Filed 6/18/26 P. v. Burkhart CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B344289

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA425399)
v.

HARRY BURKHART,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles G. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Ana R. Duarte, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
 Harry Burkhart appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered after a jury found him guilty of multiple counts of arson
and related offenses. After a bifurcated trial on Burkhart’s
sanity, the jury found Burkhart was sane when he set the fires.
Burkhart’s sole contention on appeal is that substantial evidence
does not support the trial court’s finding that he was not eligible
for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.1
Burkhart argues that under the amended standard that took
effect in 2024, the prosecution did not rebut the presumption
under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), that Burkhart’s mental
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
offenses. Burkhart further argues the court erred in finding that
his borderline personality disorder was not a qualifying disorder
under the statute.
Burkhart is correct that by the time of the hearing on
mental health diversion, most personality disorders, including
borderline personality disorder, were qualifying disorders under
the statute. However, the trial court did not base its finding that
Burkhart was ineligible for mental health diversion on the fact he
did not have a qualifying mental disorder. Rather, the court
relied on expert opinions that, although Burkhart suffered from
multiple mental disorders, there was clear and convincing
evidence his mental disorders were not motivating, causal, or
contributing factors to his commission of the offenses. Rather,
Burkhart committed the arsons to seek revenge against the

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
United States government for arresting and extraditing his
mother to Germany. We affirm.2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Offenses and Convictions
From the early morning of December 30, 2011 until his
arrest in the early morning of January 2, 2012, Burkhart lit a
series of more than 40 fires. Burkhart started each fire by
placing a fire starter on top of a fire log, which he positioned
beneath the engine compartment of an automobile, usually one
parked in a carport. Many of the fires spread to surrounding
structures, including some residences. Burkhart typically lit
clusters of fires by setting logs aflame beneath multiple parked
cars in a particular location, then traveling to another area to do
the same.
On December 28, 2011, prior to Burkhart setting the first
fire, his mother, Dorothee,3 was arrested at the request of the
German government to extradite her to Germany on pending
criminal charges. That evening Burkhart purchased fire starters
from a grocery store. The next day, Burkhart attended a hearing
in a federal courthouse on Dorothee’s extradition. During the
hearing, Burkhart shouted out, “Fuck all Americans.” He was

2 Burkhart also contends substantial evidence does not
support the trial court’s finding he was not suitable for diversion
because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger. Because we
affirm the court’s finding that Burkhart was not eligible for
mental health diversion, we do not reach this issue.
3 We refer to Burkhart’s mother as Dorothee to avoid
confusion because they share a last name.

3
escorted out of the courtroom by security officers, and in response
to their inquiries he stated, “Fuck You. Fuck America. Fuck all
Americans.”
Burkhart lit the first fire at around 1:00 in the morning
following the extradition hearing (December 30). That day
Burkhart set more than 30 fires. At trial the prosecutor played a
taped telephone conversation between Burkhart and his mother
that took place on January 1, 2012, while Dorothee was in jail
awaiting extradition. In the call Dorothee told Burkhart to stay
calm, and he responded, “Roast America. I cannot remain calm.”
When Dorothee again encouraged Burkhart to calm down, he
responded, “What can I do? Roast America? Yes, roast Germany,
as well. Yes, roast Germany.” The following day Burkhart
started more than 10 additional fires.
Burkhart pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity. During the guilt stage of the trial, the jury found
Burkhart guilty of 18 counts of arson of an inhabited structure,
25 counts of arson of property, two counts of arson of a structure,
two counts of attempted arson, and two counts of possession of
flammable material.
During the sanity stage of the trial, forensic psychologist
Dr. Richard Romanoff testified for the defense and opined
Burkhart suffered from autism spectrum disorder, impaired
cognitive function, paranoid delusions, and stress-related
psychotic mental illness, which rendered Burkhart legally insane
when he set the fires. Dr. Romanoff also noted that Burkhart
was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months before setting
the fires. He opined Dorothee had an unspecified mental illness
that caused her to have “paranoid delusional beliefs” that she had
been “feeding” to Burkhart since he was a child. As a result of

