Filed 6/26/26 In re Alberto R. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Alberto R., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
THE PEOPLE, D086078

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J245116)

v.

ALBERTO R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marissa Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson, Junichi P. Semitsu, and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 The People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section

6021 alleging that Alberto R. committed two murders. (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a).) With respect to each murder, the People also alleged that Alberto
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm within the meaning of
Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The petition also alleged that
Alberto was not a proper subject for the juvenile court. (Citing § 707, subd.
(a)(1) [authorizing the People to make a motion to transfer a minor from
juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction].)
As discussed in detail below, section 707 outlines the procedures that
a juvenile court is to utilize in determining whether to transfer a minor from
the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The statute mandates
that a juvenile court shall consider various statutory criteria, including
“[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(i)); “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration
of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); “[t]he minor’s
previous delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); “[s]uccess of previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(D)(i)); and “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in
the petition to have been committed by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)).
The statute further provides that in order to find that a minor should be
transferred from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the
juvenile court “shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is

1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to
the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Section 602 provides the juvenile court with jurisdiction over certain
minors who have committed a violation of the law.

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not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
In May 2025, after the preparation of a transfer report, copious
briefing, and a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued a
lengthy ruling that considered the statutory criteria outlined above and
found that Alberto was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 707, subdivision (a)(3).
Accordingly, the juvenile court granted the People’s request to transfer
Alberto to criminal court.
On appeal, Alberto claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in granting the People’s transfer request because there is insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that he was not amenable to
rehabilitation prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. We
conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s
amenability finding and affirm the transfer order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The transfer report
In February 2025, a probation officer submitted a section 707 transfer
report. The report described the circumstances of the alleged offenses, noting
that the two victims, aged 18 and 16, had been shot during a gang-related
confrontation outside a Halloween party. One of the victims was a gang
member who had been involved in the confrontation and a second victim
was an “innocent bystander.” Among other evidence, the report described
Alberto’s admissions to a jailhouse informant during a controlled operation
that inculpated him as the shooter. The report also documented that Alberto
was 17 years old at the time of his alleged commission of the offenses.

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 The transfer report also summarized Alberto’s family and criminal
history, physical and mental health, educational background, employment
history, participation with gangs, use of alcohol and drugs, and behavior
while in custody. In addition, the report summarized the results of a
psychological evaluation and described interviews conducted with Alberto
and his family members. The report also recounted statements made by the
victims’ family members pertaining to the offenses’ impact on their lives.
The report also considered the five criteria set forth in section 707,
subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E) for determining whether Alberto would be
amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
The report expressed the view that Alberto’s criminal sophistication and
the circumstances and gravity of the offense warranted transfer but that
the remaining criteria (i.e., possibility of rehabilitation; prior delinquency
history; success of prior court attempts at rehabilitation) supported a
finding that Alberto was amenable for rehabilitation by the juvenile court.
Ultimately, after evaluating the five statutory criteria, the probation officer
recommended that Alberto be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction.
B. The People’s transfer brief
In March 2025, the People filed a brief arguing that the juvenile court
should transfer Alberto to the criminal court. In their brief, the People
contended that each of the five section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E)
criteria weighed in favor of transfer.
First, the People argued that Alberto had demonstrated criminal
sophistication through his commission of various acts, including his use of a
firearm to commit two gang-related murders and his admission to a jailhouse
informant that another member of his group attempted to shoot a gun during
the offenses. The People also pointed to Alberto’s use of an untraceable

