Filed 9/8/26 P. v. Bryant CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B349770
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CJCF06862)
v.
SHYOLA MIESHA BRYANT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed.
Travis Daily, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael Keller and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Shyola Miesha Bryant
(defendant) appeals from the denial of her request for pretrial
mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1001.36.
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion and its “public
safety finding lacks substantial evidence.” Because the record
discloses no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Statement of facts
Defendant and 64-year-old Angela Bennett were neighbors
for five years. For the three years leading up to the instant
offense, defendant and Bennett had verbal altercations. During
that time, the court granted Bennett a restraining order, but law
enforcement representatives were never able to serve defendant
with the order.
On October 30, 2024, defendant and Bennett had another
verbal confrontation, during which defendant repeatedly called
Bennett a “snitch ass b-i-t-c-h.” During that incident, defendant
called the police about Bennett. However, according to Bennett,
defendant had stolen a plant from Bennett’s yard and destroyed
it because “[defendant] said it was in her way.” The police
responded, but Bennett did not speak to them.
The next day, defendant again referred to Bennett as a
“snitch ass b-i-t-c-h,” which led Bennett to call the police. When
Bennett went outside her home to retrieve a package, she was
attacked by defendant. Bennett was stabbed six times and, as a
result, suffered a pierced lung, had to undergo surgery, and
remained in the hospital for six days.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
II. Procedural background
On December 3, 2024, an information was filed against
defendant alleging one count of assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1). It was further alleged defendant
caused great bodily injury upon the victim within the meaning of
section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and defendant had suffered a
prior strike conviction for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12). On July 7, 2025, defendant filed
a motion for pretrial mental health diversion pursuant to sections
1001.35 and 1001.36. After a hearing, the court denied the
motion.
Defendant pled no contest to count 1 and admitted the
great bodily injury allegation. The court dismissed the strike
allegation and sentenced defendant to a total term of five years,
comprised of the low term of two years in count 1 and three years
for the great bodily injury enhancement. Defendant timely filed
a notice of appeal and request for a certificate of probable cause
regarding her denial of pretrial diversion. The trial court granted
defendant’s request.
III. Defendant’s diversion motion
In support of defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health
diversion, defendant included a forensic health assessment
conducted by licensed psychologist Megan Johnson, Ph.D., and a
letter confirming defendant’s “successful[] screen[ing]” at
Prototypes’s second chance women’s reentry substance use
residential program.
In her assessment, Dr. Johnson reported defendant “met
the qualification criteria for Mental Health Diversion.”
Dr. Johnson diagnosed defendant with intermittent explosive
disorder, unspecified trauma and stressor related disorder, and
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cannabis use disorder. It was reported that defendant “has used
cannabis daily” in an effort “[t]o manage [her] surprising and
seemingly uncontrollable impulsive rages.” Dr. Johnson opined,
“While some historical and clinical factors, such as previous
incarceration, suggest some risk for violence, [defendant] exhibits
protective factors, such as strong motivation to keep her
daughter, which ultimately place her at a low to moderate risk
for violence and recidivism.” Factors contributing to defendant’s
moderate risk include her history of violence, young age at the
time of her first violence-related arrest, substance abuse, early
maladjustment, and impulsivity. The doctor noted defendant’s
“negative attitudes” and stress as high risk factors.
On July 28, 2025, the court heard defendant’s motion. At
the start of the hearing the court noted its concern regarding
defendant’s conduct. Defense counsel said she “obviously
underst[oo]d that is the biggest concern in this case,” but
explained the three-year history of verbal disputes between
defendant and the victim. Counsel argued this was a “completely
isolated incident” “related to the tensions” between the two
neighbors and because defendant is no longer in that home, she
would no longer be near the victim. Counsel argued defendant
has no other “sort of actual violence on her record,” and the prior
strike is “from more than a decade ago.”
Counsel pointed to the mental health assessment wherein
defendant was found to pose a “low to medium risk for any sort of
violence.” Counsel explained defendant has a young daughter
with developmental challenges and, as a result, she “has a lot to
live for” and “is committed to addressing any sort of mental
health issues, so that she can be present.” Counsel highlighted
defendant’s difficult upbringing “in a really horrible, unstable
4
household in foster care where she was abused.” As a result,
counsel argued defendant is not “at risk of committing a super
strike.”
