In re J.B.
Filed 10/9/12 In re J.B. CA1/5
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
the Juvenile Court Law.
and Respondent,
Defendant and
Appellant.
A134711
(
Super.
JD09-3253A)
J.B.
(mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her twin
children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.
to due process because the juvenile
court did not comply with Family Code section 7862, which governs the procedure
and quantum of proof necessary to terminate the rights of a parent in family
court due to a mental disability. Mother also argues that her parental rights
should not have been terminated under section 366.26 because the “beneficial
relationship†exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applies. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
During
her childhood and teenage years, mother was subjected to serious abuse,
including sexual abuse by her own mother.
She has a long history of drug use and mental health issues, including
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She has been described as hypervigilant,
rigid, and subject to dissociative states.
In
2008, mother became pregnant. She
stopped using drugs, with the exception of marijuana and prescription medications,
and moved into Ashbury House, a residential treatment center for mentally ill
women and their children. Mother gave
birth to twins, D.B. and J.B., in January 2009.
Jennifer
Curley is a social worker with respondent the
Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency), who acts as a liaison between the
Agency and Ashbury House. The director
of Ashbury House approached Curley about providing childcare for mother, who
was feeling very stressed. On August 4, 2009, Curley opened a
voluntary case so mother could receive services from the Agency.
The
Agency provided mother with childcare assistance as part of the voluntary
services, but mother remained exhausted and unable to cope. In September 2009, when the twins were eight
months old, mother told Curley that they should be placed in foster care. Though Curley convinced mother to have the
staff at Ashbury House watch the twins for a couple of days before she made
that decision, mother called later that day and said she was hearing voices
telling her that she was sexually and physically abusing her children. Mother was “tender and sweet†with the twins,
and there were no signs of actual abuse.
The twins were taken into protective custody on September 10, 2009, and the Agency filed a
dependency petition on September 14,
2009.
title="">[2]
Mother
became psychotic and relapsed on alcohol and crack cocaine on the same day the
twins were taken into foster care. She
was placed in a detoxification program for two weeks and then returned to
Ashbury House, where she appeared flat and sedated. Mother continued to have auditory
hallucinations and thought they might have been caused by an antidepressant medication,
though she had been exhibiting some signs of psychosis before the medication
was prescribed.
During
the months following the removal of the twins, mother received mental health
treatment. She was taking several
prescription medications (including Depakote, Rispiridal, and Klonopin) and,
despite her doctors’ warnings, used marijuana to ease her anxiety. Mother was ambivalent about her ability to
care for the twins and in January 2010, considered giving them up for
adoption. After she learned that the
maternal grandmother would not be considered as a caregiver for the children
(due to the grandmother’s abuse of mother when mother was growing up), mother
decided to try to regain custody.
On
May 11, 2010, mother
submitted on an amended version of the dependency petition, which alleged that
her mental health problems greatly impacted her ability to safely care for the
twins. The court declared the twins
dependents under section 300, subdivision (b), removed them from mother’s
custody, and approved a reunification plan that included components of drug
treatment, counseling and therapy, parenting education, and suitable
housing. After considering an addendum
report filed by the social worker, the court also ordered mother to submit to a
psychological evaluation.
In
a December 2010 report prepared for the status review hearing (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)),
title="">[3]
social worker Curley recommended that the children remain in foster care and
that reunification services be terminated.
The report indicated that mother’s affect was improving and that she had
made a “herculean†effort to regain custody by managing her psychiatric
symptoms, but that “given the seriousness of her diagnosis and the history of
her very slow recovery from her psychotic episode, we cannot conclude that this
brighter period signals a permanent stable mental condition.†Mother had moved into the home of a friend,
having reached the 18-month limit that she was permitted to stay at Ashbury
House, and was paying her friend rent.
As a consequence, she had lost her status as a homeless person and was
not eligible for housing through other programs. The friend with whom mother was living would
not allow the children to live in her home permanently.