4
his mother’s delusions and his autism spectrum disorder,
Burkhart had difficulty distinguishing between what was real
and what was not. Dr. Romanoff opined that Burkhart had
“some evidence of goal-directed behavior that reflects thinking,
decision-making that’s rational, and . . . some evidence of
irrational [thought] . . . that goes along with, you know, the
paranoid thought process he had.”
Forensic psychologist Dr. Kris Mohandie testified for the
prosecution. Dr. Mohandie also diagnosed Burkhart with mild
autism spectrum disorder, but he opined it did not interfere with
Burkhart’s ability to recognize right from wrong or to engage in
highly organized, purposeful criminal behavior and to know what
he was doing. Dr. Mohandie also opined that Burkhart had a
personality disorder, which led to his strong hatred of the
United States. Further, he was malingering and making up the
severity of his mental illness to avoid blame for his crimes.
Dr. Mohandie acknowledged that Burkhart had a history of
psychotic symptoms, which may have been due to his borderline
personality, but Dr. Mohandie did not see any evidence of
psychotic thinking at the time Burkhart was committing the
crimes. Burkhart’s first sanity trial ended in a mistrial because
the jurors were unable to reach a unanimous decision.
At Burkhart’s second sanity trial, Dr. Romanoff testified for
the defense and again opined Burkhart suffered from autism
spectrum disorder and paranoia as a direct consequence of the
information shared by Dorothee with respect to her perception of
the world; Burkhart had a very unhealthy relationship with his
mother. Further, there was evidence he was legally insane when
he set the fires. Dr. Joseph Ortego, the chief psychiatrist at the
jail where Burkhart was confined during trial, testified that

5
Burkhart exhibited paranoid behavior when he was first taken to
the jail. Dr. Ortego added that while Burkhart was in custody,
he stated he was angry at America because they arrested his
mother to extradite her.
Forensic psychologist Dr. Joel Leifer testified for the
prosecution. Dr. Leifer opined that at the time Burkhart set the
fires, he was not suffering from autism spectrum disorder or any
other mental illness. Rather, Burkhart committed the crimes out
of revenge for his mother’s arrest and extradition.
At the conclusion of the second sanity trial, the jury found
Burkhart was sane when he set the fires. The trial court
sentenced Burkhart to an aggregate state prison term of 33 years
four months. Burkhart timely appealed.

B. Burkhart’s First Appeal and Motion for Mental Health
Diversion
On appeal, we rejected Burkhart’s contention that his trial
counsel conceded Burkhart’s guilt in violation of Burkhart’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, since Burkhart’s
sentencing in 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and
1001.36 as part of Assembly Bill No. 810 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.),
effective June 27, 2018, which provided trial courts discretion to
grant pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain
mental health disorders. We conditionally reversed and directed
the trial court to determine whether Burkhart qualified for
mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. (People v.
Burkhart (Aug. 19, 2020, B289069) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court conducted a mental health
diversion eligibility hearing and found Burkhart was not eligible
for mental health diversion under section 1001.36,

6
subdivision (b)(1)(B), because Burkhart’s mental disorder was not
a significant factor in the commission of the offenses. In reaching
its conclusion, the court considered the testimony from the three
experts who had testified at the sanity phase of the trial, as well
as the evidence presented at trial that Burkhart’s “criminal
conduct was motivated by retribution for his mother’s extradition
from the United States.”
The trial court acknowledged that Dr. Romanoff “testified
[Burkhart] suffered from autism and a schizophrenic disorder.”
Further, Burkhart argued in his brief that his anger over his
mother’s extradition was “‘intensified’ by his mental disorder and
played a significant role in his criminal conduct.” However, the
court characterized Burkhart’s contention as “nothing more than
a conclusory statement when considered with the overall
voluminous evidence presented in the trial proceedings by the
various doctors.” After hearing argument from Burkhart’s
counsel, the court denied Burkhart’s request for diversion,
explaining, “[T]he court did consider this case very carefully, and
it was a tedious review of the record and the testimony rendered
by the various doctors that the court referenced . . . but, in the
end, I don’t find that his . . . mental disorder played a significant
role in the commission of the charged offenses and/or
substantially contributed to the conduct he’d engaged in, the
various arson offenses . . . .” The court reinstated Burkhart’s
convictions and sentence (with the exception of fines and
assessments).
Burkhart again appealed.

