Filed 8/18/26 Lin v. Seafood Village CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
YE LIN, B348789
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV31860)
v.
SEAFOOD VILLAGE, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Steven A. Ellis, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Shun C. Chen and Shun C. Chen for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Kulik Gottesman Siegel & Ware, Matthew Mejia for Defendants and
Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Ye Lin fell as she stepped off the sidewalk in front of a
restaurant operated by respondent Seafood Village, Inc. (Seafood Village).
Lin sued Seafood Village for negligence and premises liability. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Seafood Village, finding the
place where Lin fell was a “common area” over which Seafood Village had no
control. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Seafood Village is located in a four-unit shopping center. The center’s
owner, not named here, leased the center to Tak Shing Hong, Inc. (TSH).
TSH subleased one of the four units to respondent Chaoyue Seafood, Inc.
(Chaoyue).1 Seafood Village subleased that unit from Chaoyue.
On October 7, 2020, Lin was leaving Seafood Village; as she stepped
into the parking lot from the pedestrian walkway outside the restaurant, she
fell. Lin claims her fall was caused by an exceptionally steep slope between
the walkway and the parking lot.
On September 29, 2022, Lin filed a form complaint asserting causes of
action for negligence and premises liability against TSH and Seafood Village.
On March 4, 2023, Lin amended her complaint to add Chaoyue as a
defendant.
Seafood Village moved for summary judgment, arguing it did not
control the area where Lin fell, and therefore owed her no duty of care.
Chaoyue joined in Seafood Village’s motion.
1 For convenience, the parties and the trial court refer to the sublease
between TSH and Chaoyue as the “Master Lease.” We do likewise.
2
Lin opposed the motion and the joinder. She argued that both Chaoyue
and Seafood Village were sublessees of the premises where she fell, that the
subleases obliged Chaoyue and Seafood Village to comply with the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), and that both Chaoyue and Seafood Village are
responsible for the safety of customers as they come and go from the
business, regardless of whether they own or lease the path the customers use.
The trial court granted both Seafood Village’s motion and Chaoyue’s
joinder. It found no evidence that the walkway or parking lot outside the
restaurant was under the legal control of Seafood Village or Chaoyue; their
respective subleases defined the walkway and parking lot as “common areas”
and gave neither Seafood Village or Chaoyue the right to control or alter the
common areas. The court also found no evidence that either Seafood Village
or Chaoyue exercised practical control over the common areas. The court
concluded the exclusive right to control and alter the common areas was
reserved to, and exercised by, TSH.
The court entered judgment in favor of both Seafood Village and
Chaoyue on May 30, 2025. Lin timely appealed.2
DISCUSSION
We review the trial court’s ruling de novo. (Oroville Dam Cases (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 173, 180, fn. 6.) Premises liability requires those who possess
and control property to act with the same standard of care that applies in
negligence cases. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158–
1159.) Thus, the elements of both premises liability and negligence are the
same. (Id.) A defendant who does not own, possess, or control the property
2 Chaoyue filed a notice of voluntary dissolution on February 23, 2026. It
has not filed a respondent’s brief.
3
at issue cannot be held liable on either theory. (Soto v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 168, 177.)
Lin argues there is evidence to suggest that Seafood Village and
Chaoyue controlled the walkway and parking lot because they had non-
exclusive use of the common area, paid to maintain it, and had a right to
summon maintenance. She also argues Seafood Village and Chaoyue
controlled the walkway and parking lot because their subleases obliged them
to provide indemnity for their conduct “in or about the Premises or
elsewhere.”3 Finally, she contends the doctrine of negligence per se should
apply. We are not persuaded.
I. Common Areas
It is not disputed that the area where Lin was injured is considered a
common area under the applicable subleases. While the Master Lease allows
Chaoyue nonexclusive use of the common areas, it bars Chaoyue from placing
anything in the common areas and reserves “exclusive control and
management” to TSH. The Master Lease gives TSH “sole discretion” to alter,
close, or improve the common areas. While Chaoyue is obliged to pay a
portion of the expenses for operating the common area, nothing in the Master
Lease obliges or permits Chaoyue to take part in those operations. Likewise,
if the ADA requires alteration of the common areas because of Chaoyue’s use
of the premises, Chaoyue is obliged to pay for the alterations. But nothing in
3 Lin also asserts that a duty to inspect and warn may exist even where
there is no control. She cites no authority to support that assertion, relying
instead on two cases in which the defendant owned the property where the
injury occurred. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200; Mora v.
Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771.) Failure to support an
argument with citations to on-point authority forfeits that argument. (City of
Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287.)