According
to the social worker’s report, mother had been unable to increase her visits
with her children until September 2010.
Visitation had been taking place at Ashbury House through a special
arrangement made after mother moved out, and mother had declined offers to take
the children by herself when those visits ended. Mother had been offered the opportunity of
day-long visits so she could demonstrate her ability to care for the children,
but had not been able to make the necessary arrangements. As the six-month period for reunification
passed, mother began to panic about her time being up and began wanting to see
the children for longer periods. She
needed a tremendous amount of support just to maintain her own mental health,
and her service providers believed she could not care for the twins unassisted.
On
February 1, 2011, mother filed
a petition for modification of a prior order under section 388 (form JV-180),
seeking an increase in visitation to 18 hours a week, including overnight
visitation. The petition alleged that
the court had ordered a minimum of six hours a week visitation with discretion
to increase the length of the visits, that visits of 18 hours a week had been
offered in late 2010, but that social worker Curley had since reduced the
amount of visitation.
Prior
to the review hearing, Dr. Hugh Molesworth submitted his psychological
evaluation of mother, which was based on psychological testing, interviews with
mother and her mental health providers, and a review of her mental health
records. He diagnosed her as suffering
from chronic PTSD, psychosis not otherwise specified (currently controlled with
medication), a history of poly-substance dependency, amphetamine and cocaine
dependence (in remission), cannabis dependence, and maladaptive personality
traits. The report concluded that mother
was vulnerable to further psychotic episodes and that while she was commendably
engaged in treatment, “her psychopathology will not disappear.†She had a “wild and crazy†history, but
because of her substance abuse, it was hard to tell how much of it was the
product of underlying personality traits.
In Dr. Molesworth’s opinion, mother would need ongoing support to
parent her children outside of a supervised setting.
At
the contested review hearing, which began on March 7, 2011 and was finally completed on June 13, 2011, Dr. Molesworth was
called as a witness. He testified that
mother’s PTSD went beyond the “more classical symptoms†and included
“significant problems with regulating emotions and marked problems with
interpersonal relationships.†She was at
a high risk of future psychotic episodes and he was concerned that her
continued use of marijuana increased that risk, as well as her risk of relapse
with other drugs. Her Global Functioning
Assessment score (GAF) was 50 to 55, indicating a moderate to severe degree of
impairment, which would make it difficult for her to hold down a job, maintain
relationships, and manage daily activities such as parenting.
Dr.
Molesworth believed that mother could not parent her children without support
and assistance, that she could not be the primary caretaker, and that her
struggles with depression, anxiety and psychotic thinking impaired her ability
to make decisions. In his opinion, there
would be a “moderate to high risk†that mother’s parenting ability would
collapse if the children were returned to her, which would in turn necessitate
intervention by child welfare services.
Her preoccupation with her own problems could distract her from
monitoring the children: “I could see []
a range of negative consequences occurring.
One is, due to her problems with decision making, she may, you know,
make bad judgments, poor decisions, act on impulse with her kids in ways that,
you know, are negative. For example, she
could take the kids to the park and become preoccupied with her own issues and
[] the kids might wander away.
[¶] She could – decisions in the home, like leaving, basic things
like leaving kitchen appliances on or water boiling in the kitchen while she
might be preoccupied with her own mental health state.â€
Alisa
Birgy, the program director of Ashbury House, had almost daily contact with
mother while she was living there. She
testified that she was concerned about mother’s ability to parent, given that
mother was easily overwhelmed and could not deal with unexpected changes. Mother had difficulties soothing her children
and was not able to independently care for them during her visits. In Birgy’s opinion, mother was not ready to
reunite when she left Ashbury House after 18 months.
