and admitted an allegation under the Strikes law, pursuant to an indicated sentence by the court. Over the People’s objection, the court indicated it would order the terms for the two new offenses to run consecutive to the term he was serving at CRC, and it would calculate the term for both offenses at one-third the midterm. The defendant was sentenced as the court had indicated, and was awarded presentence credits to defendant. The People appealed.
On appeal, the People assert that the indicated sentence was unauthorized. In their supplemental briefs submitted at our request, the People argue defendant was not entitled to presentence credits against his term, while defendant argues that the record is ambiguous as to whether he had been paroled prior to sentencing. We reverse and remand to the lower court for further proceedings.

Defendant Rodolfo Guzman, Jr., with support from codefendant Rafael Diaz Morales, committed an armed carjacking and other crimes against three men. A jury convicted Guzman of nine criminal offenses: count 1, carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)); count 2, vehicle theft (Veh. Code § 10851, subd. (a)); counts 4 through 6, false imprisonment by force (§ 236); count 7, criminal threats (§ 422) and counts 8 through 10, assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2).) The jury also found true the firearm allegations for counts 1 and 4 through 10. The jury convicted Morales of vehicle theft.
The court found true the allegations that Guzman had two prison priors. The court sentenced Guzman to a total prison term of 30 years. The court imposed a two-year sentence on Morales which, with credit for time served, was a paper commitment only.
On appeal, Guzman argues there was insufficient evidence on count 1 for the allegation of discharge of a firearm during the carjacking and the trial court committed constitutional error when it did not give an instruction on after-acquired intent regarding the discharge of a firearm. Morales argues the court abused its discretion in denying him probation. We reject defendants’ contentions and affirm the judgment.

Bethany V. contends the court erred when it set a hearing to select and implement a permanency plan for her daughter, S.V., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] We deny the petition.

Appellant Loan Phuong Nguyen appeals from two trial court orders. One order modified the spousal support obligation of her former husband, respondent Thuan Dinh Ngo, for each of their two children. The other order required Ngo to pay Nguyen $150 per month in child support arrears.
Nguyen, who is appearing in propria persona, contends Ngo was not truthful in his declaration of income and expenses that he submitted in connection with a motion to modify child support. She also generally contends one or both of the orders are deficient because they omit certain subject matters/items discussed during the hearings that led to those orders. Affirmed.

The juvenile court declared Cameron D. a ward of the court after he admitted committing a misdemeanor assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 17, subd. (b)(4), 245, subd. (a)(1)). Consistent with the plea agreement leading to the admission, the juvenile court dismissed two other felony charges, in which Erick Becker was the victim. At a subsequent restitution hearing, the juvenile court ordered Cameron to pay Becker restitution of $4,106, consisting of $2,393.04 for lost wages, $412.96 for Becker's share of an ambulance bill, and $1,300 for the portion of the ambulance bill paid by his insurance company.[1]
Cameron appeals, contending the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to apply comparative fault principles in determining the restitution amount and by failing to reduce the amount of the restitution because of compelling and extraordinary circumstances. We conclude there is no merit to these contentions and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
According to evidence presented at the restitution hearing, Cameron and his two companions encountered Becker and Becker's companion in the middle of the night at a convenience store. Becker, who was under the influence of alcohol, confronted Cameron about something. Cameron lightly pushed Becker. Becker went outside and Cameron and his companions followed. Becker took a confrontational stance and started physically fighting with one of Cameron's companions. Cameron intervened and kicked Becker in the head or face twice.

On May 3, 2010, the juvenile court found that S. N. committed assault, by means likely to produce great bodily injury, a felony (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(1) (count 1)). The juvenile court dismissed count 2 which claimed S. willfully and unlawfully used force and violence upon another to inflict serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). The court also dismissed, as to both claims, the allegation that S. personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a) (count 1) and 1192.7, subd. (c)(8) (counts 1, 2)).
On appeal, S. claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b), to have the assault offense reduced to a misdemeanor. S. also claims the juvenile court's notification letters to the superintendent of the Poway Unified School District and to the San Diego Police Department should be amended. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 827, subd. (b)(2), 827.1.)
As we explain, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying S.'s motion to have the assault offense reduced to a misdemeanor. However, as we explain, the notifications should be amended

In 2010, plaintiffs R. David (David) and Carolyn (Carolyn) Verdugo (together the Verdugos) were members of defendant Southwestern Yacht Club (SYC), and David was Commodore of SYC. When a confrontation between David and an employee of SYC caused the employee to raise the specter of legal action against SYC, defendants Gregg Ward and Orlando-Ward & Associates (together Ward) were retained by SYC to investigate the employee's complaints, and to provide a report and recommendations (the Ward Report) to SYC. Relying on the recommendations of the Ward Report, SYC commenced procedures for taking certain adverse actions against the Verdugos, including possibly removing David as Commodore and terminating the Verdugos' membership in SYC. Although no adverse action had been taken before the Verdugos commenced the present lawsuit, the events and conversations transpiring in connection with the subsequent disciplinary proceedings triggered this action.
The Verdugos filed this lawsuit, alleging they were injured as a result of the Ward Report and the events and conversations connected with SYC's subsequent disciplinary proceeding. The lawsuit alleged claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with contract, and breach of contract against numerous defendants.[1]

In considering the modification of spousal support, the family court is statutorily prohibited from considering a subsequent spouse's income. (Fam. Code, § 4323, subd. (b).)[1] Here, the court violated the statute by considering the income of Robert Kulken's new wife in denying his request for the termination of his spousal support obligation to his ex-wife, Fae Michiel Kulken (Michiel). Accordingly, we reverse the order and remand the matter for a new hearing.

This case is before us a second time. We previously affirmed Judge Nugent's September 2005 order allowing the Timms to regrade a nonexclusive landscape easement, and granting Rusk's injunction that the Timms remove a fence they had installed over the easement. (Rusk v. Timm (Feb. 16, 2007, D047840) [nonpub. opn.].) Rusk appealed our decision to the California Supreme Court, which denied review.
After our remittitur issued in May 2007, Rusk moved to modify Judge Nugent's injunction in the superior court. Rusk argued, "Jurisdiction has returned to this court." Rusk explained in his moving papers the developments that had occurred following Judge Nugent's injunction: "[The Timms] did remove the fence, but then reinstalled the fence only seven feet over. The new fence restricts [Rusk's] ability to use the remaining 23 feet of the easement. It appears that [the Timms] think that they have technically complied with the judgment since they did remove the fence that was installed. However, to reconstruct the same fence only seven feet over on a 30[-]foot easement is a clear violation of the spirit of the court's order. The prior fence interfered with [Rusk's] easement and the new fence is no different. [¶] Consequently, [Rusk] requests that the court modify . . . the judgment to state: '[The Timms] shall remove the fence they installed on the easement and shall not install any fence within the boundaries of the easement.' " (Italics added.)