CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Manuel Gustavo Hernandez Guzman (Defendant), as charged, of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(4)), five counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 (id., § 288, subd. (a)), one count of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10 (id., § 288.7, subd. (a)), and two counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child under the age of 10 (id., § 288.7, subd. (b)). The jury also found true allegations that, as to each of the counts, Defendant committed the offense charged against more than one victim. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total of 55 years to life in prison.

A contingency fee provision in an attorney retainer agreement (the Retainer Agreement) provides: “Client agrees to pay to Attorney a fee of 33-1/3 percent of any recovery. If Attorney is unable to obtain money for Client in this case, then Attorney will receive no Attorney fee at all.” David C. Kadin, the attorney, represented ABS Power Brake, Inc. (ABS), and Pedro Gomez, Guillermo Lopez, and Lucio Gomez (the Gomez Brothers) in a lawsuit against an insurer, its agent, and its broker. In settlement of the lawsuit, ABS and the Gomez Brothers received $1.1 million in cash, and the insurer agreed to obtain (for an undisclosed amount) a satisfaction of a $12.88 million judgment against ABS and the Gomez Brothers in a federal trademark lawsuit.

Appellant J.M., a minor, appeals from the dispositional order in this matter, finding true the contention that appellant committed the crime of rape, accomplished by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of another. (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2).) Following our review of appellant’s initial brief, filed pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we requested supplemental briefing addressing three issues concerning appellant’s advisement regarding registration under section 290 and any potential claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising at the time of appellant’s plea. Appellant responded to that request by contending his plea advisement was improper, that he would not have admitted the petition if properly advised, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his dispositional hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

David K. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to his now six-year-old son, David. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

In this consolidated appeal, appellant R.F., father of minor D.F., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders entered at a pretrial hearing (case No. C081529) and the subsequent contested review hearing (case No. C081913). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) His sole contention is that the juvenile court erred in revoking his pro per status at the pretrial hearing, based on undue delay for the minor. We affirm.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Paula J. Roach, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellants F.L.J. (Father) and N.B. (Mother) appeal a juvenile court judgment terminating their parental rights to seven-year-old A.J. and three-year-old F.J. (the children), and choosing adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted.) Father also appeals the court's order denying his modification petition seeking custody and placement of the children with him, or placement with family maintenance services.

Defendant and appellant Eric A. Klein appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to purchase respondent Karen W. Diggs’ membership interest in respondent Cultured Gourmet, LLC, pursuant to Corporations Code, section 17707.03, subdivision (c). The court did not err.
Appellant and respondent Diggs are the sole members of Cultured Gourmet, LLC (LLC). In March 2015, respondents filed the present action against appellant, asserting causes of action for, among other things, expulsion of appellant from the LLC, involuntary dissolution of the LLC, breach of contract, and fraud. In November 2015, respondents filed an amended complaint asserting the same causes of action.

When a child who was conceived, born, and lived in Germany was six years old, the German Institute for Youth Human Services and Family Law (German Institute) sent a support petition to the State of California requesting assistance in seeking child support from her father, M.B, who resides in California. Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) as adopted by the California Legislature, the trial court entered a paternity judgment and ordered M.B. to pay child support. M.B. appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside the judgment he filed two years after the judgment was entered. He asserts the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and he is entitled to have the judgment set aside because he presented evidence that another German became the child’s presumed father by taking care of her along with his own biological daughter. Because both arguments are completely without merit, we affirm.

Appellant Thomas O’Toole appeals from a judgment entered in this dissolution proceeding requiring his former wife, respondent Julie Greenlaw, to pay him spousal and child support. O’Toole contends that the trial court made a number of errors in calculating and awarding this support, which he considers to be too low. We affirm.

In this action challenging a nonjudicial foreclosure of rental property, Erlinda Aniel and her son, Marc Aniel, (the Aniels) appeal from a stipulated judgment after the trial court granted certain defense motions in limine regarding the evidence that could not be presented at trial on the Aniels’ cause of action fraud. Previously, the trial court had sustained demurrers dismissing, among other things, the Aniels’ claim for wrongful foreclosure. We conclude the Aniels’ first amended complaint failed to allege a viable cause of action for wrongful foreclosure and that the trial did not abuse its discretion in preventing evidence related to this claim at trial. Additionally, the trial court did not err in dismissing Erlinda as party for lack of standing. Finally, the Aniels challenge the trial court order awarding attorney fees to defendants and respondents American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (AHMSI) and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Harborview Mortgag

Defendant and appellant Jonathan Sears pled no contest to one count of grand theft from the person (Pen. Code § 487, subd. (c)), and the trial court imposed a two-year prison term. Sears’ counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable sentencing or other post-plea issues. (See Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not filed a supplemental brief. We direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment and otherwise affirm.

Appellant V Stiviano received valuable gifts from the husband of respondent Rochelle Sterling. All of the gifts were derived from community property, and Ms. Sterling did not consent to any of them. Ms. Sterling sued Ms. Stiviano for return of the gifts. Relying on Family Code section 1100, subdivision (b), the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Sterling, setting aside the gifts and ordering Ms. Stiviano to return the gifts or their value to Ms. Sterling on behalf of her marital community.
Ms. Stiviano appeals from the judgment, contending the trial court did not have authority to grant this relief. Her contentions have no merit, and we affirm the judgment.

Jamel Walker appeals from the denial of his petition to recall his sentence under Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18), which reduced certain theft-related and drug-related felonies to misdemeanors. In August 2014, appellant pled guilty to one count of second degree commercial burglary (§ 459) and admitted one prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). After Proposition 47 was passed in November 2014, appellant filed a petition alleging that his conviction should be reduced to a misdemeanor because the value of the property he took did not exceed $950. In this appeal, he challenges only the denial of his Proposition 47 petition. We conclude that appellant has failed to meet his burden of establishing eligibility for relief under Proposition 47 and therefore affirm.

Defendant Jason Santana appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after Santana pled guilty to one count of carrying a concealed firearm. The trial court sentenced Santana, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 240 days in custody and three years of probation. Santana challenges two of the conditions of probation that the trial court imposed. Specifically, Santana first contends that a Fourth Amendment waiver that requires him to submit to searches of his computers and other recordable media is an unreasonable probation condition under the test set forth in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), and is also unconstitutionally overbroad. Next, Santana contends that a probation condition that prohibits him from being in a building, vehicle or in the presence of a person who possesses a firearm or ammunition is unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore should be stricken.