Filed 6/23/26 In re N.M. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re N.M. et al., Persons Coming B344337
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 24CCJP03517)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra L. Losnick, Judge. Affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 M.S. (Mother) is the mother of two sons, N.M. and O.M.
(collectively, Minors).1 The juvenile court found Mother was a
“recent user” of substances, asserted and then immediately
terminated dependency jurisdiction over Minors, and entered
what is known colloquially as an “exit order” that limits Mother
to monitored visitation and compels her to submit to random and
on-demand drug testing. We are asked to decide whether the
dependency petition’s substance abuse allegation was facially
sufficient and, if so, whether the court’s jurisdiction finding and
the order for drug testing are supported by substantial evidence.
We also consider whether the exit order’s visitation terms require
modification.

I. BACKGROUND
In the evening on September 28, 2024, the Seal Beach
Police Department received a report of a man and woman
arguing and shoving each other outside a Dollar Tree store. The
witness described the couple, their automobile, and noted the
presence of children in the vehicle’s rear seats.
Minutes later, a police officer spotted a vehicle driven by
Mother that was speeding and matched the witness’s description.
When the police officer pulled his vehicle alongside Mother’s, she
appeared to be crying and both she and her male companion (who
is not Minors’ father), Joshua Sainz (Sainz), looked “extremely

1
At the initiation of dependency proceedings, N.M. was eight
years old and O.M. was five years old.

2
nervous.”2 The officer pulled Mother over and was joined by
additional officers.
The officers smelled alcohol when speaking with Mother,
and a field sobriety test indicated “she had consumed some
alcohol, and was under the influence, but likely not impaired.”
The officers also observed bruising, redness, and swelling to the
right side of her face.
In her conversation with the officers, Mother admitted she
and Sainz were drinking earlier at a party and subsequently
argued in front of the store. Mother also said Sainz had played
“‘chicken’” by driving the vehicle at her in the parking lot, but she
initially denied there had been any physical altercation between
them both. She later admitted she struck Sainz in the face, but
she denied he struck her.
Sainz, who had a small open wound on the bridge of his
nose and blood stains on his shirt, shorts, and hands, also
admitted to drinking alcohol at the earlier party and to arguing
with Mother in the parking lot. He denied there was any
physical violence between them; he explained he got cut on the
nose while playing in the pool at the party.
Minor N.M. “immediately broke down crying” when
questioned by the police. He said that Sainz, who hits Mother
“‘all the time,’” had punched Mother in the face earlier that
evening. The police arrested Mother and Sainz for domestic
violence and child endangerment.
Five days after Mother’s arrest, a social worker from the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services

2
L.M., who is not a party to this appeal, is Minors’ father.

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(the Department) interviewed Mother, Sainz, and Minors at their
home. Mother and Sainz each admitted to engaging in a verbal
argument in the parking lot, but they denied there had been any
physical violence between them on the evening of their arrest.
Mother also denied any history of domestic violence with Sainz,
and he similarly told the social worker that he and Mother had
“never fought before” that evening. Mother additionally denied
being under the influence of any substance while driving on the
night of her arrest (but she and Sainz admitted to recreational
use of marijuana outside of Minors’ presence).3 Minors denied
witnessing any violence between Mother and Sainz on the night
of their arrest.
In follow-up interviews conducted in October and
November 2024, Mother and Sainz continued to deny there had
been physical violence between them—even after being
confronted with evidence to the contrary outlined in police
reports. In addition, they each denied Mother had consumed any
alcohol on the day of her arrest.
In November 2024, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1),4 the Department
filed a dependency petition alleging Minors were at substantial
risk of serious physical harm from Mother and Sainz’s history of
engaging in violent altercations and from Mother’s operation of a
vehicle—with Minors as passengers—at high speed and while
under the influence of alcohol. At the initial hearing on the

3
The following day, Mother tested positive for marijuana.
4
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

4
petition, the juvenile court detained Minors from Mother,
released them into the care of their father, and granted Mother
monitored visitation. The court also directed the Department to
provide an assessment as to whether the case could be closed
with a juvenile custody exit order at the disposition hearing.
Although medical and individual counseling services were
ordered for Minors, no services were ordered for Mother.
After Mother tested positive for marijuana and cocaine in
mid-December 2024, the Department filed an amended petition
adding an allegation under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that
Minors were at risk of harm “by the inability of [Mother] to
provide regular care for the child[ren] due to [her] . . . substance
abuse.”5 At her arraignment on the amended petition, Mother
did not challenge the sufficiency of the petition with these
allegations; she only denied the allegations were true.
In advance of the jurisdiction hearing, a Department
investigator re-interviewed Mother and Minors and interviewed
the maternal grandmother. To the investigator, Mother denied
all of the following: drinking alcohol on the day of her arrest,
Sainz playing “‘chicken’” with her in the store parking lot, and

