CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Jack Jackson was convicted in 1997 of two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1) [formerly Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)].) Because he had prior convictions that qualified as “strikes,” he was sentenced as a “third strike” offender to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on each count (running concurrently). In the underlying action, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to be resentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Reform Act or the Act), because during the commission of the offense he was armed with a firearm. In his appeal, appellant contends the court erred in concluding his offense was ineligible for resentencing under the Reform Act. We affirm.

Defendant James Robinson, Jr. was convicted of corporal injury to his girlfriend after he punched her and grabbed her arms, causing bruises. On appeal, he argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, and the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser included offense. We find no error and affirm.

Leonardo C. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s April 22, 2016 orders terminating jurisdiction, granting mother sole legal and physical custody of their children L.C. and R.C., and ordering monitored visits for father. Father had sexually abused the children’s half sister, Y.S., and, though he attended counseling, he continued to deny the sexual abuse. His only contention on appeal is that the court abused its discretion by failing to order joint legal custody of L.C. and R.C. to mother and father.

Jorge Tejada appeals a postjudgment order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. (Pen. Code, § 4852.01.) The trial court found that appellant’s 1996 conviction for lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (c)) rendered appellant ineligible for relief. (§ 4852.01, subd. (c).) We affirm. “The standards for determining whether rehabilitation has occurred are high. . . . [T]here is no circumstance under which the statutory scheme requires or guarantees issuance of a certificate of rehabilitation . . . .” (People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 887-888.)

In 2003, appellant Jonathan J. Headman, Jr., was named as a defendant in a wrongful death lawsuit after his brother, Timothy Headman, struck and killed two pedestrians while driving a pickup truck. The lawsuit, filed by respondents Ung Tiong Ung, Ai Lang Yong, Margaret Shin Ung, Shin Yu Yung, Anabel Shung We Ong, Abigail Shung Qi Ong, and San San Seah, the survivors of the two pedestrians, alleged that Timothy was employed by appellant and was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Respondents attempted to personally serve appellant several times with the summons and the complaint but were unable to complete service. Thereafter, the trial court granted their application to serve appellant by publication. In 2004, the San Jose Post Record published notice of the summons four times. Appellant failed to appear in the action, and the trial court entered a default judgment against him in 2005.

M.G. (born in 2000) was removed from her mother’s custody when mother gave birth to a child who, along with mother, tested positive for methamphetamine. At the time of M.G.’s removal, M.G.’s father was incarcerated, with an anticipated release date in 2021.
Father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to M.G. He contends the juvenile court failed to decide his form JV-505 petition requesting presumed father status. Father argues there was substantial evidence supporting a finding he is M.G.’s presumed father. Father also contends his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by failing to litigate vigorously the issue of presumed fatherhood. We conclude the juvenile court’s failure to rule on father’s JV-505 petition does not constitute prejudicial error. There likewise was no IAC, because any ineffectiveness by defense counsel in not ensuring the petition was heard and granted was not prejudicial.

Plaintiffs Victor H. Rodriguez and Angelita B. Rodríguez appeal from a judgment entered after the court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to their first amended complaint (FAC). The issues on appeal involve foreclosure proceedings brought against plaintiffs by defendants ReconTrust Company and Bank of America. Based on our independent review, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Victoria Williams was charged by information with animal cruelty (Pen. Code., § 597, subd. (a); count 1), animal abuse and neglect (§ 597, subd. (b); count 2) and animal endangerment (§ 597.7, subd. (a); count 3). The information also alleged two prior prison convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The jury acquitted defendant of count 1 but found her guilty of counts 2 and 3. After defendant admitted her two prison priors, the court imposed a split sentence on count 2 of two years in county jail and two years of mandatory supervision. (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) The court stayed punishment on count 3 (§ 654, subd. (a)).
On appeal, defendant contends that her conviction on count 3 must be reversed for lack of sufficient evidence as a result of her proposed construction of section 597.7; that the court's imposition of probation conditions requiring her probation officer's approval of residence and employment were overbroad and unenforceable; and th

Defendant James W. Neal appeals from the judgment entered following trial at which the jury found him guilty of sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for a five-year period on certain terms and conditions.
Defendant contends the judgment must be reversed, because the trial court denied his motion for a mistrial based on references during trial to the absence of audio on the videotape of the drug transaction and his later mistrial motion based on a brief and somewhat vague reference to gangs. Further, he contends cumulative errors also mandate reversal of the judgment.

D.W. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging that D.W. committed two counts of resisting arrest. D.W. argues that the officers lacked authority to detain him because there was no objective manifestation of criminal activity. We agree and reverse because the officer’s directives were unlawful.

Victor Luevanos and Juan Hernandez were convicted of second degree robbery with gang and firearm enhancements. On appeal, they argue that the prosecution introduced case-specific testimonial hearsay statements prohibited by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). Luevanos also argues the trial court improperly denied his requests for a continuance made in conjunction with his motion to represent himself (Faretta motion). We find no reversible error and affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Rosa Rosas (Rosas) and Julio Casas (Casas) (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal an order denying their motion for reconsideration of an order vacating entries of default and default judgments that Plaintiffs obtained against defendants and respondents Richard Mooney (Mooney) and Kensington Caterers, Inc. (Kensington) (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs also appeal a subsequent order insofar as it compels their attorneys to return funds seized from Defendants’ accounts pursuant to the vacated judgments.

A jury convicted Jonathan Torres and Jimmy Diaz of attempted murder in connection with the a gang-related shooting. We affirm the convictions over contentions the trial court erred by refusing to allow read-back of testimony during deliberations, refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense, and admitting photographic lineup and in-court identifications by the victim. We also reject a challenge to the sentence the trial court imposed.

In January of this year we affirmed the conviction of Edward Robert Starski for “the unlawful practice of law . . . , the misdemeanor charge that was the cornerstone of felony charges of attempted grand theft and two counts of conspiring to commit those offenses.” (People v. Starski (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 215, 218.) Imposition of sentence was suspended, and defendant was admitted to probation upon specified conditions, one of which was that he not leave the state without the approval of his probation officer or the court. The question presented is whether defendant was legitimately found to have violated that condition, and thereafter ordered to serve 30 days in the county jail.