P. v. ONeill
Filed 4/30/08 P. v. ONeill CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL HOWARD ONEILL, Defendant and Appellant. | H030854 (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. F12636) |
Appellant Michael Howard ONeill comes before us after pleading guilty to driving with a blood alcohol of 0.08 or more and possession of methamphetamine. As a part of his negotiated plea, he also admitted three prior convictions all involving drunk driving. He was placed on probation for five years on the condition that he serve one year in county jail. Upon his acceptance of the terms and conditions of probation all other charges were dismissed.
Officer Lewis of the California Highway Patrol observed appellants grey Jeep cross over a solid double line in violation of Vehicle Code section 21460, subdivision (a). When double parallel solid lines are in place, no person driving a vehicle shall drive to the left thereof, except as permitted in this section. (Veh. Code, 21460, sub. (a).) In crossing over the double yellow line the grey Jeep came close to a Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) truck which was made to swerve out of the way. The honking of the PG&E truck and the honking back of the grey Jeep was a further prelude to Officer Lewiss stop. The officer testified that the appellant appeared to be intoxicated and he called for back-up for the drunk driving investigation.
Appellant challenges what he claims to be a warrantless seizure of appellant. In particular he argues that Officer Lewiss testimony was not credible and therefore the trial courts denial of the motion to suppress was without substantial evidence. However, the basis of appellants claim lies in the following few excerpts from Officer Lewiss testimony:
Q: After the incident on December 24th, did you write some notes regarding your participation in this incident?
A: I wrote some notes and then handed it to the officer.
Q: Which officer?
A: Holmstadt.
Q: Okay.
A: Correct[ion]. I didnt hand him any notes. I wrote it down and then just verbally told him the notes I had.
Appellant argues that it was unreasonable for the trial court to make the implied finding that Officer Lewiss testimony was credible. But the only question before the trial court was, in this instance, whether he had probable cause to make the traffic stop. No matter how sketchy the officers testimony may have been about his notes or whether he read them or handed them to the back-up officer, there is no doubt that substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that there was a traffic violation observed by the officer and that it was a proper exercise of the authority of a peace officer to stop the driver. The standard of appellate review of a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial courts factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Thus, we will not independently review the evidence presented below. We must accept the trial courts resolution of disputed facts and its assessment of credibility. (People v. Zededa (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1192.) In other words, there was probable cause for this arrest.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
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RUSHING, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
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PREMO, J.
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ELIA, J.
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