Filed 8/11/26 P. v. King CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B339341

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CMCF00116)
v.

AUNDRA LIONELL KING,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean Coen, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Michael Reed for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
 Appellant Aundra Lionell King appeals his conviction for
grand theft. King challenges the sufficiency of evidence to
support the grand theft conviction, the admissibility of witness
testimony regarding the value of the stolen items, and the failure
to instruct on the value of the stolen items. He also claims
cumulative error. We reject King’s claims and affirm the
judgment but order the clerk of the superior court to correct the
abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. September 24, 2023 incident
On September 24, 2023, King jumped the backyard fence of
the home of Phyllis and Mallory Funches in Gardena, California,
and broke into their backyard storage shed. King broke the lock,
pried open the door, and removed several items including a
toolbox containing various tools and a power weedwhacker. The
incident was caught on a surveillance video taken by a
neighboring electrical company. Mallory Funches was given a
still shot from the surveillance video, and recognized King from
having seen him around the neighborhood. Mallory Funches
approached King with the photo. King admitted he was the
person in the photo and told Mallory Funches that he no longer
had possession of the stolen items but would attempt to “make
things right.” King did not return the items.
B. December 25, 2023 incident
On the evening of December 25, 2023, King broke into the
warehouse of Pro Design Group, a plastic manufacturing facility
in Gardena, California. Over a period of eight hours, King stole

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approximately 12 to 16 wheels1 from the warehouse. King also
damaged the business’ front gate, which cost a “couple hundred
dollars” to repair. The incident was captured by Pro Design
Group’s motion activated cameras.
Margarita Garcia Orozco, an office manager at Pro Design
Group, testified about the stolen wheels. Orozco testified that
approximately 12 wheels were stolen from the warehouse. From
the surveillance footage, Orozco identified King as the individual
who took the wheels.
Orozco testified that she had worked at Pro Design Group
for four years, and her job responsibilities included accounting,
accounts payable, accounts receivable, and payroll. She stated
that related to her job duties she was familiar with the
warehouse inventory and with the production of plastic products
for wheels.
According to Orozco, each wheel was worth “around $200.”
Pro Design Group used the wheels for testing purposes but did
not manufacture or sell wheels. On cross-examination, Orozco
explained that the wheels were factory seconds provided by a
customer. The wheels were used to determine the correct
dimensions of the plastic products that Pro Design Group
produced. She confirmed that factory seconds usually had some
sort of manufacturing defect, which would typically affect the
value of the wheel. However, she did not change her estimation
of the value of the wheels.

1 The witnesses and attorneys referred to the items as
wheels, wheel rims, and tire wheels. Based on the description
provided by the witnesses, each stolen item consisted of the
entire wheel. We refer to the items as wheels.

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 Darrin Olsen, the Chief Operating Officer and a partial
owner of Pro Design Group, also testified regarding the value of
the stolen wheels. Olsen testified that he was familiar with the
warehouse inventory and approximately 16 wheels were stolen
from the warehouse. He explained that the wheels were used for
quality checking the wheel dunnage the company manufactured
for a wheel company. When asked the value of each wheel he
replied, “estimated $200, $400 each. Maybe I – honestly I
couldn’t tell you exactly.”
II. Procedure
On April 17, 2024, a jury convicted King of one count of
second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 2),2 one count of
grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a); count 3), and one count of vandalism
under $400 (§ 594, subd. (a); count 4). The court declared a
mistrial as to the additional count of second degree burglary
(§ 459; count 1) related to the September 24, 2023 incident. King
pleaded no contest to this charge.3
On May 15, 2024, the trial court imposed three years on
count 2 and a consecutive one year on count 4. The court

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
3 King also admitted that he sustained eight prior
convictions, which rendered him ineligible for probation under
section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). Additionally, he admitted to
three aggravating circumstances for serving a prior prison term
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)), being on supervision at the
time of the offenses (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)), and previously
performing unsatisfactorily while being supervised (id., rule
4.421(b)(5)).

