P. v. Navarro

Filed 6/19/08 P. v. Navarro CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Kristi Lousteau, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, 21.) Affirmed.

Patrick J. Hennessey, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Victoria B. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Emmanuel Navarro appeals from the judgment entered following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 and his no contest plea to count 1, possession of a deadly weapon, a sharpened screwdriver, (Pen. Code,  12020, subd. (a)(1).) In accordance with the plea agreement, he was sentenced to the low term of 16 months to be served concurrent with any sentence on his parole violation and count 2, possession of marijuana, (Health & Saf. Code, 11357, subd. (b)) was dismissed. He contends his detention was improper and any evidence seized as a result of that detention should have been suppressed. For reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY^[1]

On June 14, 2007, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Lance Perkins was on patrol in the area of Santa Monica Boulevard between Highland and Western in the County of Los Angeles when he saw appellant cross the street against a red light. As this was a violation of Vehicle Code section 21453, subdivision (d), the officer conducted a pedestrian stop.^[2] He approached appellant and asked him for his identification. When appellant was unable to provide identification, the officer asked him if he was on probation or parole, and appellant stated he was on parole. Officer Perkins asked appellant if he had any weapons or narcotics on his person and appellant stated he had marijuana and an open blade in his pocket. The officer retrieved a screwdriver with a sharpened tip and a razor blade from appellants pocket. Additionally, he recovered a bag containing less than one ounce of marijuana.

Officer Perkins knew the area to be a high narcotic area and a violent area due to gang crimes. He had made approximately one hundred arrests for narcotic related crimes and multiple arrests for gang related crimes. He did not recall if any traffic stopped because of appellants actions. It was Officer Perkinss intention to write appellant a ticket, but he did not know appellants identity. He had no previous contact with appellant and did not know his probation or parole status until he asked appellant. Officer Perkins asked appellant if he had any narcotics or weapons because appellant had no identification and had indicated he was on parole. The officer asks this question of everyone who has no identification and is on parole.

In denying the motion to suppress evidence, the trial court found that the detention was not unduly prolonged and the responses during the detention provided the grounds for prolonging the detention in order to search or arrest appellant.

DISCUSSION

An appellate courts review of a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] The [trial] courts resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review. [Citations.] [] The courts resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, . . . is also subject to independent review. [Citation.] (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182, quoting People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; accord, People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.)

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Stopping and detaining a pedestrian who is suspected of criminal activity is analyzed under the framework of Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1. (See United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682.) A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 958-959.) Here the officer observed appellant cross the street against a red light. Appellant violated the Vehicle Code and the detention was proper.

The scope of the search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. [Citation.] (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500.) It will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. . . . [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officerssuspicion in a short period of time. [Citations.] (Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. 491, 500.) Officer Perkins testified he intended to give a ticket to appellant for violating the Vehicle Code but did not know his identity. Asking for appellants identification was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. (Ibid.) Further, the officer was permitted to ask appellant about his probation or parole status. (See People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 499.) Appellants response that he was on parole allowed the officer to conduct a suspicionless search, (see Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 852) which then led to the discovery of drugs and weapons. The scope of the intrusion was justified by the circumstances and the trial court properly denied the suppression motion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

SUZUKAWA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.

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^[1]The factual summary is taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing.

^[2]Vehicle Code section 21453, subdivision (d) provides, Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian control signal as provided in Section 21456, a pedestrian facing a steady circular red or red arrow signal shall not enter the roadway.