Filed 10/19/26 P. v. Templar CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086822

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD295831,
SCD306463)
ELLIS TEMPLAR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, and
Matthew Mulford and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION
Ellis Templar appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for mental
health diversion. He argues the evidence did not support the trial court’s
finding that he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. Templar further
contends the trial court erred in using its residual discretion to deny mental
health diversion. We find the trial court’s public safety risk determination
supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm on that ground
without reaching the issue of the trial court’s residual discretion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Case Number SCD295831
In 2022, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged Templar with

assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1)), alleging that
Templar personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§§ 12022.7,
subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). That case stemmed from an incident involving
Templar’s ex-girlfriend, Heather L., and her new boyfriend, Matthew B.
According to a probation report, Templar followed Heather and
Matthew to several bars and then attacked Matthew from behind as Matthew
and Heather walked home. Templar struck Matthew approximately six
times in the head with a metal thermos, tackled him to the ground, and
punched him in the face twice. Heather attempted to intervene, but Templar
pushed her to the ground. Matthew’s injuries included a one to two inch
laceration in the back of his head, requiring 10 staples. Leading up to that
incident, Heather reported to law enforcement that Templar was sending her

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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threatening emails and violating a temporary restraining order that had been
issued but not yet served.
Templar pleaded guilty to an amended lesser count of assault likely to
cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The trial court granted
Templar two years’ probation.
B. Case Number SCD306463
In 2025, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged Templar with
stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 1); stalking with a court order in effect
(§ 646.9, subd. (b); count 2); two counts of assault by means likely to produce
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); counts 3 & 4); nine counts of
disobeying court orders (§§ 273.6, subd. (a), 166, subds. (a)(4) & (c)(1);
counts 5–7, 10–15); making a criminal threat (§ 422; count 8); and battery
(§ 242; count 9). As a result, the trial court revoked probation in case number
SCD295831.
Prosecutors based the new charges on incidents occurring between
August 2024 and February 2025, involving Zoey R., another ex-girlfriend of
Templar’s. The People alleged that Templar called and texted Zoey nonstop,
sometimes over a hundred times a day, and he would also contact her family
and friends. If Zoey did not answer, Templar would go to her house, and on
one occasion, Zoey awoke to Templar inside her bedroom. When Zoey’s father
confronted Templar several blocks from Zoey’s home, Templar told Zoey’s
father,“ ‘if you wanna start some s***, I’ll kill you too.’ ”
Zoey’s mother reported Templar to the police for arson after finding
signs of a fire and incendiary devices in her backyard. Weeks later, Templar
threatened to kill Zoey and attempted to force entry into Zoey’s apartment as
her father held the door shut.

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 Templar continued to contact Zoey and her family after several court
orders barred him from doing so, including an incident where Templar got
into a physical altercation with one of Zoey’s friends. Templar also traveled
to Zoey’s father’s residence and struck Zoey’s father and his girlfriend with a
bamboo rod, leading to a fight between Zoey’s father and Templar during
which a knife fell out of Templar’s pocket.
C. Motion For Mental Health Diversion and Subsequent Proceedings
On June 17, 2025, Templar filed a motion for mental health diversion
under section 1001.36. In support, Templar submitted an evaluation from
psychologist Asher Johnson, who interviewed Templar on May 5, 2025 and
June 1, 2025. Dr. Johnson outlined Templar’s mental health history, noting
anxiety and depression since childhood, and hallucinations and racing
thoughts since age 13. Templar was also hospitalized for suicidal ideation in
2002 and approximately 2006.
Dr. Johnson also reported that after two doctors found Templar
incompetent to stand trial on stalking charges in Florida, Templar was
committed to a state hospital for about six months in 2017. Hospital staff
diagnosed Templar with a psychotic disorder, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and
schizophrenia disorder with grandiose delusions and paranoid ideations.
Templar was uncooperative during the Florida commitment, telling
Dr. Johnson that he lacked faith in the clinical team there. When his
competence was restored, Templar pleaded guilty to aggravated stalking,
violation of a stalking injunction, and trespassing.
Dr. Johnson’s report also detailed how in 2020 Templar failed to comply
with a residential treatment program that he was placed in as a parole
condition in an Arizona case. Templar reported that he did not take the
treatment seriously and did not believe he had a mental health disorder.