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“ghost gun” to commit the alleged murders, his belief that he would likely
only serve seven years in custody because he was 17 at the time of offenses,
his flight from the scene, his disposal of evidence, and his efforts to avoid
detection as supporting a finding that Alberto’s criminal sophistication
supported transfer.
The People further argued that Alberto could not be rehabilitated prior
to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction given his current age of 20
and the fact that the remaining period that he could spend in the juvenile
system would likely be reduced or eliminated when Alberto was sentenced to
state prison on pending charges for additional crimes that he had allegedly
committed after the offenses alleged in this case. With respect to Alberto’s
delinquency history, the People noted that Alberto’s social media postings
reflected a desire to commit numerous robberies and they contended that
prior rehabilitative efforts by Alberto’s family and school officials had not
deterred Alberto from engaging in criminal behavior.
Finally, the People argued that the “gravity of the alleged offenses is
beyond question,” contending that Alberto had murdered two unarmed young
persons in order to “build his reputation as a hardened gang member.” The
People further maintained that the alleged murders had left the victims’
families and friends “heartbroken.”
C. Alberto’s opposition brief
Alberto filed a brief opposing the People’s transfer request. In his
brief, Alberto emphasized that he had retained three experts, a psychologist,
a juvenile justice consultant, and a gang expert, each of whom found that
Alberto was amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile court and should not
be transferred. Alberto’s brief also addressed each of the relevant statutory
criteria and argued that none supported transfer. Alberto maintained that

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the evidence supported a finding that he was not criminally sophisticated
but instead that “he was easily manipulated” and that he had acted out of
both “immaturity and impulsivity” and fear that he would be “jumped and
attacked” at the time of the shooting. Alberto further argued that he could
be rehabilitated while in juvenile detention, noting that he had not engaged
in any in-custody incidents of violence since September 2023, that he had
taken advantage of rehabilitative programming opportunities that the
juvenile system had provided, and that he would be able to engage in years
of future rehabilitative programming if left within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. Alberto additionally contended that he had “ ‘no prior juvenile
[court] record’ ” and there had been “no past attempts at rehabilitation for
delinquency,” and that these criteria both favored maintaining his case in
the juvenile court.
Finally, while Alberto acknowledged that there was “no denying the
magnitude of the instant offenses,” he contended that the circumstances
of his offenses were distinct from another case involving “pre-planned,
coordinated actions of the minors.” Alberto further stressed, “[t]he burden
of proof is upon the prosecution to rebut the presumption that the minor
involved is suitable for juvenile jurisdiction,” and argued that the gravity
and circumstances of the offense criterion weighed against transfer.
Alberto supported his brief with several exhibits, including a
psychological report prepared by a psychologist, Dr. Kristina Malek; a
juvenile court suitability report; a gang expert’s evaluation; numerous family
character letters; mental health therapy notes; a character letter from the
lead facilitator and mentor of a gang prevention and youth development
program; and copies of various certificates that he had obtained for his
completion of rehabilitative programs while in juvenile detention.

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D. The transfer hearing
The juvenile court held a hearing on the People’s transfer request
over the course of several days in March of 2025. Among other evidence, the
People presented extensive testimony pertaining to the circumstances of the
offenses, as well as evidence of Alberto’s social media postings pertaining to
gang and criminal activity. In addition, the People presented evidence
pertaining to Alberto’s participation in additional offenses after those at issue
in this case, including a gang-related conspiracy offense and a violent group
assault while in juvenile detention. The People also presented the testimony
of the probation officer who drafted the transfer report recommending
Alberto’s transfer to criminal court.
In opposition, Alberto presented the testimony of numerous witnesses,
including the experts who had prepared reports lodged with his opposition
brief, his therapist, and family members with whom he lived.
E. The juvenile court’s ruling
On May 2, 2025, the juvenile court issued a written ruling granting the
People’s request to transfer Alberto to a court of criminal jurisdiction. In its
ruling, as discussed in detail below, the juvenile court considered each of the
statutory criteria specified in section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E),
and, after weighing all of the criteria, found by clear and convincing evidence
that Alberto is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.
F. The appeal
Alberto filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s order on the
same day of its issuance.