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imposed a concurrent term of two years on count 1. The court
imposed and stayed two years on count 3 under section 654.
The court found King in violation of his probation for cases
TA157309, TA157608, and TA158129, based on the convictions in
the underlying case.4 The court imposed consecutive terms of
eight months on each probation case. For all four cases, the
aggregate term was six years.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the evidence
King challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the
grand theft conviction. Specifically, he asserts that substantial
evidence does not support the jury’s finding that the value of the
stolen items exceeded $950. We disagree.
A. Standard of review
In determining a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we
“review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment . . . to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “The focus of the substantial evidence
test is on the whole record of evidence presented to the trier of
fact, rather than on ‘ “isolated bits of evidence.” ’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261, italics omitted.)
“Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that

4 On June 6, 2025, we consolidated the appeal for B339341
with the appeals for the three probation cases in B339346,
B339348, and B339351.

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upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) In other words, “ ‘the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015,
1055, italics omitted.)
B. Analysis
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s
grand theft conviction. Two witnesses testified that the value of
the stolen wheels exceeded $950, the minimum amount required
for grand theft. Olsen, a partial owner of Pro Design Group and
its Chief Operating Officer, testified that King stole
approximately 16 wheels, which he estimated were valued at
$200 to $400 each. Based on Olsen’s lower estimation, the value
of the stolen items totaled $3,200, which far exceeded the
required minimum.
Even though Olsen admitted that he did not know the exact
value of the stolen wheels, he was materially consistent with
Orozco. With four years of experience as an office manager at Pro
Design Group, Orozco was familiar with the contents of the
warehouse, and was responsible for accounting, accounts payable,
and accounts receivable. According to Orozco, King took
approximately 12 wheels from the warehouse. She estimated
that each wheel was worth around $200. Based on her
estimation, the value of the stolen property totaled $2,400, which
also exceeded the required minimum. “The testimony of just one
witness is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as that

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testimony is not inherently incredible. [Citation.]” (In re Daniel
G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.) Here, neither witness’
testimony regarding the value of the wheels was “ ‘so inherently
incredible, so contrary to the teachings of basic human
experience, so completely at odds with ordinary common sense,
that no reasonable person would believe it beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983,
996.) Based on the testimony of Olsen and Orozco and the lack of
any conflicting evidence, a rational trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that the stolen wheels were worth more than $950.
1. Personal knowledge of witnesses
King argues that the court should have excluded Olsen’s
and Orozco’s testimony as unreliable because neither had
sufficient personal knowledge of the value of the wheels, as
required under Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a). We
disagree.
Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a) states that “the
testimony of a witness [at trial] concerning a particular matter is
inadmissible unless [the witness] has personal knowledge of the
matter.” Personal knowledge means a present recollection of an
impression derived from the exercise of the witness’s own senses.
(People v. St. Andrew (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 450, 458.) When a
witness’s personal knowledge is in question, the trial court must
make a preliminary determination of whether “there is evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding” that the witness has the requisite
knowledge. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(2).) The trial court may
exclude testimony for lack of personal knowledge “ ‘only if no jury
could reasonably find that [the witness] has such knowledge.’ ”
(People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 573.) Thus, “[a]
witness challenged for lack of personal knowledge must . . . be

