CA Unpub Decisions

After a jurisdiction/disposition hearing in dependency proceedings involving S.M. (a boy born in December 2008), the juvenile court sustained the dependency petition, declared S.M. a dependent, ordered that he be removed from the custody of his mother, S.M. (Mother), and ordered that reunification services be provided to Mother. Mother appeals the disposition order, contending the court (1) should have appointed a guardian ad litem for her, and (2) should have continued the jurisdiction/disposition hearing to address whether to appoint a guardian ad litem. We affirm.

K.M. (mother) and C.V. (father) separately appeal the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over their infant daughter O.V. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). As for the allegations against mother, the evidence showed mother used marijuana regularly while pregnant; O.V. tested positive for marijuana at birth; mother breastfed O.V. despite being warned not to breastfeed with marijuana in her system; mother and father regularly use medical marijuana outside the presence of O.V.; and neither parent believed marijuana to be harmful to O.V. This constituted substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that mother’s drug use placed O.V. at a risk of future harm. We therefore affirm the court’s order on that basis. Because the sustained allegations against mother were sufficient to support the court’s orders, we dismiss father’s appeal as nonjusticiable.

While the victim was walking on a pier with her family, defendant and appellant K.D. (minor) aided and abetted an adult who attempted to steal the victim’s purse. Following a jurisdictional hearing, the San Diego County Juvenile Court found true that minor aided and abetted an attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211/664). After the case was transferred to Riverside County, the Riverside County Juvenile Court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation. Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s true finding minor aided and abetted an attempted robbery. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

J.S., a minor, appeals from an order adjudicating him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). Following a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegation that he committed an assault (Pen. Code, § 240). The court placed J.S. on home probation.
J.S. contends the juvenile court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when it admitted statements he made to the police without Miranda warnings. We correct the disposition minute order to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement, but otherwise affirm.

E.E., a minor, contends on appeal the juvenile court erred in failing to specify the maximum period of physical confinement at the disposition hearing. The People concede error, and we will remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to set the maximum physical confinement time.

Appellant Georgina Huskey appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of her former employer, respondent California Department of Social Services (Department). Huskey, a supervisor in the Department’s north branch office in Los Angeles, filed suit alleging she was subjected to sexually harassing conduct by her subordinate, Dr. Emery Jakab, which was so severe and pervasive as to create a hostile work environment. Her first amended complaint sought damages for sexual harassment; failure to stop harassment; and failure to prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). The trial court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment, ruling Huskey could not establish a sexual harassment claim as matter of law because her evidence was insufficient to establish Jakab’s harassing conduct towards her was severe when viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person in her position.

Antoinette served a copy of the trust, as originally executed, on all of the beneficiaries; with it, she served a notice that started a 120-day limitations period on any action to contest the trust. During the 120-day period, however, she served a copy of a purported amendment to the trust on all of the beneficiaries. The amendment reduced George’s share of the trust. After the 120-day period had run, she filed a petition asking the trial court to rule that the amendment was valid.
George opposed the petition on the ground that it was, in substance, an action to contest the trust, and therefore it was time-barred. The trial court rejected this argument and granted the petition. We find no error. Hence, we will affirm.

Randolph Ramirez (Randy) appeals from the probate court’s orders made on the petition filed by respondent Erik Cabral (Erik), appointing a conservator of the person and a conservator of the estate of Susan Q. Galera (Susan). Randy contends the probate court erred in making these orders without allowing an evidentiary hearing. We agree and reverse.

Dov Charney appeals from an order staying his lawsuit against respondents Standard General, L.P.; Standard General Master Fund, L.P.; P Standard General LTD (collectively Standard General); American Apparel, Inc. (American Apparel) ; Allan Mayer; David Danzinger; Robert Greene; Marvin Igelman; William Mauer; and John Luttrell (five former directors and the former chief financial officer (CFO) of American Apparel). We find no prejudicial abuse of discretion and affirm the order.

Based primarily on evidence provided by law enforcement witnesses, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Deshon Atkins of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murders of Mark Beasley (count 4) and Dashon Wright (count 5) and found gang and gun enhancements to be true. On appeal, defendant contends insufficient evidence supports his conviction for the attempted murder of Beasley and the gang enhancements; the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument, and defense counsel failed to object; and the trial court erred in failing to award him presentence conduct credit. The Attorney General concedes the latter point, and we modify defendant’s abstract of judgment to reflect 235 days of presentence conduct credit. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Victor Zuniga, Jr., challenges the superior court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 petition seeking to have his 1994 auto burglary (§ 459) conviction reduced to a misdemeanor. The superior court concluded that auto burglary does not fall within the provisions of section 1170.18. On appeal, defendant contends that auto burglary qualifies for treatment under section 1170.18 because it falls within section 490.2. He also claims that, should we find that auto burglary does not fall within section 490.2, the distinction between auto burglary and theft of a vehicle (§§ 487, subd. (d), 490.2) violates equal protection. We reject both his primary and alternative contentions and affirm the superior court’s order.

Defendant William Jay Price has been serving an indefinite term at a state hospital after having been found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). He petitioned for conditional release pursuant to section 6608, subdivision (a), and following a hearing the trial court dismissed his petition because it was frivolous. He now contends that the provision in the SVPA that allows for the court to deny a conditional release petition as frivolous without a hearing violated his equal protection rights. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition as frivolous.

In December 2014 defendant Lauren Perez pleaded guilty to two felony offenses: unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and buying or receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); count 2). Defendant admitted she had a prior conviction that qualified as a “strike” (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and admitted that she had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court subsequently dismissed the strike allegation, struck the prior prison term allegation, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed defendant on probation for three years.
In August 2016, defendant filed a petition to redesignate both of her felony convictions as misdemeanors pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (f), which was enacted by Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (Prop. 47, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014), eff. Nov. 5, 2014.) The trial court denied the petition on the ground that n

A jury found Alejandro Morales guilty of attempted robbery on an aiding and abetting theory. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664.) Morales admitted to having one prison prior (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), and the court found Morales had been convicted of a strike offense (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court imposed a sentence of three years eight months.
Morales challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, and contends the court erred in giving a flight instruction (CALCRIM No. 372). We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.