Marriage of Hiramanek
“There are three categories of appealable judgments or orders: (1) final judgments as determined by case law, (2) orders and interlocutory judgments made expressly appealable by statute, and (3) certain judgments and orders that, although they do not dispose of all issues in the case are considered ‘final’ for appeal purposes and are exceptions to the one-final-judgment rule.†(Conservatorship of Rich (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1235.) There is no final judgment in this case; the underlying family law proceeding within which the order was made is still pending. And an order designating a person to be a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7[2] is not expressly made appealable by any statute. But where, as here, the order is made in the course of an underlying action but is collateral to the subject of that action, it is appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. (Lester v. Lennane, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) Under the majority rule, “an interim order is appealable if: [¶] 1. The order is collateral to the subject matter of the litigation, [¶] 2. The order is final as to the collateral matter, and [¶] 3. The order directs the payment of money by the appellant or the performance of an act by or against appellant.†(Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298, citing Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 119.) The order in this case is wholly collateral to the subject of the underlying proceeding. Indeed, it has no effect upon the proceeding. It affects only litigation Hiramanek might want to file in the future. The trial court’s granting of the motion is a final decision on that issue. And the order directs Hiramanek to perform an act, namely to obtain an order from the presiding judge before filing any future litigation. Thus, the order is appealable as a final decision on a collateral matter.
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