Filed 9/29/26 Roman v. Lee CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LISA ROMAN,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G065246

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-01447169)

JEFFREY GIHUN LEE, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Glenn Mondo, Commissioner. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Law Offices of Frances Prizzia and Frances Marie Prizzia for
Defendant and Appellant.
 Much Shelist, Ryan Burns and Isaac R. Zfaty for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
In this case, we assess whether a civil harassment restraining
order was properly entered against Jeffrey Gihun Lee after he and Lisa
Roman had an angry confrontation in the Irvine neighborhood where both
reside. In keeping with our standard of review, we find the trial court lacked
substantial evidence to find by clear and convincing evidence that Lee had
engaged in unlawful harassment. We therefore reverse the restraining order
and remand back to the trial court with instructions that the trial court deny
Roman’s petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Roman and Lee live across the street from one another at a
diagonal angle and have a history of conflict.
A. December 17, 2024 Incident
1. Roman’s Testimony
On December 17, 2024, Roman said she was returning home
when she noticed Lee’s car was parked along the curb outside her house. Lee
was outside his car. Roman testified that she made a U-turn and told Lee,
“Can you please not park here.” She then pulled into her neighbor’s driveway
and waited for Lee to leave.
According to Roman, Lee got out of his car and came toward her
car with his hand up and an object in it. She thought he was going to hit her

1 We derive the facts in this section from the testimony at the

hearing on the restraining order and the exhibits entered into evidence at
that hearing.

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or her car window, so she rolled up the window. Lee was shouting at her,
using profanity, and calling her “Karen.” Roman also said she noticed Lee
was filming her on his phone while moving around the outside of her car. She
felt “trapped” in her car.
At this point, Roman’s neighbors came out of their house and
confronted Lee. Roman testified Lee began to record the neighbors as well.
One of the neighbors testified that Lee was calling Roman names like “bitch”
and would not let her leave her car.
After the interaction, Lee got into his car and left. Roman
testified she had an anxiety attack as a result of the confrontation.
2. Lee’s Testimony
According to Lee, Roman said to him: “Don’t park in front of my
house” even though he was legally entitled to park there. He testified he then
said to her “Karen,2 what did you say? Where should I park then?” He
admitted he called her a “bitch” because he said Roman had been told
“several times not to interact with” him, “especially about parking.”
Lee played the video he recorded for the trial court, and the video
was entered into evidence. The video evidence consists of three clips. The
clips have time stamps of 3:50 p.m., 3:50:30 p.m., and 3:51 p.m. on
December 17, 2024. However, as the trial court noted, it appears that the
events in the clip time-stamped 3:50:30 p.m. may precede the events in the
3:50 p.m. clip. The court did not find the 3:51 p.m. clip helpful.
The 3:50:30 p.m. clip shows a woman, presumably Roman, sitting
calmly in her car with the window up while the person filming, presumably

2 Lee confirmed that he used the name “Karen” as a slur to refer

to Roman “poking her nose where it doesn’t belong.”

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Lee, shouts: “Don’t tell me what to do,” and “Where am I gonna park? What
am I gonna do?” At the end of the clip, Roman makes a gesture, the meaning
of which is unclear.
The 3:50 p.m. clip shows the front driver’s side window of
Roman’s car with the window down. Roman is turning her head away from
the camera and rolling up her window as Lee says “Karen, what did you say?
Hey Karen. Exactly, bitch.” Lee then walks away from Roman’s car with his
phone camera facing down.
Lee testified he made the recordings due to repeated interactions
he and Roman have had regarding parking. He acknowledged yelling at
Roman. And he acknowledged that, in hindsight, he did not react
appropriately to her. But he testified that he was not trying to scare,
intimidate, or threaten Roman by his actions. Rather, he was trying to
document the fact that Roman was interacting with him when she had
previously been told by police not to interact with him. He also said he
wanted her to stop asking him about parking.
B. Lee’s Social Media Postings
At some point after the December 17 incident, Roman testified
she heard that Lee had posted images of her on social media. In one post, Lee
had tagged Roman’s gym. She also testified that there were remarks on Lee’s
posts “that people wanted to pin [her] location.”
Lee testified he had posted the video clips he took on Instagram
and TikTok. He did not tag Roman’s home but admitted to tagging Roman’s
gym on these posts. He claimed the gym was a location within the
neighborhood with the highest visibility and the most tags on social media.
Thus, he said, tagging the gym would increase his views.

