Filed 7/24/17 In re S.E. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re S.E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BUREAU OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
F.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.


A150289

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J14-01172)


Mother appeals from an order terminating dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3 and placing S.E., her now five-year-old son, under a legal guardianship with his paternal relatives. Mother contends the court abused its discretion by terminating jurisdiction in the face of concerns regarding visitation and the condition of the guardians’ home. We find no abuse of discretion and shall affirm the order.
Factual and Procedural Background
On October 31, 2014, the Contra Costa County Bureau of Children and Family Services (the bureau) filed a petition alleging that the then two-year-old child was at risk of serious physical harm under section 300, subdivision (b) due to mother’s substance abuse. The petition also alleged that S.E. was at risk of harm under subdivision (j) based on an allegation that mother hit his sibling in the face with a belt. S.E. was detained and placed with his maternal grandmother. In December 2014, the allegations of the petition were sustained. At the February 2015 disposition hearing mother was granted reunification services and supervised weekly visitation.
At the July 2015 six-month review hearing, the court granted mother an additional six months of reunification services. At the time of the hearing, the bureau reported that S.E. was still with the maternal grandmother but that an application for placement had been received from the paternal aunt and uncle and the bureau was assessing their home for possible placement.
In November 2015, the social worker report requested a brief continuance of the 12-month review hearing. The social worker reported that mother was doing well on her case plan and indicated that the bureau anticipated recommending the continuation of reunification service. The report expressed concerns, however, about mother’s untruthfulness regarding her ongoing contact with her previous boyfriend. The bureau also reported that S.E. had been placed with his paternal aunt and uncle and was doing well in his placement.
In February 2016, the bureau recommended termination of mother’s reunification services. The social worker’s report explains that the bureau discovered that mother had not terminated her relationship with her boyfriend as she previously reported. At the 12-month review hearing, the court terminated mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for June 15, 2016. Mother was afforded visitation once a month in a therapeutic setting. In May 2016, the court permitted mother to have supervised rather than therapeutic visits with her son.
In June 2016, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting her son be placed in her care and custody under a plan of family maintenance or, alternatively, for an additional six months of services. The court denied mother’s motion, finding that she had not demonstrated changed circumstances or that additional reunification services were in the child’s best interests. In a prior appeal, this court affirmed the denial of mother’s modification petition. (In re S.E. (May 5, 2015, A149216) [nonpub. opn.].)
On June 27, 2016, the court continued the section 366.26 hearing to allow the bureau 30 days to investigate an allegation that S.E. was being physically abused by the paternal relatives. On July 27, 2016, the bureau reported to the court that the “investigation was deemed to be inconclusive in that [S.E.] did not disclose that there had been any physical abuse, however, another child in the home did, in fact, disclose that she had seen the caretaker tell [S.E.] to go get a belt and then proceeded to swat him with the belt.” Concerned about the allegations of abuse, as well as “other issues in terms of the bed for the child in the home, the make-up of the home, [and] people who were allowed to move into the home,” the court continued the section 366.26 hearing to December. At the same hearing, the court increased mother’s visits to weekly supervised visits.
At the continued section 366.26 hearing on December 12, 2016, the bureau recommended legal guardianship with the paternal aunt and uncle as the permanent plan for the child. The bureau’s report states, “The paternal uncle and aunt appear to be a loving couple who is committed to caring for [S.E.]. They remain committed to providing [him] with a stable, permanent and loving home thus they would like to become [his] legal guardians until such time that they can complete an adoption home study in order to move forward in finalizing an adoption.” The bureau reported that the paternal relatives had “completed a six-week positive parenting class” and that although they were initially upset that the court ordered them to attend, “they quickly came to realize that the class was beneficial to them. They learned different techniques and skills that they feel have benefited their parenting of not only [S.E.] but their two children who reside in the home.” The bureau also recommended that “any future visitation between the child and mother continue to be supervised and the prospective guardians have agreed to supervised visits. The prospective guardians have also agreed that the visits take place on the second Sunday of each month for a few hours at a neutral, public place in Modesto. The visitations arrangements have been discussed with [mother] and she is agreeable to the proposed plan as she now has a vehicle in which she can make the drive to Modesto.”