Social
worker Curley testified that when the children were initially removed, she
thought it would be temporary and so encouraged numerous and lengthy visits to
build mother’s confidence. Mother could
not handle the visits, so they were reduced to enable her to focus on bettering
herself. It was only recently that
mother had been willing to increase visitation, but Curley did not believe
there was enough time left for mother to demonstrate that she was competent to
care for the children. On a recent visit
with the children at a park, mother was not able to address several safety
concerns, at one point leaving J.B. at the edge of a water fountain to chase
D.B.
Although
she recognized that mother loved the twins and had worked hard, Curley believed
mother’s severe mental illness continued to impair her ability to parent. She acknowledged that mother had participated
in the reunification services offered to her and had recently quit using
marijuana, but did not believe additional services would enable mother to
independently parent the children. Mother
had entered a program with Women’s Hope Project, an affiliate of Walden
House.
Another
concern was that mother had decided against adoption and decided to try to
reunify after she was told her own mother would not be considered for
placement. The maternal grandmother had
sexually abused mother when she was growing up, and mother did not seem to
understand why it would not be appropriate to place the twins with their
grandmother.
Curley
explained that she had been eager to offer mother more visitation, and
increased the time to 18 hours per week in September 2010. She had reduced the time to six hours per
week because (1) mother’s drug counselor told Curley that mother was not “being
straight†with her; (2) Dr. Molesworth had expressed concerns about mother
while he was conducting his evaluation; and (3) mother returned the children to
the foster parent with wet clothing, bleeding diaper rashes and smelling
strongly of cigarette smoke.
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] Curley was also concerned that mother had
rejected a housing opportunity with Harbor House that would have required her
to stop smoking marijuana and that visits at Ashbury House had been
discontinued because the children were crying too much.
Beginning
in December 2010, mother’s visits with the twins were supervised through the La
Raza program. Although the supervisor
from La Raza wrote generally positive reports about those visits, Curley
discounted them because the supervisor had taken it upon himself to act as a
“second parent,†rather than simply observing mother. As a result of this, the visits were moved to
a different agency.
Based
on this evidence, the trial court found that reasonable efforts had been made
to help mother overcome the problems leading to removal of the twins, but there
would be a substantial danger if they were returned home at that time. On June
24, 2011, the court terminated reunification services and set a
hearing under section 366.26 to select the permanent plan. The court denied mother’s petition for
increased visitation under section 388 and granted a petition filed by the
Agency to decrease visitation to ease the twins’ transition into an adoptive
home.
Mother
filed a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition, arguing that (1) no
substantial evidence supported the court’s determination that it would be
detrimental to return the children to her care; (2) she was not provided with
reasonable reunification services; (3) the children should have been placed in
her care subject to supervision and monitoring as a less drastic alternative;
and (4) the court should have granted her request for increased
visitation. This court denied the
petition. (J.B. v. Superior Court (Oct.
5, 2011, A132535) [nonpub. opn.].)
On
November 14, 2011, mother
filed a petition for modification under section 388 (form JV-180) seeking an
additional six months of reunification services. The changed circumstances cited in the
petition were mother’s completion of the Women’s Hope program, her regular
visitation with the children, and her abstinence from all non-prescription
substances. Mother submitted a letter
from her therapist stating that her “prognosis was greatly improved . . by
several factors: she has been stable for 2 years without any recurrent
[psychotic] episodes, she is sober from drugs and alcohol and active in her
recovery, she can readily identify early warning signs to her illness and is
able to communicate them to her providers, she is adherent with her medication
regimen, she is engaged in therapy, she utilizes a number of different coping
skills when under stress and practices good sleep hygiene.†However, mother continued to experience
significant symptoms of anxiety. The
juvenile court denied the petition on December
20, 2011, concluding that mother had failed to show that an extension
of the reunification period would be in the best interests of the children.