5
The substance abuse allegation included the following
statement of facts: “[Mother] has a history of substance abuse,
and is a current abuser of alcohol, marijuana[,] and cocaine,
which renders [Mother] incapable of providing the children with
regular care and supervision. On 10/04/24, [M]other had a
positive toxicology screen for marijuana. On 12/10/24, [M]other
had a positive toxicology screen for marijuana and cocaine.
[Mother’s] substance abuse endangers the children’s physical
health and safety and places the child[ren] at risk of serious
physical harm, damage[,] and failure to protect.”

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any physical violence between her and Sainz on the day of their
arrests or at any other time. She also denied generally drinking
to excess or driving while under the influence. She further
denied cocaine use, attributing her positive test result to
“‘someone . . . put[ting] something in [her] drink.’”
In the same interview, Mother said she stopped living with
Sainz for two weeks but moved back in with him after that time.
She also said she had enrolled in parenting classes and
individual counseling but had not yet begun those services. The
Department’s investigator told Mother that the Department
would also likely recommend she enroll in domestic violence
counseling.
When re-interviewed, N.M. affirmed the truth of his
statement to police that Sainz hits Mother “‘all the time’” and
N.M. told the investigator he would not want to live with Mother
if she was living with Sainz. N.M. stated Mother drinks beer
approximately three times a week and smokes “vapes,” but does
not act different when drinking or smoking. N.M. further stated
he previously saw Mother drunk on two separate occasions, both
at car shows, but Mother was not driving on either occasion.
N.M. confirmed that on the day of Mother’s arrest she had been
drinking alcohol. N.M. also related that Sainz likes beer and
tequila, drinks “‘a lot’” “every day,” and becomes “mean.”
O.M. told the investigator that Sainz is “‘mean’” to Mother
and “‘hits her a lot’”; like his brother, he expressed a desire not to
live with Sainz. O.M. revealed Mother smoked the “‘[t]he same
thing’” Sainz did, which made the home “‘foggy,’” and drank
beer—but advised Mother did not act differently when drinking,
unlike Sainz who acted “‘bad’” when drinking.

6
 C.S., the maternal grandmother, stated she found Sainz to
be both controlling and violent and related incidents in which he
threw a brick through Mother’s windshield, slashed her tires, and
broke her phone. C.S. also expressed concerns about Mother’s
alcohol use; she opined Mother relies on alcohol as an “‘escape’”
because she has “‘a lot of anxiety’” and she stated Mother
“absolutely drinks more when she is with [Sainz].”
The Department’s jurisdiction report recommended the
juvenile court sustain the amended petition, award “full physical
custody” to Minors’ father, grant joint legal custody to the
parents, order Mother to complete services (domestic violence
counseling, individual counseling, and substance abuse
treatment) before petitioning for a change in custody, and then
terminate jurisdiction.
In a pair of last minute information reports, the
Department related Mother had tested positive for marijuana in
late December 2024 and twice more in January 2025. In early
February 2025, Mother advised she had stopped smoking
marijuana but admitted she still drank alcohol (“‘a couple of
beers’” three times a week on average); she maintained she did
not have an “issue with alcohol,” though, because she does not
drink “excessively.” Mother also advised she had enrolled at a
different facility for parenting and domestic violence classes and
was participating virtually. In addition, Mother reported she had
moved out of the home she had shared with Sainz and obtained a
temporary restraining order against him.
At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing held
in February 2025, the juvenile court admitted the Department’s
reports into evidence. Mother did not contest the sufficiency of

7
the amended petition’s allegations; she argued only that those
allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence.
The juvenile court sustained the domestic violence
allegations under subdivisions (a) and (b) and the driving under
the influence count under subdivision (b). The court sustained
the amended petition’s substance abuse allegation under
subdivision (b) as amended by interlineation. Specifically, at the
suggestion of Minors’ counsel, the court deleted the reference to
Mother as a “current abuser” and replaced with it with the
phrase “recent user.”6 Mother did not object to this amendment.
During the disposition segment of the combined hearing,
Mother objected to monitored visitation and urged the juvenile
court to either order unmonitored visitation or “keep the case
open a couple of months longer so that [she] can demonstrate
that she could have unmonitored visits.” Mother also objected to
the inclusion of a substance abuse program in her case plan
because there was “little evidence of an ongoing problem” and the
principal problem leading to dependency jurisdiction was
“domestic violence.”
The juvenile court disagreed, explaining it could not “help
but note that in this [amended] petition we have marijuana use,