At the hearing, mother indicated that she was in agreement with the bureau’s recommendation but was requesting visitation twice a month. She asked further that “the caregivers . . . step back a little bit [during the visits] and let her and [her son] just interact with each other instead of her interacting with a whole group of people.” Mother also asked that the caregivers not bring their other children to the visits. The bureau indicated that because the child “is wanting to attend sports activities,” the caregivers would “prefer not to tie up two weekends a month with visits. [The paternal aunt] did however say that she’s willing to supervise the visits in Modesto. And she’s open to additional time if it’s a birthday or a visit to the pumpkin farm or Santa, something like that, up to 4 hours when mom is in Modesto visiting so that they can have that additional time.” The bureau also indicated that the guardians had chosen the second Sunday because one of the other children had her own visitation that day and would not be present and assured mother that a social worker would “speak with [the guardians] about ensuring that [the other child] is not present during the visits, so that it’s just kind of [S.E.’s] time” with mother.
The court adopted the bureau’s recommendations, ordered legal guardianship for S.E. with once-a-month visitation, vacated dependency jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal.
Discussion
Under section 366.3, subdivision (a), if a relative is appointed legal guardian of a child at a section 366.26 hearing and the child has been placed with the relative for at least six months, the court must, “except . . . upon a finding of exceptional circumstances, terminate its dependency jurisdiction and retain jurisdiction over the child as a ward of the guardianship, as authorized by Section 366.4.”
Because S.E. had been in the custody of his paternal relatives for almost 17 months at the time of the hearing, the juvenile court was required to terminate dependency jurisdiction unless it found “exceptional circumstances” warranting continued jurisdiction. “The statute does not define ‘exceptional circumstances.’ However, because a primary difference between dependency and guardianship jurisdiction is the extent of oversight, it stands to reason that exceptional circumstances exist where the circumstances of the parties create a heightened need for judicial oversight.” (In re Ethan J. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 654, 660.) “We review the juvenile court's decision to terminate its dependency jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
Mother argues that the unresolved “concerns over mother’s ability to have meaningful supervised visits and . . . conditions in the legal guardian’s home” are exceptional circumstances that warrant continuing dependency jurisdiction. Mother concedes that she did not raise this argument in the trial court and that her failure to raise the argument would ordinarily result in its forfeiture on appeal. She contends, however, that this court should exercise its discretion to review the matter because the facts are not disputed and the “effect or legal significance of those facts is a question of law.” We disagree.
The arguments raised by mother on appeal are precisely the type of arguments for which the forfeiture rule was designed. (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [“ ‘The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver . . . . Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.’ ”) In this case, mother not only failed to raise her arguments but expressly agreed to the recommendation that jurisdiction be terminated. In any event, mother’s arguments do not establish an abuse of discretion.
With respect to visitation, mother claims that without continued jurisdiction, the court will be unable to ensure that the caregivers do not interfere with her visits by bringing their own children and interacting with her as a group. The court addressed this issue explaining, “I don’t think the court really is in a position to set rules about how the visits are conducted. The alternative to allowing the guardian to supervise these visits [is] to have it supervised by a professional paid for by mom, which may be cost prohibited and then result in no visits and only when mom can afford to pay a supervisor. It could be that the legal guardian has no one else to watch the children so has to bring the children along. . . . I understand why that’s not ideal because it’s distracting for [S.E.] in terms of spending time with mom; and also, for me to say step back and allow some time together, there is no enforceable order I can establish around that.” The court reasonably concluded that allowing the guardians to supervise visitation was mother’s best chance at maintaining regular visitation and given the guardians’ expressed willingness to support visitation, there is no basis to conclude that ongoing jurisdiction was necessary to ensure visitation.
Mother also argues that continued jurisdiction is necessary based on the concerns raised earlier in the proceedings regarding the allegations of physical abuse and the appropriateness of the guardian’s home. As the court noted in July 2016, when the allegations of physical abuse were first raised, it was unclear that the conduct rose to the level of abuse. More importantly, the social worker reported that since then the guardians had completed a parenting course, which included learning skills and techniques for appropriate discipline. Had any concerns remained for mother, she was obligated to raise them in the trial court. The same is true about any generalized concerns about the appropriateness of the home. There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s finding that there are no exceptional circumstances that warrant continued jurisdiction.
Disposition
The order terminating dependency jurisdiction is affirmed.

Pollak, J.

We concur:

McGuiness, P. J.
Siggins, J.