7
C. Burkhart’s Second Appeal
On September 29, 2022, while Burkhart’s second appeal
was pending, the Legislature amended section 1001.36, effective
January 1, 2023. (See Sen. Bill No. 1223 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1) (Senate Bill 1223).) Amended
section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), modified the standard for
eligibility for mental health diversion by creating a presumption
that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in
the commission of the offense: “If the defendant has been
diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged
offense.”
In his second appeal, we agreed with the parties that
amended section 1001.36 applied retroactively to Burkhart’s
prosecution under People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624 and
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745. (People v. Burkhart
(Dec. 13, 2022, B311443) [nonpub. opn.].) We conditionally
reversed Burkhart’s judgment of conviction and directed the trial
court to determine whether Burkhart qualified for diversion
under the standard set forth in amended section 1001.36.

D. Proceedings on Remand
On remand, Burkhart filed an updated report from
Dr. Romanoff and a proposed treatment plan for Burkhart
submitted by a German clinic.4 In response, the prosecution filed

4 On August 7, 2025 Burkhart filed a motion to augment the
record with the trial transcript filed in his first appeal, case

8
a renewed opposition to Burkhart’s motion for mental health
diversion and an updated report from Dr. Leifer.
Dr. Romanoff stated in his updated report that he had
interviewed Burkhart multiple times in 2012 and most recently
in November 2023. He opined that there was “clear evidence”
that Burkhart had autism spectrum disorder, which made the
abrupt extradition of his mother difficult, especially given his
close relationship with her. Dr. Romanoff also diagnosed
Burkhart with schizoaffective disorder and noted that Burkhart
had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
Further, autism spectrum disorder and schizoaffective disorder
were qualifying mental disorders under section 1001.36. He also
found that Burkhart’s mental disorder was a significant factor
leading to his commission of the charged offenses.
In his updated report, Dr. Leifer opined, as he did in his
earlier testimony, that Burkhart was diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder, but he “evidenced the capacity to
communicate and interact meaningfully” and had “engaged in
highly organized, purpose-driven behaviors.” Further, Burkhart

No. B289069, and three documents filed in the trial court with
respect to the February 13, 2025 hearing on mental health
diversion: (1) March 15, 2024 updated report from Dr. Romanoff;
(2) February 8, 2024 treatment plan submitted by Burkhart from
the Limes-Schloss Clinic in Germany, translated into English;
and (3) People’s opposition to Burkhart’s motion for mental
health diversion, which attached an October 26, 2024 updated
report from Dr. Leifer. The documents were filed in the trial
court and relied on by the court. In addition, Burkhart and the
Attorney General cite to the documents in their appellate briefs.
We grant the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

9
“was not consistently experiencing psychiatric disturbances” and
“was not consistently an agitated, oppositional, dysfunctional
individual.” He also opined that Burkhart suffered from a
“longstanding, complex personality disorder,” citing the reports
and testimony from Drs. Mohandie and Romanoff. But Dr. Leifer
observed that although Burkhart’s diagnosis with dependent
personality disorder satisfied the specifications in the current
version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM), the disorder was not a qualifying mental
disorder under section 1001.36.
Dr. Leifer also opined that Burkhart’s claims of persecution
were not symptoms of a psychotic disorder, but rather, his
adoption of his mother’s delusional beliefs. In reaching this
conclusion he cited Dr. Romanoff’s testimony at the sanity trial,
in which Dr. Romanoff testified that Burkhart “has a paranoid
view of the world that is not best thought of as a delusion, but as
a pervasive way of the viewing the world . . . . He lives in a
fantasy world . . . that’s been fueled by an unhealthy interaction
with his mother,” and Burkhart’s purported delusions reflected a
“shared paranoid view of the world that includes information
that, if accepted at face value, would be labeled delusional,” but
actually was a product of the persecutorial mindset imparted to
him by his mother. (Italics omitted.)
Dr. Leifer concluded that Burkhart’s “severe mental
disorder did not play a contributory role in his charged offenses.”
In reaching that conclusion, Dr. Leifer pointed to Burkhart’s
stated hatred of the United States after learning of his mother’s
arrest and extradition and the multiple threats he made to “roast
America” during conversations with his mother. Further, during
the surveillance videos of Burkhart shopping for incendiary