The People opposed diversion and pointed to the
particularly violent conduct in this case, the vulnerability of the
64-year-old victim, and the nature of her injuries. The People
also directed the court’s attention to defendant’s history of violent
conduct. In 2013, defendant was convicted of robbery. During
that incident, she punched a 57-year-old shop owner in the face,
causing that victim to fall and injure her right shoulder.
Defendant was placed on probation for three years. In 2014,
defendant violated her probation and was sentenced to six years
in prison.
Defendant’s mental health assessment did not include a
detailed discussion of her criminal history. However, it did note,
in 2019, defendant was “restrained … from her uncle after a
physical altercation when she was unable to visit her daughter.”
The court denied defendant’s motion for diversion because,
based on the severity of the current offense and her previous
crimes of violence, it was “not satisfied that the defendant
[would] not commit a super strike in the future.” In other words,
diversion was denied because the court found defendant posed an
unreasonable risk to public safety pursuant to section 1001.36,
subdivision (c)(4). The court did not discuss any other reasons for
the denial. As such, we determine the court found defendant
satisfied the eligibility criteria listed in section 1001.36,
subdivision (b) and the first three suitability criteria listed in
section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(1)-(3). Because the statute
requires all four factors in subdivision (c) be met in order to be
5
found suitable, failure to satisfy one requirement can be
determinative.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
A “court may, in its discretion, and after considering the
positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial
diversion … if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements
for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court
determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion
under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd.
(a).) A defendant is “suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified
mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would
respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their
speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with
treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an
‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as defined in
sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).” (Sarmiento v.
Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.) Section 1170.18
defines an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as “an
unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new violent
felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” (§ 1170.18, subd.
(c).) Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) provides a list of
serious or violent felonies, which, among others, includes “[a]ny
homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense,
defined in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive” and “[a]ny serious or
violent felony offense punishable in California by life
imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV) & (VIII).)
Section 1001.36 does not require trial courts to provide a
statement of reasons when deciding whether to grant a
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defendant’s request for pretrial diversion. “[W]here a statement
of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a reviewing
court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a
particular finding or order.” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1107, 1114–1115 (Stowell).)
“Ultimately, … diversion under section 1001.36 is
discretionary, not mandatory, even if all the requirements are
met.” (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080
(Gerson).) “We review the trial court’s ultimate decision whether
to grant the request, after considering its findings as to each of
the relevant criteria, for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Brown
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 121 (Brown).) “‘A court abuses its
discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by
applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its
decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence.’” (Gerson, supra, 80
Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) “The abuse of discretion standard
‘involves abundant deference’ to the court’s ruling.” (People v.
Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 243.)
II. The trial court was not required to prioritize the
opinions of the mental health expert over other
factors
Defendant alleges the trial court abused its discretion by
“plac[ing] heavy weight on the present offense and prior history
of [defendant] (which includes a 2004 sustained juvenile petition
for robbery, as well as 2012[2] adult conviction for robbery), while
insufficiently weighing or explaining its rejection of Dr. Johnson’s
2 It appears this offense was committed in 2012 and
conviction occurred in 2013.
7
uncontradicted expert opinion and treatment plan.” Defendant
also alleges the trial court abused its discretion by denying
diversion “without adequate engagement with the statutory
factors, the expert’s evaluation, the proffered treatment plan, or
the governing public safety standard.” We disagree. The trial
court is not required to prioritize the expert’s opinion over other
factors or provide a statement about its consideration of each of
the aforementioned factors.