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 DISCUSSION
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting the People’s request
to transfer Alberto to criminal court
Alberto raises a single claim on appeal. He contends that the juvenile
court abused its discretion in granting the People’s request to transfer
“because the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation
prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.”
A. Governing law and standard of review
As noted above, “Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring
a minor from juvenile court to criminal court. It provides that whenever a
minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to have committed a felony, the
prosecutor may move ‘to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court
of criminal jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] The prosecution bears the burden of
proving that the minor should be transferred.” (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 152, 164 (Miguel R.).)
Section 707, subdivision (a)(3) provides, “In order to find that the
minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall
find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Section 707,
subdivision (a)(3) further provides that, in making its transfer decision, the
juvenile court shall consider five criteria specified in subparagraphs (A)
through (E) of the statute quoted in the introduction of this opinion and
discussed in detail below.
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of
discretion. . . . The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of section
707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable

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inferences in support of the court’s findings. [Citation.] [¶] Likewise, we
review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s ultimate finding ‘that the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.’ [Citation.] Because the juvenile court must make that
finding by clear and convincing evidence, we ‘determine whether the record,
viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by’ the
clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at p. 165.)
B. Application
Alberto raises several arguments in support of his claim that the
record contains insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s ruling,
but none is persuasive. We observe at the outset that Alberto’s arguments
each amount to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence presented in
the juvenile court and/or substitute our discretion for that of the juvenile
court. Since, however, in reviewing a ruling on a transfer request, “we do
not reweigh the evidence and we do not substitute our discretion for the
discretion exercised by the [juvenile] court,” all of Alberto’s arguments fail.
(See In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211 (J.S.).) We address each of
Alberto’s specific arguments below.
First, Alberto contends that the juvenile court “should have given
more weight” to the section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E) criteria
that the court found supported amenability, and less weight to those criteria
that the court found did not support amenability. The statutory scheme
“says nothing about the relative weight to be given to any of the criteria.”
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) Accordingly, we reject
Alberto’s argument that the juvenile court erred by failing to “give[] more

9
weight” to certain statutory criteria. (See ibid. [rejecting argument that
juvenile court should have given greater weight to one of the five section 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E) criteria].)
Next, Alberto claims that the juvenile court “failed to properly weigh
the expert evidence and dismissed the expert’s conclusions.” The juvenile
court was authorized, and indeed entrusted, to weigh the experts’ opinions
and consider their value. (See J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212 [“[T]he
juvenile court was not required to credit the testimony of the defense experts.
As trier of fact, it was free to discredit such testimony. Phrased otherwise,
any trial court is not bound by an expert’s testimony and opinion.”].) And,
here, the juvenile court’s 17-page transfer order reflects careful consideration
of the experts’ opinions and reasonably explains those aspects of the expert
testimony and evidence that the juvenile court found persuasive and those
aspects that the court did not. For example, while Alberto argues that
“Dr. Malek prepared a comprehensive and compelling report,” the juvenile
court reasonably disagreed with portions of that report as unsupported by
the court’s view of the evidence and the court explained in detail its reasons
for doing so in its ruling.
In addition, none of Alberto’s specific arguments with respect to
the section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E) criteria is persuasive.
With respect to the first criterion, pertaining to “[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor,” the juvenile court reasonably found
that this criterion favored transfer. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) The juvenile
court reasoned that Alberto’s conduct before, during, and after the alleged
offenses supported such a finding. The court explained that Alberto had been
associating with gang members, had obtained a firearm in the days before
the shooting, and had carried a loaded firearm with him to the party on the