6
As sustained, the amended petition reads: “[Mother] has a
history of substance abuse, and is a recent user of alcohol,
marijuana[,] and cocaine, which renders [Mother] incapable of
providing the children with regular care and supervision. On
10/04/24, [M]other had a positive toxicology screen for marijuana.
On 12/10/24, [M]other had a positive toxicology screen for
marijuana and cocaine. [Mother’s] substance abuse endangers
the children’s physical health and safety and places the child[ren]
at risk of serious physical harm, damage[,] and failure to protect.”

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we have cocaine use, and we have alcohol use, and it’s not a one-
time incident. So[,] that’s what concerns the court.” The court
stated further that while it did not have “a problem with
substance abuse being addressed [through] individual
counseling,” it believed “testing” was required to help address
Mother’s “self-medicat[ion].”
The court placed Minors in the home of their father,
awarded him sole physical custody, granted joint legal custody to
both parents, and limited Mother to monitored visitation. “For
the rider on the custody exit order,” the court stated, “I would like
to see Mo[ther] finish her domestic violence program, attend the
individual counseling and substance abuse treatment, which I
believe she is already in, so she’s ahead of what we may have
wanted her to do. I do think that that would include a testing
component.” The court then terminated jurisdiction.
Two days after the hearing, the juvenile court entered a
“Custody Order—Juvenile—Final Judgment” with the custody
and monitored visitation terms it outlined on the record. In a
pre-printed attachment to the exit order concerning “reasons for
no or supervised visitation” (Judicial Council of California Form
JV-206), however, the court checked boxes indicating Mother was
limited to supervised visitation because she had “not completed”
or had “not made substantial progress” in connection with the
following “court-ordered programs”: a domestic violence
treatment program for victims and individual counseling. Under
the same section of the form, under the subheading “Other,” the
court added the following: “Mother to address domestic violence
and substance abuse in individual counseling with a licensed
therapist. [¶] Mother to submit to random and on/demand drug
testing.”

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 II. DISCUSSION
Two of Mother’s three assignments of error fail. Her claim
that the amended petition’s substance abuse allegation was
facially insufficient is forfeited and meritless in any event. Her
challenge to the substance abuse jurisdiction finding and the exit
order requiring drug testing fails because we need not discuss the
sufficiency of the substance abuse evidence when there is an
unchallenged domestic violence basis for jurisdiction and because
making an order for drug testing was within the juvenile court’s
discretion even without a sustained substance abuse
jurisdictional finding.
Mother’s third assignment of error, however, has merit.
She argues the exit order incorrectly indicates she was denied
unmonitored visitation because she failed to complete certain
court-ordered programs when, in fact, no such programs were
ever previously ordered. Mother is correct that the order does not
conform to the record or the court’s comments at the combined
hearing. We shall therefore vacate the exit order and remand to
give the juvenile court the opportunity to revise the exit order
with proper reasons for ordering monitored visitation (if that
remains the court’s ruling).

A. Mother’s Challenge to the Petition’s Sufficiency is
Forfeited and Meritless Regardless
“A dependency petition must contain a ‘concise statement of
facts, separately stated, to support the conclusion that the child
upon whose behalf the petition is being brought is a person
within the definition of each of the sections and subdivisions
under which the proceedings are being instituted.’ (§ 332, subd.

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(f).) If the parent believes that the allegations, as drafted, do not
support a finding that the child comes within section 300, the
parent has the right to bring a motion akin to a demurrer.” (In re
Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92, 107.) If, however, a parent
fails to object to the petition’s sufficiency in the juvenile court, the
contention is forfeited on appeal. (In re David H. (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 1626, 1640; In re B.H. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 469,
479.) That is the case here.
Even putting aside the forfeiture, “[w]hen the facial
sufficiency of a petition filed under section 300, subdivision (b) is
challenged on review, we construe the well-pleaded facts in favor
of the petition to determine whether the [Department] pleaded
that the parent or guardian did not supervise or protect the
children within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b).
[Citations.] A facially sufficient petition ‘does not require the
pleader to regurgitate the contents of the social worker’s report
into a petition, it merely requires the pleading of essential facts
establishing at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.’
[Citation.]” (Kaylee H., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at 108.) Here, in
support of its subdivision (b)(1) count, the Department alleged
the requisite risk of harm was shown (among other things) by
Mother’s drug test results, her violent confrontation with Sainz
while under the influence of alcohol, and her arrest for child
endangerment for driving a vehicle at high speeds while under
the influence of alcohol and with her children as passengers.
This combination of alleged facts was sufficient to state a claim
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D).