The
section 366.26 hearing was held on January
9, 2012, with the Agency recommending adoption as the permanent
plan. In the report prepared for the
hearing, social worker Curley noted that the twins had been moved to an
adoptive home and were doing exceptionally well. They seemed to be having fewer emotional
symptoms since visits with mother had been reduced. D.B. had “changed from [an] angry, sad
toddler with frequent tantrums and trouble with any transition to a happy,
active boy . . . .†J.B., who had been
developing a “blunted affect†now seemed to “display a normal range of affect
and her personality is really blooming.â€
Both children were very attached to the new caretaker.
According
to the report, mother had visited the children regularly. “The children seem to be happy to see their
mom at visits and seem to leave the visits without too much distress. The mother certainly loves her children. However, although the children may know her
name as ‘Mommy,’ the actual person who provided the care and attention for all
their days except a few hours was their first foster mother. Their relationship ever since they were
removed from their mother was much more like the visit of a favorite aunt. The children suffered without a permanent
caretaker.â€
Mother
testified that the children were very excited to see her on visits and
sometimes cried when she left. At the
conclusion of the hearing, her attorney argued that the court should not
terminate parental rights because the “beneficial relationship†exception of
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied. The court found that mother had not carried
her burden of establishing this exception and ordered the termination of
mother’s parental rights.
I.
Mother
argues that the order terminating her parental rights violates due process
because the juvenile court did not follow the procedures of Family Code section
7827.
Procedures
for terminating parental rights outside of the dependency context are set forth
in Family Code section 7820 et seq.
Family Code section 7820 provides, “A proceeding may be brought under
this part for the purpose of having a child under the age of 18 years declared
free from the custody and control of either or both parents if the child comes
within any of the descriptions set out in this chapter.†Family Code section 7821 establishes the
burden of proof for such proceedings, and states, “A finding pursuant to this
chapter shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence, except as
otherwise provided.†Family Code section
7827 authorizes the termination of parental rights “where the child is one
whose parent or parents are mentally disabled and are likely to remain so in
the foreseeable future†(id., subd.
(b)), and defines “mentally disabled†to mean “that a parent or parents suffer
a mental incapacity or disorder that renders the parent or parents unable to
care for and control the child adequately†(id.,
subd. (a)). A finding of mental
disability under Family Code section 7827 must be supported by “the evidence of
any two experts†who are psychiatrists or psychologists, and who meet certain
educational and experiential requirements.
(Fam. Code, § 7827, subd. (c).)
The
procedural requirements of Family Code section 7827 have been statutorily
incorporated into dependency proceedings
when a parent is denied reunification services at the outset of the case. Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5
provides in relevant part, “(b) Reunification services need not be provided to
a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] [¶] (2) That
the parent or guardian is suffering from a mental disability that is described
in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7820) of Part 4 of Division 12 of the
Family Code and that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services.†This section has been interpreted to require
the testimony of two qualified experts before reunification services may be
denied on the grounds of mental
disability. (In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 76, 84; In re Joy M. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 11, 18; Linda B. v. Superior Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 150, 152–153;
Cal.App.4th 470, 474.)
Appellant
argues that the procedural requirements of Family Code section 7827 extend to
all hearings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 in which the
termination of parental rights is based on the parent’s mental disability or
mental illness. We disagree. Such a rule would be contrary to the plain
language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, which makes no
mention of Family Code section 7827 and which specifically states, “The
procedures specified herein are the exclusive procedures for conducting these
hearings.†(Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 366.26, subd. (a).) If the Legislature
had wished to incorporate the requirements of Family Code section 7827 into
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, it could have done so with
language similar to that used in section Welfare and Institutions Code 361.5,
subdivision (b)(2), which extends those requirements to cases in which
reunification services are denied based on a parent’s mental illness or mental
disability. The Legislature’s failure to
include comparable language in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
shows that it did not intend Family Code section 7827 to apply to hearings
under that section. (See
Cal.App.4th 481, 487.)
A
similar issue was presented in In re
Khalid H. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 733 (Khalid H.),
in which the court made a jurisdictional finding that the child was a dependent
because the mother suffered from a mental illness under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).