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 Dr. Johnson also wrote that more recently, in 2024, Templar
voluntarily admitted himself to the Jane Westin Center seeking assistance
with depression and homicidal ideation. Templar told his therapist that he
wanted to kill Zoey by means of “ ‘unspecified military style killings.’ ” Staff
reported Templar to the police, considering him a high risk. Templar did not
follow up with a referral to a specialty clinic and did not take his prescribed
medication. Dr. Johnson classified this incident as help-seeking behavior
indicative of Templar’s ability to work with treatment.
During his second session with Dr. Johnson, Templar reported taking
two medications while in jail that had not been as helpful as he hoped, but he
agreed to remain compliant and ask his psychiatrist about adjusting the
medication. Templar also reported a desire to return to the Jane Westin
Center for a referral for mental health services.
Dr. Johnson’s report also referred to several text messages attributed to
Templar. In those messages, Templar described “ ‘luring’ ” or “ ‘tailing’ ” Zoey
so he could find an unnamed male, referring to execution and murder.
Templar also texted that the only way to save Zoey’s mother was to “hand
[the unnamed male] over to me,” otherwise Zoey would lose her mother and
Templar would “take him.”
Ultimately, Dr. Johnson opined that Templar had been diagnosed with
“Schizoaffective Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, and Other
Specified Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder.” Dr. Johnson determined
that these disorders were a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offenses, and that “there is a reasonable expectation that [Templar’s]
symptoms will respond to appropriate mental health treatment.”
As for whether Templar posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, as defined in section 1170.18, Dr. Johnson stated, “[i]f [Templar]

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receives adequate mental health treatment and support in the community, he
may not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. . . . However, it
is essential that he remains compliant with treatment plans and engages
actively with mental health providers to ensure his stability and reduce risk
factors.” Dr. Johnson noted that mental health providers will have to build
trust and rapport with Templar due to his “high level of paranoia.”
Dr. Johnson also believed that Templar “oftentimes relies upon his own
moral code to ‘do what he feels is right’ at the risk of violating legal or
institutional rules.”
Regarding a treatment plan, Dr. Johnson proposed 60 days of inpatient
psychiatric care. Templar would then transition into intensive outpatient
care, including regular psychiatric consultations, medication, and monitoring.
The People opposed Templar’s motion. They conceded Templar’s
eligibility for mental health diversion, arguing instead that he was not
suitable.
Zoey read a prepared statement at the motion hearing, asserting that
Templar has threatened the lives of her parents, physically assaulted her
father, and set fire to her mother’s yard. Zoey explained that prior to his
incarceration, Templar made no meaningful effort to seek help for his mental
health, nor did he take any steps toward treatment, therapy, or
rehabilitation. Zoey also stated that Templar expressed numerous times his
strong belief in revenge against anyone who has wronged him.
The court also heard from Zoey’s friend Cathy R., who stated that fake
Molotov cocktails made with material that matched Zoey’s bed sheets were
found near the fire in Zoey’s mother’s backyard. Cathy also described texts
from Templar where he stated he would ignore court orders and disobey the
law.

