CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Ryan Neil Shropshire appeals from a judgment of conviction in Placer County following a plea of no contest to one count of possession of concentrated cannabis in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (a) (count two). He was sentenced to two years in state prison. This case involves a search warrant authorizing a search for stolen property in El Dorado County, the execution of which resulted in the seizure of controlled substances, which the Placer County prosecutor intended to use as evidence in this Placer County prosecution.

T.M., a minor, appeals from an order adjudicating him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). The juvenile court found true the allegations that T.M. possessed a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610; count 1), carried an unregistered loaded firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 2), and possessed live ammunition (§ 29650; count 3). It also found true an allegation that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). The court ordered T.M. to serve six months of probation at his home.

This is an appeal from the sentence imposed after the court revoked probation. Appellant Henry L. Palacios contends the court erred in imposing sentence without first obtaining an updated probation report, even though his counsel agreed to immediate sentencing and did not object to the absence of an updated report. The People contend the trial court was obligated to obtain a new report, but that the failure to do so was harmless. We are satisfied any error that may have occurred is harmless on this record. Accordingly, we will affirm.

Mother appeals from an order terminating dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3 and placing S.E., her now five-year-old son, under a legal guardianship with his paternal relatives. Mother contends the court abused its discretion by terminating jurisdiction in the face of concerns regarding visitation and the condition of the guardians’ home. We find no abuse of discretion and shall affirm the order.

Appellant’s counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised appellant of his right to file a supplemental brief (see People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106), and appellant filed a timely brief contending that the trial court could not require him to waive custody credits while in a residential treatment facility, that his waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s Romero motion to strike a prior strike conviction. We affirm.

Natalia K. (mother) appeals from a May 19, 2016 order summarily denying her May 11, 2016 petition to change court orders under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. As explained below, mother’s appeal is moot because in a related appeal (B278288), this court affirmed an order terminating mother’s parental rights, and there is no effective relief that can be granted in this appeal.
While the current appeal was pending, the dependency court terminated mother’s parental rights at a hearing under section 366.26 on October 4, 2016. Mother appealed the October 4, 2016 orders, challenging the dependency court’s denial of a different section 388 petition and arguing the court could not find the children were likely to be adopted without first requiring compliance with the Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention (the Convention). Mother sought to consolidate the two appeals in March 2017, pointing out that they “arise from the same facts, same

Appellant Joshua Reid Keyes appeals from the trial court’s judgment following his guilty plea to robbery and attempted robbery and admission to a prior strike conviction. He contends the trial court erred in its response to his request to represent himself at an earlier point in the criminal proceeding. (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).) We affirm.

Defendant Lucio Hernandez, Jr., was convicted by no contest plea of felony possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), a conviction the trial court later reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18). On appeal, he contends (1) he is no longer subject to postrelease community supervision (PRCS), (2) he is no longer subject to the registration requirements of Health and Safety Code section 11590, and (3) his excess custody credits should be applied to reduce his fines and fees pursuant to section 2900.5. The People concede these points, and we agree.

The only issue in this appeal is whether a Marsden hearing should have been held at the conclusion of a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Nikki D., the mother of minor Lucy M., has appealed from the order terminating her parental rights, asserting that she should have had a Marsden hearing after she expressed dissatisfaction with her court-appointed counsel. She contends the failure to hold this hearing warrants reversal of the order.
We affirm the order. Nikki waited too long to complain about her lawyer. And even if the court should have stopped, held a Marsden hearing, and appointed new counsel for her, Nikki was not prejudiced. The proceedings were over, and there was nothing a new attorney could have done going forward.

This is an appeal from an order denying Charles L. Hallgren's petition to have his second degree burglary conviction reclassified as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18; the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act). The question presented is whether entering a commercial establishment with the intent to commit a nonlarceny theft of less than $950 can be classified as misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5.

Kevin Tran and Linh Tran appeal from the trial court’s order granting Brian and Khanh Nguyen’s motion to confirm an arbitrator’s award. The arbitration resolved a dispute arising from a settlement agreement that unwound an investment and real estate transaction between the Nguyens and multiple parties, including the Trans, Pegasus Investment Group, LLC (Pegasus), and Shelley Investment, LLC (Shelley). As we explain, we dismiss Linh Tran’s appeal for lack of standing because the Nguyens did not seek or obtain an arbitration ruling against her. Kevin Tran forfeited the five issues he now attempts to raise for the first time on appeal because he did not assert them in his opposition to the Nguyens’ motion to confirm the arbitration award. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order granting the Nguyens’ motion to confirm the award. We also grant the Nguyens’ motion on appeal for $1,275 in sanctions for the Trans’ failure to follow the rules of appellate procedure.

Defendant William Doug Fletcher, a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO), contends on appeal that (1) he gave no personal waiver of his right to a jury trial in his MDO case, as required by People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 (Blackburn), and (2) the trial court erred in revoking his outpatient status pursuant to Penal Code section 1608. The People concede that the trial court’s error requires that we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We agree.

Petitioner Foremost Insurance Company (Foremost) seeks relief from an order granting the petition of real party in interest Gordon Blackwell to compel an appraisal under an insurance policy issued by Foremost to Blackwell’s deceased father. We grant the requested relief and remand to the trial court with directions to deny Blackwell’s petition to compel.

Defendant Luis Armando Delavega appeals from the judgment following trial at which the jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and carrying a loaded firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 2) and found true the allegations that, as to the murder, he personally used a firearm and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which also caused great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). The trial court found true that he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to prison to the two-year midterm on count 2, and on count 1 to a consecutive term of 25 years to life, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 12022.53. The court imposed and stayed (§ 654) another 25-year-to-life term under subdivision (b) of that same section and struck the one-year prior prison term enhancement.