The mother challenged this finding on appeal, arguing that it could not
be sustained because it was not based on the testimony of two qualified
experts, as was required for a termination of parental rights on the basis of
mental illness under Civil Code former section 232, subdivision (a)(6) [the
predecessor statute to Family Code section 7827]. (Khalid
H., at pp. 735-736; see In re Jasmon
O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 407, fn. 1.)
The appellant mother noted that Welfare and Institutions Code section
361.5, subdivisions (b) and (c), which pertained to the denial of reunification
services, specifically required the court to find evidence of mental disability
as defined by Civil Code former section 232,
upon the testimony of qualified mental health professionals. (Khalid
H., at p. 736.)
The
court in Khalid H. disagreed that the
procedures of Civil Code former section 232 were required for a
jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b): “Since section 300,
subdivision (b), does not contain a described formal procedure to determine if a
parent suffers from a mental illness, we will not borrow one from another
statute. The Legislature is presumed to
have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language will govern the
interpretation of the statute.
[Citation.] Where exceptions to a
general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions will not be implied or
presumed. [Citation.] We conclude that if the Legislature had
intended to require section 300, subdivision (b), to adhere to a specific
evidentiary scheme, it would have expressly designated one within the statute,
as it has done in others. In limiting
the interpretation of section 300, subdivision (b), to the plain language
within, we preserve the legislative intent.â€
(Khalid H.,
Mother
urges us to import Family Code section 7827 into Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 because section 366.26 involves the termination of parental
rights, rather than a jurisdictional finding authorizing juvenile court
intervention. She argues that because
her mental illness is the only basis for the dependency, with no evidence of
independent acts of abuse or neglect, her rights have been terminated without a
showing of “fault.†Mother then jumps to
the conclusion that under these circumstances, an order terminating parental
rights comports with due process only if it is supported by clear and
convincing evidence by two qualified mental health experts as provided in
Family Code section 7827.
The
California Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the state must present
clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness at the hearing under
section 366.26. (
Cal.4th 242, 253 (Cynthia D.).) Although such evidence must appear before
parental rights can be terminated, a finding of unfitness need not be made at
the section 366.26 hearing itself.
“[T]he purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate
further evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to begin
the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family placement. [] By the time the dependency proceedings
have reached the stage of a section 366.26 hearing, there have been multiple
specific findings of parental unfitness . . . there have been a
series of hearings involving ongoing reunification efforts and, at each
hearing, there was a statutory presumption that the child should be returned to
the custody of the parent. (§§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f), 366.22, subd.
(a).) Only if, over this entire period
of time, the state continually has established that a return to custody to the
parent would be detrimental to the child is the section 366.26 stage even
reached.†(Cynthia D., at p. 253, fn. omitted.)
Mother
argues that the termination order in this case cannot be upheld under
children and, in this case, the children suffered no actual harm as a result of
mother’s mental disorder. The court in
cases involving actual harm. (See
parent’s mental illness was not required for termination of parental
rights].)
We
also disagree with mother’s suggestion that Cynthia
D. does not apply because there was no finding of “fault†in this
case. At the
jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the court made findings (not challenged
on appeal) that mother had “mental health problems which greatly impact her
ability to safely care for the children.â€
The twins were removed from mother’s custody after the court found clear
and convincing evidence that return to mother would present a substantial risk
of danger to their physical safety or their physical and emotional well
being. This finding was the equivalent
of a finding of parental unfitness and satisfies due process. (In re
P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211–1213.) Mother cites no authority to support her
claim that the court was additionally required to follow the procedures of
Family Code section 7827 at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
hearing.
Nor
are we persuaded by mother’s citations to David
B., supra, 91 Cal.App.3d 184 and
946. Both involve the termination of
parental rights of a mentally disabled parent in cases under Civil Code former
section 232, a different statutory scheme.
In neither case was the parent offered reunification services before the
termination of parental rights.