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 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Roman filed for a restraining order two days after the incident
occurred. After issuing a temporary restraining order, the trial court set an
order to show cause hearing regarding civil harassment for January 13, 2025.
At the hearing, the court heard testimony from both Roman and
Lee, as well as Roman’s neighbor. After admitting two exhibits, the court
issued its ruling from the bench, finding Lee “engaged in a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at” Roman, “[t]hat, although short, showed
a continuity of purpose.” It also found Lee’s conduct “would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress” and “certainly did
cause [Roman] substantial emotional distress.”
The trial court issued a restraining order, effective for a three-
year period, extending not just to Roman, but also to her spouse and two
adult children who reside with her. The court also enjoined Lee from entering
or placing any object on Roman’s property or engaging in “social media
harassment with family names.” In doing so, the court noted “not all speech
is protected.” It said it “did not find Mr. Lee credible in several respects, in
particular, his attempt to explain why he’s tagging the gym on that posting.
It just simply did not make any sense. There appear[s] to be no legitimate
purpose for the posting which he made.”
Lee timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Lee argues the restraining order was issued in error for several
reasons. First, he was lawfully parked on the street and a parking dispute
cannot constitute harassment. Second, he contends the restraining order
violates his rights under the First Amendment of the federal constitution
because it contains a content-based restriction on his online speech. Third, he

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argues his social media posts do not constitute harassment under Code of
Civil Procedure3 section 527.6 because there was no violence, threat of
violence, or sustained course of conduct involved. Fourth, he argues the trial
court showed a judicial bias against social media. Fifth, he contends the court
violated his procedural due process rights by not telling him he had the right
to cross-examine Roman when she testified. And, finally, he argues the order
improperly included Roman’s husband and two adult children as protected
parties.
Because we agree with Lee that the trial court lacked sufficient
evidence of harassment, we need not address the remainder of his individual
arguments.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, “[w]e review the trial court’s decision to grant the
restraining order for substantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘The appropriate test on
appeal is whether the findings (express and implied) that support the trial
court’s entry of the restraining order are justified by substantial evidence in
the record. [Citation.] But whether the facts, when construed most favorably
in [the petitioner’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment
under section 527.6, and whether the restraining order passes constitutional
muster, are questions of law subject to de novo review.’” (Harris v. Stampolis
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497.)
We also note that the judge must find “by clear and convincing
evidence that unlawful harassment exists” in order to issue a civil

3 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of

Civil Procedure.

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harassment restraining order. (§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1).) “[W]hen reviewing a
finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-established
principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this
assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the
trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts
in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996.)
II.
THE RESTRAINING ORDER WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Under section 527.6, a trial court is authorized to issue a
restraining order prohibiting harassment. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) At the
restraining order hearing, “the judge shall receive any testimony that is
relevant, and may make an independent inquiry. If the judge finds by clear
and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists an order shall issue
prohibiting the harassment.” (Id., subd. (i)(1).) “The ‘“‘[c]lear and convincing’”’
standard ‘“requires a finding of high probability”’ of unlawful harassment.”
(E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688, 698 (E.G.).)
The statute defines “‘[h]arassment’” as “unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed
at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) It further
defines a “‘[c]ourse of conduct’” as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series
of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of

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purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing
telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an
individual by any means . . . . Constitutionally protected activity is not
included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) A
course of conduct “must be that which would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress to the petitioner.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) “Beyond the
requirement that there be more than one act to qualify as a ‘“[c]ourse of
conduct”’ (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1)), the statute does not prescribe the necessary
number or frequency of the acts required for a finding of course of conduct
harassment.” (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 699–700.)
Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219 states, “‘The
elements of unlawful harassment, as defined by the language in
section 527.6, are as follows: (1) “a knowing and willful course of conduct”
entailing a “pattern” of “a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of purpose”; (2) “directed at a specific person”;
(3) “[that] seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person”; (4) “[that] serves
no legitimate purpose”; (5) [that] “would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress” and “actually cause[s] substantial emotional
distress to the [person to be protected by the order]”; and (6) which is not a
“[c]onstitutionally protected activity.”’” (Id. at p. 1227, disapproved on other
grounds by Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1003, fn. 4, 1010,
fn. 7.)
The trial court found no evidence of unlawful violence or a
credible threat of violence. Rather, the court concluded Lee had “engaged in a
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person,
Ms. Roman. That although short, showed a continuity of purpose.” The court

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also found that the conduct was the “sort of thing that would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress” and that Roman
did suffer such distress.4
The evidence indicated at least three separate incidents occurred
which gave rise to the court’s finding of a course of conduct. The first was the
driveway incident on December 17. The second and third were the posts of
videos of the incident to Instagram and TikTok.
The court made clear findings on the first incident which were
supported by substantial evidence. Roman testified that Lee approached her
angrily and surrounded her car, making her feel uncomfortable and unable to
get out. The video corroborated this to a certain extent. The court found this
evidence established that an “angry” and “aggressive[]” Lee was “circling the
car holding a camera” while Roman rolled up her window, “avoiding eye
contact,” and said nothing. While we note Roman’s demeanor in the video did
not visibly betray signs of distress, we defer to the court’s assessment of her
credibility regarding her emotional reaction to the incident. There is a high
probability that the incident seriously alarmed or annoyed Roman and
caused her substantial emotional distress.
But the December 17, 2024 incident is insufficient on its own. A
course of conduct requires a “series of acts”—more than one. (See Leydon v.
Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 4; see also § 527.6, subd. (b)(1)[“‘[c]ourse
of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short”].) The only evidence regarding the second and third

4 The court did not expressly find that Lee’s course of conduct

“seriously alarm[ed], annoy[ed], or harrasse[d]” Roman (see § 527.6,
subd.(b)(3)), but we imply this finding under our standard of review.