4
the Master Lease obliges or permits Chaoyue to make those alterations itself.
The sublease between Chaoyue and Seafood Village provides that
Seafood Village assumes Chaoyue’s obligations under the Master Lease.
Nothing in that sublease expands Seafood Village’s rights and obligations
beyond those afforded to Chaoyue in the master lease.
Lin relies on Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149 (Alcaraz) and
Morris v. De La Torre (2005) 36 Cal.4th 260 (Morris) to support her argument
that these contractual provisions demonstrate Chaoyue and Seafood Village’s
control over the common areas.4 Neither case is on point. In Alcaraz,
although the defendants did not own the property on which the plaintiff was
injured, they maintained it and enclosed it with a fence of their own
construction. (Alcaraz, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1161–62.) Here, there is no
evidence that Chaoyue or Seafood Village maintained or modified the
walkway and parking lot.
In Morris, a patron of an all-night restaurant was stabbed in the
shared parking lot outside, in full view of the restaurant windows, with a
knife from the restaurant kitchen, while restaurant employees watched from
inside without making any attempt to summon help. (Morris, supra, 36
Cal.4th at pp. 264–269.) The Court found a special relationship between the
restaurant and the victim. (Id. at pp. 269–270.) It found that the special
relationship continued even into the parking lot because patrons were
expected to use the parking lot and because, at the time of the attack, the
4 Lin also cites Jordan v. City of Long Beach (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 878, a
case involving allegations of a dangerous condition on public property, and
Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties (1946) 28 Cal.2d 394, in which the
defendant assumed control over the lighting of a walkway by installing a
neon sign and re-wiring the light so it would be on the same switch as the
sign. Those cases are dissimilar from this one.
5
restaurant was the only business open with the right to use the parking lot.
(Id. at p. 274.) None of those circumstances apply here. There is no special
relationship, Lin was not the victim of a criminal assault using an implement
taken from Seafood Village, and Seafood Village was not the only user of the
parking lot at the time.
In sum, there is no evidence that Chaoyue or Seafood Village had
control over the common areas.
II. Indemnity Clause
Lin contends the indemnity clause found in section 8(e) of the Master
Lease demonstrates control. That clause provides: “[Chaoyue] shall
indemnify . . . [TSH] from . . . any and all claims arising from [Chaoyue’s] use
of the Premises or from its conduct in or about the premises or elsewhere . . .
[Chaoyue] shall indemnify . . . [TSH] from . . . any and all claims . . . arising
from any negligence of [Chaoyue].”
Nothing in this clause expressly confers control over the common areas,
but Lin argues control is implied. She reasons that if Chaoyue and Seafood
Village have a duty to indemnify, then they must have sufficient control to
prevent any acts that might trigger indemnity. But this assumes the point to
be proven — Chaoyue and Seafood Village must indemnify TSH if any claims
arise from their conduct and if they behave negligently. There is no evidence
that Chaoyue and Seafood Village engaged in any conduct that led to Lin’s
injury, nor is there evidence to support the existence of a duty that would
give rise to a negligence claim.
6
III. Negligence Per Se
The doctrine of negligence per se permits a party to raise a rebuttable
presumption of failure to exercise due care where (1) the defendant violated a
statute, (2) the violation caused an injury, (3) the injury resulted from the
sort of incident the statute was designed to prevent, and (4) the victim was
one of the class of persons the statute was adopted to protect. (Evid. Code
§ 669; Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 927–928 & fn.7.) Lin argues
that the place where she tripped, where the walkway and parking lot meet,
was in violation of the ADA, and therefore in violation of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act (Unruh Act).5
We reject this argument for the same reason the trial court did.6 There
is no evidence Lin is disabled, and therefore no evidence she is a member of
the class of persons the ADA was adopted to protect. Lin claims the ADA and
the Unruh Act are intended to protect all pedestrians whether disabled or
not. But she cites no authority supporting the proposition that the ADA was
intended to protect all pedestrians. Nor does she cite authority to show that,
where it incorporates the ADA, the Unruh Act was intended to protect all
pedestrians. We decline to apply the doctrine of negligence per se in the
absence of supporting evidence or authority. (See Orange County Water Dist.
v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 343, 380.)
5 The Unruh Act provides “[a] violation of the right of any individual
under the [ADA] . . . shall also constitute a violation of this section.” (Civ.
Code § 51, subd. (f).)
6 We also note that while Lin’s opening brief refers to the ADA and the
Unruh Act by name, neither is properly cited or quoted.
7
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Respondents shall recover
their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
DAUM, J.
8
