CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs and appellants Elia Rezkalla and Rezk Rezk (collectively, plaintiffs) sued defendants and respondents Wael Haddad and Jamal Jamil Khoury. In May 2014, the trial court entered a default judgment against Haddad and Khoury (collectively, defendants). In December 2015, the trial court granted relief from the default, vacating the default and default judgment. Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by granting relief. We affirm.

Appellants Gil Palacios and Micki Howard own a hillside home in respondent City of San Luis Obispo (the City). Down-slope neighbors built a home that is, in appellants’ view, too tall. Appellants sued the City for approving the neighbors’ plans and issuing a building permit. They assert that the City should have withheld its approval because the house violates guidelines governing the residential development where appellants live.

Appellant Jonathan Arthur Westbrook pled no contest to unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and admitted that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

After a preliminary hearing, Waiton was charged by information with making criminal threats (a felony) and exhibiting a deadly weapon (a misdemeanor) in violation of section 422 and section 417, subdivision (a)(1), respectively. On November 18, 2014, Waiton’s appointed attorney declared a doubt as to Waiton’s competency to stand trial. Waiton made a motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) seeking appointment of a different attorney. After an in camera hearing, the trial court granted Waiton’s motion and appointed a second attorney to represent him.
On January 6, 2015, Waiton’s second attorney declared a doubt as to Waiton’s competency to stand trial. Again, Waiton made a Marsden motion. The trial court held another in camera hearing and denied this second Marsden motion. The trial court then, pursuant to section 1368, suspended criminal proceedings and appointed two psychologists to evaluate Waiton’s competency. Waiton refused to speak to eit

A jury convicted appellant Santos Anguiano Verduzco on two counts each of attempted voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 192), a lesser included offense of the attempted murder charged in counts 1 and 2, and discharging a firearm into a motor vehicle (§ 246/counts 6 and 7), three counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)/counts 3, 4, and 5), and one count each of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1))/count 8), and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)/count 9).

Defendant and appellant Melvin Hiram Thomas II appeals from the trial court’s order denying his Proposition 47 petition seeking to reduce his 2004 felony conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18.
Defendant claims his Proposition 47 petition was erroneously denied because, in enacting Proposition 47, the voters intended to include all felony theft-related offenses under $950, including convictions for receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d) worth $950 or less, within the class of felony convictions eligible to be designated as misdemeanors under Proposition 47.

Appellant Kayla Michelle Thomas pled no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) in case No. SF018266B and to failure to appear (§1320.5) in case No. SF018460A. Thomas also admitted an on bail enhancement (§ 12022.1) in case No. SF018460A.
Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Naasir Ali Talibdeen appeals following his no contest plea to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and two counts of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in the performance of her duties (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant also admitted he had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and had served 11 prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In exchange for appellant’s plea, the trial court dismissed the strike and prison priors and sentenced him to two years in state prison. Concurrent 180-day county jail terms were imposed on the two resisting counts. Appellant was also ordered to pay various fines and fees and was awarded 210 days of presentence custody credit.

Defendant Amie Robin Silva was convicted of four drug-related offenses arising from two separate incidents in which methamphetamine was found on or near her person. On appeal, Silva contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to sever. She also contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt. We affirm.

Appellants Patrick Shields and Wynn Brewer appeal their convictions arising from a conspiracy to murder. They argue the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury about the lesser included offenses of assault with a deadly weapon and voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that even if the offense of conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm is a lesser included offense under the accusatory pleading test, there was no substantial evidence of a conspiracy to commit assault presented at trial. Furthermore, any error in failing to instruct on this lesser crime was harmless as there was no prejudice to appellants. The trial court also properly refused appellants’ requested instruction on conspiracy to commit voluntary manslaughter, a request unsupported by the law or the evidence presented at trial.

Robert Sendejas appeals his conviction by jury for assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) and making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)) with a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)). He was sentenced to 12 years state prison. Appellant contends that a 15-month prefiling delay violated his due process rights and that the trial court committed evidentiary and sentencing errors. We affirm the judgment of conviction but remand for resentencing.

A jury found defendant Dawood Saraei guilty of making criminal threats to one victim and, in a separate incident, committing battery on a second victim, a custodial officer. On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his pretrial motion to sever the two charges against him and try them separately. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Defendant Jose Gerardo Rangel was convicted of perpetrating a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a), count 1) based on an incident involving a nine-year-old foster child. He also was convicted of both orally copulating a person under 14 who was more than 10 years younger than he (§ 288a, subd. (c)(1), count 2), and orally copulating a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b), count 3) in connection with a second incident involving a different foster child. The trial court, sitting as trier of fact, also found the multiple victim enhancement true as to counts 1 and 2. (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e).) The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of 30 years to life, staying the sentence on count 3 pursuant to section 654.

A jury convicted Miguel Ramos of three counts of forcible lewd acts with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1) ; counts 1, 3, and 4) and one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. (a)(3); count 2). The trial court sentenced Ramos to 3 five-year consecutive terms for counts 1, 3, and 4, and a consecutive 15-year to life term for count 2 for an aggregate term of 30 years to life in state prison.
Ramos contends there is insufficient evidence of force or duress to support the convictions for forcible lewd conduct (counts 1, 3, and 4). We affirm.