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 B. Mother’s Challenges to the Sufficiency of the
Substance Abuse Evidence and the Substance Testing
Order Are Unavailing
Mother argues insufficient evidence supports the juvenile
court’s ruling sustaining the allegation that her substance abuse
puts Minors at substantial risk of suffering serious physical
harm; she does not challenge the court’s finding that this same
risk of harm is established by the evidence of the domestic
violence between Sainz and her. In these circumstances, we need
not consider the propriety of the jurisdiction finding she selects
for review. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 [“‘When a
dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a
reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of
jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for
jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need
not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory
grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’
[Citation]”].) Instead, we conclude what Mother perhaps
implicitly concedes by not challenging the domestic violence basis
for dependency jurisdiction: that basis, and thus jurisdiction over
the children, is well supported by the evidence—including the
children’s own statements to Department personnel and the
police reports documenting Mother and Sainz’s statements and
actions when arrested. Insofar as Mother would argue we should
exercise our discretion to address the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the substance abuse jurisdiction finding, we have
considered the factors our Supreme Court has identified as

12
relevant (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266) and believe such an
exercise of discretion is unwarranted in this case.
Mother additionally challenges the juvenile court’s
requirement, set forth in its exit order, that she participate in
drug and alcohol testing (and address substance abuse in
individual counseling). Section 362.4 authorizes a juvenile court
to make such orders, which remain in effect until modified or
terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court. In
making exit orders, a juvenile court considers the best interest of
the children and “has broad discretion.” (In re N.M. (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094; In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112-
113.)
The juvenile court here did not transgress the bounds of
that broad discretion. There was evidence not only of Mother’s
history of drug and alcohol use, but also of child-endangering
behavior when Mother was using (at least) alcohol—namely, the
domestic violence between Mother and Sainz when both were
under the influence of alcohol, Mother’s high-speed driving while
under the influence of alcohol with the children in the car, and
the statements made by Minors suggesting Mother and Sainz
were using marijuana in the home with the children present.
Those facts demonstrate drug and alcohol testing was a prudent
measure in Minors’ best interests. (See, e.g., In re Natalie A.
(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186-187.) Insofar as Mother argues
drug and alcohol testing could not be a component of the juvenile
court’s exit order without a sustained jurisdiction finding on
substance abuse grounds, the argument is unavailing. (See, e.g.,
J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at 113 [“Section 362.4 does not
require a finding of detriment under any circumstances; as a
result, courts have applied the best interest standard in

13
determining appropriate custody and visitation exit orders at this
stage”]; In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008
[order for random drug and alcohol testing justified even though
the court found alcohol related basis for dependency jurisdiction
not proven].)

C. The Exit Order Must be Vacated
When an exit order is inconsistent with a juvenile court’s
oral order, a reviewing court may remand the matter so that the
orders may be harmonized or may modify the exit order itself.
(In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 800 [“direct[ing] the
juvenile court to correct the exit order so it is consistent with the
oral order regarding visitation”]; In re Maribel T. (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 82, 86, fn. omitted [when a “written custody order
fail[s] to conform to the juvenile court’s oral order,” the
appropriate remedy is to “modify the custody order to conform to
the juvenile court’s oral ruling and affirm”].)
Vacatur of the exit order is required here because it is
inconsistent with the record and the juvenile court’s on-the-
record ruling. At the hearing where the court assumed and then
terminated jurisdiction, the court correctly acknowledged Mother
was voluntarily participating in services that had not yet been
ordered. The monitored visitation attachment to the exit order,
however, incorrectly states Mother had not completed or
substantially complied with programs that had been previously
ordered. Accordingly, we remand the matter so that the court
may revisit the exit order to explain the reasons for monitored
visitation in a manner consistent with the record—if the court
continues to believe monitored visitation is then warranted.

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 DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s finding of dependency jurisdiction is
affirmed. The juvenile court’s Custody Order—Juvenile—Final
Judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded for entry of a
new and different custody order consistent with this opinion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.
We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

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