10
devices (just two hours after learning his mother was going to be
extradited), Burkhart did not display any “bizarre or
inappropriate behaviors,” and he was able successfully to execute
a strategy to build more than 40 incendiary devices that, once
ignited, would give him time to leave the crime scene undetected.
Dr. Leifer also noted that a video of Burkhart setting a fire
at the German Consulate did not show any “chaotic, compulsive,
psychotic and /or disorganized behaviors.” In addition, when he
was arrested and subsequently detained, Burkhart behaved
appropriately, without any suicidal, rageful, depressed, anxious,
psychotic, irrational, or violent behavior, and he complied with
police instructions without incident. Likewise, during his
videotaped police interviews, Burkhart explained that he had
committed the arsons because of his anger with the American
government for incarcerating his mother, and he did not evidence
any symptoms of a disabling mental illness.
Finally, Dr. Leifer opined that Burkhart would pose a
substantial danger of harm to public safety if he were treated in
the community.
On February 13, 2025 the trial court held a hearing on
Burkhart’s motion for mental health diversion. At the outset of
the hearing, the court observed that, as amended,
“[s]ection 1001.36 creates a presumption that a given defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of a
given offense, and thus the court shall find that the mental
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of said
offense, [but] it is also clear that the statute provides that said
presumption may be refuted where there is ‘clear and convincing
evidence’ that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or

11
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the offense
in question.”
The trial court indicated it had considered the trial record,
including the testimony at the guilt and sanity phase of the
trials, the expert reports presented by the prosecution and
defense, the jail calls between Burkhart and his mother, and the
updated reports from Drs. Romanoff and Leifer. Further, the
court noted it had presided over the trial and heard the testimony
provided by Drs. Leifer, Ortego, and Romanoff.
The trial court highlighted that Dr. Romanoff
acknowledged in his updated report that when he evaluated
Burkhart in 2012, he reviewed Burkhart’s entire medical history,
but given that this was an “extremely unusual case[,] . . . efforts
to accurately reconstruct Mr. Burkhart’s mental state during the
period of time when he committed the offenses [were] difficult to
pursue.” Further, given his inability to obtain meaningful
information from Burkhart, Dr. Romanoff was “‘unable to
definitively reconstruct his actual thoughts and feelings as he
engaged in them.’” Nonetheless, in his 2024 report Dr. Romanoff
opined that Burkhart’s mental issues played a significant role in
his criminal conduct.
At this point the court stated: “It should be noted that
under [section 1001.36], neither conditions such as antisocial
personality disorder nor borderline personality disorder qualify
as viable mental disorders as envisioned by the statute as
qualifying disorders.”
The trial court then stated its finding based on all the
evidence that there was “clear and convincing evidence that any
mental disorder on the part of the defendant was not ‘a
motivating factor, causal factor, and/or contributing factor’ in the

12
commission of the numerous arson offenses” on which Burkhart
was convicted. (Italics added.) The court continued, “To the
contrary, from the overall trial evidence, the defendant’s criminal
conduct was motivated by retribution for his mother’s arrest and
ultimate extradition from the United States.”
The trial court observed that Dr. Leifer testified Burkhart
“was aware of his conduct,” and the “manner and technique”
Burkhart used to set the fires did not show Burkhart “had a low
functioning mentality.” Further, the doctors agreed that
Burkhart had a strong bond with his mother. Dr. Ortego testified
he “did not feel that the defendant suffered from a mental disease
or defect at the time of the crimes, but rather that his criminal
conduct was motivated by revenge for his mother’s extradition.”
(Italics added.) In addition, Dr. Leifer testified that Burkhart’s
mother influenced Burkhart and caused him to malinger and, as
the jail calls reflected, Burkhart’s mother influenced how
Burkhart presented to Dr. Romanoff. Dr. Leifer gave as an
example that Burkhart’s mother instructed him on how he should
feign confusion.
The trial court also relied on Dr. Leifer’s conclusion that
Burkhart had the capacity for high-level cognitive reasoning, as
evidenced during his multiple arsons. Thus, his disorders “were
not severe enough to impair his capacity for comprehending
complex issues . . . or impair his ability to plan and to execute his
arson charges.” The court reiterated its finding that there was
clear and convincing evidence that Burkhart’s “mental disorders
were not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor
to the defendant’s involvement in the arson offenses. On the
contrary, it was the arrest and ultimate extradition of his mother
that was the exclusive reason behind his arson offenses.”