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incidents was the testimony of both Lee and Roman, and this testimony did
not establish harassment.
The evidence showed Lee had tagged Roman’s gym in his posts,
and that the posts were tagged “Karen” and “parking wars.” Lee
acknowledged other users of the platforms had commented on his videos, but
there was no evidence of what was said.5 And Lee maintained that he posted
the videos to show residents “that parking is fully public within [the]
community.” Lee testified on cross-examination that tagging the gym was
further intended “to increase [his] views [on] TikTok.” He also explained to
the court why tagging the gym would do this:
“THE COURT: . . . . I’m unclear why you would post or tag the
gym location. Sounds like you were trying to make sure that anybody that
looked at your post might know where to find Ms. Roman or her family
members. Was that your intent?
“[LEE]: No, that was not my intent.
“THE COURT: So one more time then. What was your intent in
tagging the gym?
“[LEE]: My intent was that that gym is located within our
area. . . . And it’s probably the most tapped area within our neighborhood.
“THE COURT: So but you’ve got a dispute with Ms. Roman over
parking. You posted multiple clips about your dispute with Ms. Roman over
parking. What in the world does that have to do with the gym?

5 The court questioned Lee about an allegation in Roman’s

petition for restraining order that Lee had made “racist comments” about
Roman’s family in a TikTok post, but Roman offered no evidence of this at the
hearing, and Lee denied it in his testimony.

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 “[LEE]: It has nothing to do with the gym. I was just tagging the
highest visibility point within our community . . . I know that within our
community, [the gym] has the most tags on social media.”
Here, “the record as a whole” does not “contain . . . substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable” (see Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 995–996) that
the TikTok and Instagram posts form part of a course of conduct that
harassed Roman within the meaning of section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3). The
record contains very limited information as to the content of the posts. For
example, the evidence at the hearing does not disclose that Lee shared
Roman’s address or contact information, or defamed or made false statements
about Roman. The evidence failed to establish whether comments on the
posts connected Roman to the gym, whether the posts contained positive or
negative comments regarding Roman, or whether the posts led to third party
harassment or threats toward Roman.
Although Lee testified that he had tagged Roman’s gym, the
concept of tagging on social media was not fully explained or explored at the
hearing. The evidence did not show that Lee tagged Roman’s home. There
was nothing to indicate that the posts were “directed at” Roman, rather than
Lee’s followers. Rather, the posts were tagged “Karen” and “parking wars,”
indicating that Lee was attempting to bring attention to those topics.
This case stands in contrast with E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
688, which also involved online postings. (Id. at 695.) There, the respondent,
M.L., had posted videos to TikTok and Instagram, accusing her mother of
sexual abuse and neglect, and accusing the petitioner, E.G., of supporting
and protecting her alleged abuser. (Ibid.) At the restraining order hearing,
E.G. testified that “viewership of her professional website increased

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significantly after the second video was posted” and she “received threats and
harassment from unknown third parties, which she reported to law
enforcement, and numerous false ‘Google reviews’ to her professional online
listing.” (Id. at p. 696.) E.G. also received anonymous messages to her
professional website contact page stating that “she was being reported to the
state licensing board” for her profession; she also received “explicit threats
via voicemail.” (Ibid.)
E.G. moved for a harassment restraining order against M.L.,
alleging online harassment based on the posted videos. (E.G., supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 696.) In granting the restraining order, the court noted
the claims made by M.L. in the posted videos had already been the subject of
litigation in family court, and the family court had found M.L.’s sexual abuse
allegations “‘“not credible.”’” The court had also found M.L.’s mother to be a
safe parent. (Id. at p. 697.) As such, the court found the posted videos were
defamatory and not constitutionally protected. (Id. at pp. 703–704.)
Roman argues Lee’s acts of posting the videos to social media
were intended to embarrass her, which is what the court found. We agree
that the evidence supports a finding that Lee, at least in part, harbored this
intent. However, an intent to embarrass is not the same as engaging in
conduct that is seriously alarming, annoying, or harassing.
We therefore find the restraining order protecting Roman was not
supported by substantial evidence. Although Roman presented substantial
evidence as to the harassing conduct on December 17, 2024, Roman did not
present substantial evidence of harassing conduct beyond this one incident.
Because we conclude the trial court erred in granting the restraining order in
the first instance, we need not reach the issue of whether Roman’s family was
properly the subject of the order.

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 DISPOSITION
The order entering a civil harassment restraining order against
appellant is reversed, and the matter is remanded with the instruction that
the trial court enter a new order denying Roman’s request for a restraining
order. Appellant to recover his costs on appeal.

SCHWARM, J.*

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, ACTING P. J.

SERVINO, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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