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 When ruling on the motion, the trial court acknowledged the parties’
agreement that Templar was eligible for mental health diversion, but
concluded that he was not suitable. The trial court questioned Dr. Johnson’s
opinion, determining that he was “hedging” and “using words that are less
than convincing.” The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence
that Templar was at great risk for a committing super strike based on his
violent acts towards both Matthew and Zoey’s father, as well as his
statements to medical health providers that he wanted to kill Zoey.
Alternatively, the trial court exercised its discretion to deny diversion,
finding that Templar would not comply with mental health treatment based
on his long history of failing to do so and his dishonesty.
A few weeks later, in case number SCD306463, Templar pleaded guilty
to stalking with a court order in effect (§ 646.9, subd. (b); count 2), criminal
threats (§ 422; count 8), and misdemeanor disobedience of a court order
(§ 166, subd. (a)(4); count 13). The trial court sentenced Templar to prison for
three years on count 2, a concurrent two years for count 8, and credit for time
served on count 13. The trial court imposed a concurrent three-year term in
case number SCD295831. Templar appealed from the judgment, obtaining
certificates of probable cause in both cases.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Mental Health Diversion
“[M]ental health diversion requires trial court findings that the
defendant is both eligible for diversion and suitable for the program. . . .
Defendants are eligible if they have been diagnosed with a recognized mental
disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of the criminal
offense with which they are charged. [Citation.] They are suitable if: (1) in
the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental

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disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their
speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment
requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety.’ ” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.)
“Section 1001.36’s definition of ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety’ is supplied by reference to section 1170.18. [Citation.] Section
1170.18, in turn, defines ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as ‘an
unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within
the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of
subdivision (e) of Section 667.’ [Citation.] The violent felonies encompassed
in this definition ‘are known as “super strikes” and include murder.’ ” (People

v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.)2
“A hearing on the suitability for diversion ‘shall be informal and may
proceed on offers of proof, reliable hearsay, and argument of counsel.’
[Citation.] ‘The court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the
defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the
defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history,
the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems
appropriate.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Taylor) (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
1153, 1165.)
B. Standard of Review

2 We note that the Legislature recently amended section 1001.36,
effective January 1, 2027, replacing “an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, as defined in Section 1170.18,” with “a substantial and undue risk to
the physical safety of another person.” (2026, ch. 18, § 1; see Assem. Bill
No. 46 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) § 1.)

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 “A trial court’s ruling on a request for mental health diversion is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the court’s factual findings are reviewed
for substantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘[A] trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.’ ” (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘ “we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact” ’ ” could make the
challenged finding. (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022)
12 Cal.5th 719, 780.) We do “ ‘ “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 646.)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Mental Health
Diversion on Public Safety Grounds
Templar had a history of stalking three different victims. The evidence
indicated that in the second case (case No. SCD295831), Templar became
violent, striking Matthew in the head numerous times with a blunt object
during a surprise attack. That violence continued in the third case (case
No. SCD306463), where Templar fought with Zoey’s friend, attacked Zoey’s
father and his girlfriend with a bamboo rod while possessing a knife, and
attempted to force his way into Zoey’s home. There was also evidence that
Templar set a fire in Zoey’s mother’s backyard.
Additionally, the record demonstrates that Templar expressed violent
intentions and a disregard for the law. He sent threatening emails to
Heather, he threatened to kill Zoey and her parents, and he told his therapist

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that he wanted to kill Zoey. Templar also violated numerous court orders, he
strongly believed in revenge, and followed his own moral code instead of the
law.
Finally, Dr. Johnson determined that Templar “may not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” which is markedly different

from determining that Templar posed a low risk of violence.3 More
importantly, that determination was conditioned on Templar “remain[ing]
compliant with treatment plans and engag[ing] actively.” There was reason
to believe Templar would abandon treatment based on his history of doing so
and his “high level of paranoia.” (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Taylor),
supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1169 [“The obligation to determine whether a
defendant will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if granted
diversion necessarily includes determining whether the defendant will
abandon treatment.”].)
Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Templar posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super
strike; namely, murder. (See, § 187, [“Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being . . . with malice aforethought”].) Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Templar’s motion for mental health

diversion.4

3 This, as well as Templar’s behavior described above, distinguishes this
case from those on which Templar relies. (See, e.g., People v. Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 450–451; People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
990, 1003.)
4 We also note, and Templar concedes, that Templar is ineligible for
mental health diversion in case number SCD295831 because he did not
request diversion until after he pleaded guilty in that case. (People v. Braden
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 819.)
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 IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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