When deciding whether to grant diversion, the court “must
consider” defendant’s suitability and in doing so, determine
whether defendant has met “all of the [suitability] criteria,”
including whether defendant poses an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) When determining
whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, the trial court “may consider the opinions of the
district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert,
and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s
violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4), italics added.) “Ordinarily, the word ‘may’ connotes a
discretionary or permissive act; the word ‘shall’ connotes a
mandatory or directory duty. This distinction is particularly
acute when both words are used in the same statute” or, as here,
the same subdivision.3 (Woodbury v. Brown-Dempsey (2003) 108
3 Section 1001.36, subdivision (a) states “the court may, in its
discretion, … grant pretrial diversion.” Section 1001.36,
subdivision (c) states “the court must consider whether the
defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.” Then, in subdivision
(c)(4) of the same section, it states, when determining whether
the defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, “[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district
8
Cal.App.4th 421, 433; see also People v. Standish (2006) 38
Cal.4th 858, 869 [same].)
“[T]he trier of fact generally may reject even uncontradicted
testimony, whether by lay or expert witnesses, so long as the
rejection is not arbitrary.” (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1080.) Moreover, as noted, section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4)
explicitly gives the court the discretion to determine what it
relies upon in making its public safety finding. Here, the court
explicitly stated its concern regarding defendant’s criminal
history and the conduct of the instant offense and apparently
gave those circumstances greater weight than the expert’s
opinion or defendant’s treatment plan. Doing so was not
arbitrary.
The court is also not required to provide a statement of
reasons when weighing “the opinions of … a qualified mental
health expert” or “defendant’s treatment plan.” (See § 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) Because the statute does not require a statement of
reasons, the reviewing court will presume the trial court had a
proper basis for prioritizing other risk factors over the expert
opinion. This is true even if “the record is silent.” (Stowell,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1114–1115.) Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by declining to rely heavily on the
expert opinion or defendant’s treatment plan, or by placing more
weight on defendant’s past and present conduct, without further
explanation.
attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and
may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant's
violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (Italics
added.)
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III. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
dangerousness finding
Defendant contends the trial court’s “public safety finding
lacks substantial evidence.” We disagree.
In order to be suitable for pretrial diversion, defendant
must “not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as
defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) In People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
440, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred in finding
“Moine was likely to commit a super-strike offense.” (Id. at
p. 451.) There, Moine had four misdemeanor convictions, the
pending charges were nonviolent felonies (criminal threats), the
court saw fit to “release Moine into the community on bond for a
period of over two years,” and two psychiatrists found “he posed a
low risk for future assault.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Defendant’s case is not like Moine’s. First, defendant
sustained a robbery petition as a juvenile in 2004 and was
convicted of robbery in 2013. Robbery is a violent felony. (See
§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9).) Second, defendant violated her grant of
probation for the 2013 robbery “when she picked up a new case in
2014” and was sentenced to state prison for six years. Third,
defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the instant
offense and was “exceedingly lucky that she did not kill this
victim.” Specifically, “[defendant] did not just threaten or
intimidate the victim in this case—[s]he invoked extreme
physical violence against a vulnerable victim in response to a
relatively minor altercation.” (Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 124 [comparing the violent actions of Brown to threatening
behavior of Moine].) In the instant offense and the 2013 robbery,
the victims were vulnerable and both sustained injuries. In 2019,
10
defendant had a physical altercation with her uncle prompting
her uncle to obtain a restraining order. Fourth, unlike Moine,
during the pendency of these proceedings, defendant remained in
custody with bail set at $110,000 because the court found “that
no less restrictive condition … of release w[ould] reasonably
assure the safety of the public or victim.” Fifth, while two
psychiatrists in Moine both opined that he posed a low risk of
future violence, here, only one psychiatrist offered an opinion
that placed defendant at a “low to moderate risk” for violence.
Defendant’s characterization of the offense as an “isolated
incident” is belied by the record. Defendant and Bennett had
been in conflict for three years, a conflict sufficiently serious that
a court granted Bennett a restraining order against defendant.
The day before the stabbing, defendant stole and destroyed
Bennett’s plant because “it was in her way.” And, as noted, in
2019, defendant was restrained from her uncle following a
separate physical altercation. This history of escalating conflict,
along with defendant’s criminal record, undermines any
characterization of the offense as an isolated departure from
otherwise nonviolent conduct.
Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that defendant posed
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is supported by
substantial evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s request for pretrial diversion.
DISPOSITION
The court’s denial of defendant’s request for pretrial
diversion is affirmed.
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CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
12