13
 Finally, the trial court cited Dr. Leifer’s opinion that
Burkhart’s actions in committing the offenses showed he
continued to pose a serious danger to public safety. On this basis
the court stated as an additional ground for denying mental
health diversion that Burkhart was not suitable for treatment in
the community. The court concluded Burkhart was not eligible
for mental health diversion.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant
pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain mental
health disorders. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 626; People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147-1148 (Whitmill).)
Under pretrial diversion, the trial court may postpone
prosecution at any time in the judicial process, either temporarily
or permanently, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health
treatment. (Frahs, at p. 626; Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn); Whitmill, at p. 1148.) “The
Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to
apply as broadly as possible.” (Whitmill, at p. 1149; see Frahs, at
p. 632.)
Under section 1001.36, a defendant must be both eligible
and suitable for mental health diversion. A defendant is eligible
under section 1001.36, subdivision (b), if (1) the defendant has
been diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert with a mental
disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the DSM,
“excluding antisocial personality disorder and pedophilia”; and
(2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense. (See People v. Tourville

14
(2026) 120 Cal.App. 5th 439, 451-452 (Tourville); Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.)
With respect to the second eligibility requirement that the
defendant’s mental disorder must have been “a significant factor
in the commission of the charged offense,” section 1001.36,
subdivision (b)(2), provides: “If the defendant has been diagnosed
with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was
not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. A court may
consider any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not
limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,
witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health
treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by
qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant
displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder
at or near the time of the offense.”
The statute specifies four factors that must be met for a
defendant to be suitable for diversion: (1) in the opinion of a
qualified mental health expert the defendant’s mental disorder
would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
diversion and agrees to waive his or her speedy trial rights;
(3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements;
and (4) if treated in the community, the defendant will not pose
an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as defined in
section 1170.18. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4); Tourville, supra,
120 Cal.App. 5th at p. 452.) Section 1001.36, subdivision (e),
places the burden on the defendant “to make a prima facie
showing that the defendant will meet the minimum requirements

15
of eligibility for diversion and that the defendant and the offense
are suitable for diversion.” (See Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 134.)
“An unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined
in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), means ‘“an unreasonable risk
that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony”’ within the
meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which felonies
are ‘colloquially referred to as “super strikes.”’ [Citation.] ‘Those
super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to
commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer,
possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent
felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually
violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors
under the age of 14.’” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679; accord, Tourville, supra,
120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.)5
Even if a defendant meets all the statutory eligibility and
suitability criteria, the trial court still has discretion to deny
diversion. (People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 53;
Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.)
We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion.
(Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135; Whitmill, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147.) A court abuses its discretion when it

5 In addition, under section 1001.36, subdivision (d),
defendants are not eligible for mental health diversion if they are
charged with murder, voluntary manslaughter, an offense
requiring sex offender registration (except for indecent exposure),
specified sex offenses, or offenses involving weapons of mass
destruction.

16
makes an arbitrary decision by applying the wrong legal
standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual
findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.
(Vaughn, at p. 135; Whitmill, at p. 1147.) A court also abuses its
discretion “when its decision exceeds the bounds of reason or is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.” (People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588.)
We review the trial court’s finding whether the defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offense for substantial evidence. (People v. Gerson (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079; People v. Oneal, supra,
64 Cal.App.5th at p. 589 [noting § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), “requires
the court to review ‘relevant and credible evidence,’” which is a
“quintessential factfinding process”].) Because the prosecution
must show by clear and convincing evidence that a mental
disorder was not a significant factor, we determine “whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that
the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
995-996; accord, Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at p. 688.) We also “must view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to
how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship
of O.B., at p. 996; accord, Gomez, at p. 688.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Ruling
Burkhart contends the trial court abused its discretion in
finding Burkhart’s mental disorders were not motivating, causal,