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allowed to testify if there is evidence from which a rational trier of
fact could find that the witness accurately perceived and
recollected the testimonial events. Once that threshold is passed,
it is for the jury to decide whether the witness’s perceptions and
recollections are credible. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 574.)
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s determination of
this issue for abuse of discretion. (People v. Tatum (2003) 108
Cal.App.4th 288, 298.)
King argues Orozco did not have personal knowledge of the
value of the wheels because Pro Design Group did not buy or sell
them. We reject King’s argument that personal knowledge of the
value of the wheels required involvement in buying or selling
them or ownership of them. The evidence does not show a lack of
the requisite knowledge. As stated earlier, Orozco testified that
her job responsibilities included accounting, accounts payable,
and accounts receivable. She was familiar with the inventory of
the warehouse and with Pro Design Group’s process of producing
plastic products for a wheel company. Orozco acknowledged that
the value of the wheels could be affected by being factory seconds,
but she did not change her original estimation. This record
established that Orozco had personal knowledge of the value of
the wheels that were in the company’s possession and were used
in its manufacturing process. Thus, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Orozco’s testimony.
We also reject King’s claim that Olsen’s testimony was
“speculative and irrelevant because it was not based on his
personal knowledge.” 5 As stated earlier, Olsen was a partial

5 Because we address the merits of King’s challenge to
Olsen’s testimony, we need not reach the Attorney General’s

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owner and Chief Operating Officer of Pro Design Group. He was
familiar with the day-to-day operations, manufacturing process,
and inventory of the company. Again, we recognize that Olsen
admitted he did not know the exact value of each wheel. But he
provided an approximate value which corresponded to the value
Orozco provided. Considering the scope and responsibilities of
Olsen’s position, the court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting Olsen to testify. Any doubts about Olsen’s knowledge
were appropriately left for the jury to decide. (People v. Mayfield
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 735) [“Generally, ‘doubts about the
credibility of [an] in-court witness should be left for the jury’s
resolution.’ ”]
2. CALJIC No. 14.26
King argues that the trial court erred by declining to
instruct with CALJIC No. 14.26, which informs the jury that the
value of stolen property is based on its fair market value. The
Attorney General concedes. We need not decide whether the
trial’s refusal to instruct was error. Even assuming it was error,
it was harmless under either People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836 or Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
(Chapman).
CALJIC No. 14.26 is based on section 484, subdivision (a).6
CALJIC No. 14.26 states, “When the value of property alleged to
have been taken by theft must be determined, the reasonable and

claim of forfeiture, nor King’s response that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object.
6 Section 484, subdivision (a) states, “In determining the
value of the property obtained . . . the reasonable and fair market
value shall be the test.”

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fair market value at the time and in the locality of the theft shall
be the test.”7 CALJIC No. 14.26 appears to set the fair market
value of property as the default when its valuation has not
otherwise been specified by statute. (See e.g., § 491 [companion
animals]; § 492 [written instruments]; § 493 [passage tickets].)
As stated, Olsen and Orozco both testified that the value of
each stolen wheel was at least $200. The testimonies of Orozco
and Olsen were the only evidence in the record relating to the
value of the wheels. CALJIC No. 14.26 would have only directed
the jury to consider their testimony as the fair market value of
the wheels. (See People v. Tijerina (1969) 1 Cal.3d 41, 45 [“[i]n
the absence of proof . . . that the price charged by a retail store
from which merchandise is stolen does not accurately reflect the
value of the merchandise in the retail market, that price is
sufficient to establish the value of the merchandise . . . .”].) It
would not have directed the jury to reduce the value provided by
Olsen and Orozco, absent evidence to support such a reduction.
“ ‘[F]air market value’ means the highest price obtainable in the
market rather than the lowest price or the average price.”
(People v. Pena (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 100, 104.)
King argues that by failing to instruct with CALJIC No.
14.26, the trial court deprived the jury of the criteria they should
have used to analyze the fair market value of the stolen items.
But King misreads CALJIC No. 14.26. CALJIC No. 14.26 defines
fair market value as “the highest price, in cash, for which the

7 Similar to CALJIC No. 1426, CALCRIM No. 1801 defines
fair market value as “the highest price the property would
reasonably have been sold for in the open market at the time of,
and in the general location of, the theft.”