Appellant
complains that the procedures of Family Code section 7827 are more “rigorousâ€
than a termination proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26, but she overlooks that a parent in a dependency proceeding
has an opportunity to reunify that is not contemplated by the Family Code. And, in cases where reunification services
are denied based on mental defect or mental illness, the Family Code procedures
are afforded under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(2).
Mother
has not established a denial of due process.
II.
Mother
alternatively argues that the court should have selected something less drastic
than adoption as the permanent plan, citing the “beneficial relationshipâ€
exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We disagree.
At
a hearing under section 366.26, the court may order one of three alternative
plans: adoption (necessitating the termination of parental rights),
guardianship or long-term foster care.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1), (c)(4)(A).)
If the child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption
over the other alternatives. (
297 (S.B.).) Once the court determines the child is
adoptable (as the twins indisputably were), a parent seeking a less restrictive
plan has the burden of showing that the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B). (S.B., at p. 297.)
Section
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides for one such exception when “[t]he
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.†The “benefit†necessary to trigger this
exception has been judicially construed to mean, “the relationship promotes the
well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the
child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the
strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous
placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would
confer. If severing the natural
parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the
preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not
terminated.†(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (
1347 (Jasmine D.).) It is not enough to show that the parent and
child have a friendly and loving relationship.
(See In re Brian R. (1991) 2
Cal.App.4th 904, 924; In re Beatrice M.
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418 (Beatrice M.).) “ ‘Interaction between [a] natural parent and
child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child[,]’ †but the
beneficial relationship exception contemplates that the parents have “occupied
a parental role.†(Beatrice M., at p. 1419.)
Case
law is divided as to the correct standard for appellate review of an order
determining the applicability of the beneficial relationship exception. Most published decisions have reviewed such
orders for substantial evidence. (See,
e.g., In re Christopher L. (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333; Autumn H.,
standard. (See, e.g.,
The
beneficial relationship exception requires a parent to show that he or she has
had regular visitation and contact with the child and that the child would
benefit by continuing the relationship.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
These are essentially factual determinations that should be upheld on
appeal if supported by substantial evidence.
On the other hand, the ultimate decision as to whether these factors
outweigh the benefit of adoption; i.e., whether there is “a compelling reason
for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child†(§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)), is a “quintessentially discretionary determination.†(Jasmine
D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p.
1351; see also In re C.B. (2010)
190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123.) In any event,
the “practical differences between the two standards of review are not
significant,†and as a reviewing court, we should interfere only if the facts,
viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, were such that no
reasonable judge could have taken the challenged action. (Jasmine
D., at p. 1351.)
Turning
to the specifics of this case, we cannot say that no reasonable judge would
have terminated parental rights based on the evidence presented. The evidence showed that mother loved her
children, but suffered from mental health issues that prevented her from
assuming custody. The twins had been
placed in an adoptive home, where they were doing extremely well and had bonded
with the foster mother. The twins’
relationship with mother, though positive in many ways, was described by the
social worker as similar to that with a favorite aunt. It was reasonable for the court to conclude
that the benefits of a stable home would outweigh any harm the twins might
suffer as a result of terminating mother’s rights.
Mother
notes that the trial judge “curiously†ruled that she had not met her burden of
proving the beneficial relationship exception while at the same time finding
that the children would benefit from a continuing relationship. The court’s comment about a continuing
relationship with mother was made in the context of an order referring the case
to an outside agency to create a post-adoption visitation agreement—something
the adoptive mother supported. The
court’s belief that the children would benefit from some contact with mother
for purposes of making this referral does not contradict its finding that the
benefit of adoption into a stable home outweighed the benefit of maintaining
mother’s parental rights.
III. DISPOSITION
The
judgment (order terminating parental rights) is affirmed.
NEEDHAM,
J.
We concur.
JONES, P. J.
SIMONS, J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] Further statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
noncustodial parent, as their father has not been identified.