17
or contributing factors to his commission of the arsons because
the court mistakenly assumed that Burkhart’s borderline
personality disorder was not a qualifying mental disorder under
the mental health diversion statute. Burkhart is correct that
both Dr. Leifer and the court (at the February 2025 hearing)
incorrectly believed that borderline personality disorder was not
a qualifying offense for purposes of mental health diversion.
Prior to 2024, all personality disorders were excluded from the
list of qualifying mental disorders, but following the passage of
Assembly Bill No. 1412 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), section 1001.36,
subdivision (b)(1), was amended, effective January 1, 2024, to
include all mental disorders identified in the DSM except for
antisocial personality disorder and pedophilia. (Stats. 2023,
ch. 687, §§ 1.1, 1.2.)
Contrary to Burkhart’s contention, however, the trial court
did not base its finding that Burkhart’s mental disorders were
not contributing factors to his commission of the arsons on a
mistaken belief that his personality disorder was not a qualifying
mental disorder. Rather, the court considered extensive evidence
that Burkhart suffered from multiple mental disorders in
addition to borderline personality disorder. As discussed,
Drs. Romanoff and Leifer in their updated reports stated
Burkhart had autism spectrum disorder; Dr. Romanoff opined
Burkhart also suffered from schizophrenic disorder and had been
diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. In addition,
the court considered the trial testimony from Drs. Romanoff,
Mohandie, Leifer, and Ortego, which included testimony that
Burkhart suffered from paranoid delusions, stress-related
psychotic illness, paranoia, and psychotic symptoms.

18
 Moreover, although the trial court “noted” (mistakenly)
that borderline personality disorder was not a qualifying mental
disorder, the court found there was clear and convincing evidence
that “any mental disorder on the part of the defendant” was not a
motivating, causal, or contributing factor to Burkhart’s
commission of the arsons, but rather, he was motivated by his
desire to seek retribution for his mother’s arrest and extradition
by the United States.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding. It is
true, as pointed out by Burkhart, that Dr. Leifer testified
Burkhart suffered from features of a personality disorder that
could cause psychotic symptoms. However, Dr. Leifer concluded
this disorder did not play a role in Burkhart’s commission of the
arsons. Instead, Dr. Leifer testified that Burkhart committed his
crimes solely out of revenge for his mother’s arrest and
extradition. Burkhart speculates that this finding was tainted by
Dr. Leifer’s belief that personality disorders were not qualifying
disorders. But nothing in the record suggests this belief had any
effect on Dr. Leifer’s conclusion that Burkhart’s conduct was not
the result of a mental disorder. To the contrary, Dr. Leifer
testified that Burkhart was not suffering from any mental
disorder at the time he committed the arsons.
As Dr. Leifer stated in his updated report, Burkhart was
able to engage in complex tasks during the course of his conduct
in setting more than 40 fires. Specifically, as seen in the
surveillance videos, Burkhart did not display any bizarre or
inappropriate behaviors or other symptoms of mental illness
while shopping for supplies, setting the fires, during his arrest
and detention, and in his videotaped police interviews. Burkhart
was able to build multiple incendiary devices that were ignited in

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a manner that allowed him to set fire to 51 vehicles and to escape
before his presence could be detected. And Burkhart admitted
during his police interviews that he committed the offenses
because of his anger over the arrest of his mother, consistent with
his repeated statements during his mother’s extradition hearing
and taped calls with his mother just before setting the fires that
he wanted to “roast America.” The trial court relied heavily on
Dr. Leifer’s opinion in finding Burkhart had the capacity for
“high-level cognitive reasoning” and that his mental disorders
were not sufficiently severe to impair his ability to plan for and
carry out the plan to set multiple fires.
Burkhart notes that persons who suffer from borderline
personality disorder have difficulty controlling their anger,
relying on Dr. Leifer’s opinion in his report that Burkhart’s
personality disorder led him to have “inappropriate, intense
anger” and difficulty controlling his anger. But Dr. Leifer still
concluded that Burkhart ignited the fires as revenge for his
mother’s arrest and extradition. Dr. Leifer pointed to Burkhart’s
lack of psychotic symptoms at the time he set the fires, and the
nature of his decision-making and complex thinking in carrying
out over 40 fires without detection.
Accordingly, reviewing the record as a whole, with
deference to the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and
credibility of the expert witnesses, substantial evidence supports
the court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
Burkhart’s mental disorders were not motivating, causal, or
contributing factors to Burkhart’s commission of the arsons. (See
Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 995-996.) Thus,
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burkhart’s
motion for mental health diversion.

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 DISPOSITION

The convictions are affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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