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property would have sold in the open market at that time and in
that locality, (1) if the owner was desirous of selling, but under no
urgent necessity to do so; (2) if the buyer was desirous of buying
but under no urgent necessity to do so; (3) if the seller had a
reasonable time within which to find a purchaser; and (4) if the
buyer had knowledge of the character of the property and of the
uses to which it might be put.” The four conditions listed in
CALJIC No. 14.26 do not comprise criteria to assess or challenge
evidence about the stolen property’s value. They are the
conditions that would provide the “highest price . . . for which the
property would have been sold in the open market” at the time.
(Ibid.) The conditions eliminate variables which might reduce
the value of the property, such as urgency, desperation, or
coercion to buy or sell, or lack of knowledge about the property
which might dupe a potential buyer into paying a higher price.8
The questions King now poses—how did Olsen and Orozco
know what an owner would receive if he sold the wheels or what
a buyer would pay if he was desirous of buying them—are not
questions that would arise from reading CALJIC No. 14.26.
Rather, they are questions contemplated by CALJIC No. 14.27,

8 This interpretation is consistent with CALCRIM No. 1801’s
bracketed optional language, which states, “Fair market value is
the price a reasonable buyer and seller would agree on if the
buyer wanted to buy the property and the seller wanted to sell it,
but neither was under an urgent need to buy or sell.” The bench
notes to CALCRIM No. 1801 state, “If the evidence raises an
issue that the value of the property may be inflated or deflated
because of some urgency on the part of either the buyer or seller,”
the trial court should give this bracketed language.

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which the trial court read to the jury.9 CALJIC No. 14.27 guides
jurors to evaluate the opinion of an owner who testifies to the
value of the property, including an assessment of the strengths
and weaknesses of the reasons on which it is based. King had the
opportunity to challenge the bases of Orozco’s and Olsen’s
opinions. For example, King asked Orozco about whether the
condition of the wheels as factory seconds could affect their value.
She acknowledged it could, but she did not change her valuation
that each was worth $200. Olsen candidly admitted that he could
not be more precise than the estimated range of $200 to $400 for
each wheel. CALJIC No. 14.27 instructed the jury to consider
these facts, along with Orozco’s and Olsen’s qualifications and
other testimony, to accept or disregard their opinions.
We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial
court’s denial of King’s request to instruct with CALJIC No. 14.26
did not contribute to the guilty verdict because the only evidence
in the record about the stolen property’s value supported that it
exceeded $950 and CALJIC No. 14.26 would have merely directed

9 CALJIC No. 14.27 states: “An expression of opinion on
value by the owner may be considered by you in determining
value together with any other evidence bearing on that issue. In
determining what weight to give an owner’s opinion, you should
consider the believability of the owner, the facts or materials
upon which the opinion is based and the reasons for the opinions.
An opinion is only as good as the facts and reasons on which it is
based. If you find that any fact has not been proved [or has been
disproved], consider that in determining the value of the opinion.
Likewise, you must consider the strengths and weaknesses of the
reasons on which it is based. You are not bound to accept an
opinion as conclusive, but you should give to it the weight which
you shall find it to be entitled. You may disregard any opinion if
you find it to be unreasonable.”

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the jury to value the stolen property at its fair market value at
the time of the theft, rather than evaluate or challenge the
evidence related to the property’s value as instructed in CALJIC
No. 14.27. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)

3. Cumulative prejudice
King contends that the cumulative prejudice from the
multiple errors requires reversal. But King cannot demonstrate
that the cumulative effect of any alleged error resulted in
prejudice. We have determined that no errors were made by the
trial court. Because the one error we assumed for the sake of
argument was harmless, we conclude reversal is not required.
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 348.)

4. Abstract of judgment

Both parties agree that the abstract of judgment
erroneously states that King’s convictions for counts 2 and 3 were
the result of guilty pleas. We order the clerk of the superior court
to amend Item No. 1 on the abstract of judgment to reflect that
for counts 2 and 3, King was convicted by jury.

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 DISPOSITION
We order the clerk of the superior court to amend the
abstract of judgment to reflect in Item No. 1 that for counts 2
and 3, King was convicted by jury.
In all other aspects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

OCHOA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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