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night of the shooting while anticipating trouble. The court also observed
that, during the incident, Alberto, who had some experience with firearms,
“not at the urging of anyone,” and “not in imminent danger,” shot and killed
two people, before firing a third shot. The juvenile court also noted that
Alberto described himself as feeling “hyped” after the shooting, and found
that Alberto participated in the wiping down and disposal of the firearm he
used in the shooting, and that he concocted a fake story in the event certain
incriminating evidence were to be discovered.
The juvenile court also discussed Dr. Malek’s opinion that this criterion
did not support transfer but explained that it “did not find Dr. Malek’s
testimony persuasive in part, because of her interpretation of the evidence.”
Pointing to the evidence surrounding the offenses discussed above, the
juvenile court reasonably elaborated, “The credible evidence before the court
is that the circumstances leading up to the murder of the victims do not
support that Alberto was pressured to commit the offenses.”
In addition, the juvenile court considered Alberto’s age, upbringing,
and the social and family environment in which he lived. The court
specifically referenced the economic difficulties that Alberto faced and that
“he did not have a father in his life.” The juvenile court also accurately
noted that Alberto “grew up in a large loving family,” and that he had “no
diagnosed physical, mental or emotional needs.” After considering the
totality of the evidence, as well as the statutory factors underlying the
criminal sophistication criterion (see § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii)), the juvenile
court reasonably determined that this criterion weighed in favor of a finding
that Alberto was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court.

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 Alberto, in turn, points to evidence that he contends would have
supported an opposite finding, namely that he was “immature [and]
impetuous,” and that he “failed to appreciate risks and consequences of his
behavior, he was manipulated by his peers, he suffered childhood trauma,
and he was a scared 17-year-old.” Yet, the fact “there may have also been
substantial evidence to support a different conclusion” from that reached by
the juvenile court does not demonstrate a lack of substantial evidence for the
finding that the juvenile court did reach. (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 173, 190.) In short, we are not persuaded by Alberto’s
contention that reversal is required because “[t]he juvenile court should have
given more weight to . . . findings,” supportive of a determination that Alberto
lacked criminal sophistication.
Next, Alberto argues that the juvenile court “should have given greater
weight” to the court’s finding that Alberto could “be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B).)
According to Alberto, the juvenile court was required to give greater weight
to this finding, because this criterion purportedly “best demonstrates the
ultimate question of whether appellant is amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” We are not persuaded. While
the juvenile court reasonably found that this criterion supported transfer, the
court did not err in failing to accord greater weight to it in determining
whether to grant the People’s transfer request for the following reasons.
As the Miguel R. court explained, “the ultimate determination of
whether ‘the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court’ (§ 707[, subd.] (a)(3)) is not the same as the
second criterion.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) While the
“focus of the second criterion is whether there is enough time to rehabilitate

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the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court
jurisdiction,” the ultimate finding of amenability requires a “global
assessment of the minor’s suitability to rehabilitation within the juvenile
court system, and not just a comparison of the time needed with the time
remaining.” (Id. at p. 167.) In addition, as the Miguel R. court noted in
rejecting an argument similar to that posed by Alberto, “[b]ecause the
juvenile court is not required to give greater weight to the second criterion
or to deny the transfer motion if that criterion does not weigh in favor of
transfer, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by not according the
second criterion greater weight than the other criteria.” (Id. at p. 168.)
With respect to the next criterion pertaining to “[t]he minor’s previous
delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)), Alberto again asks us to
reweigh the evidence, contending that the juvenile court “should have given
more weight to the fact that this was appellant’s first petition and first arrest
and Dr. Malek’s expert testimony that this factor weighs against transfer to
adult court.” We are not persuaded. To begin with, case law establishes that,
in considering this criterion, a juvenile court is not limited to “conduct taking
place before the alleged offense,” or “conduct resulting in a delinquency
petition.” (D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441, 451; accord
§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii) [“When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i)
[(i.e. “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history”], the juvenile court shall give
weight to any relevant factor” (italics added)].)
Thus, the juvenile court reasonably considered that Alberto had
engaged in some negative conduct while in high school, which included both
threatening and engaging in violence, even if such conduct had not resulted
in a delinquency petition. The juvenile court also reasonably considered the
fact that Alberto’s “social media evidence[d] an increase in delinquent

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history” following the alleged murders, including that Alberto’s postings both
suggested that he was a gang member and expressed a desire to commit
several specific robberies. And, perhaps most significantly, the juvenile court
reasonably noted that Alberto had been charged as an adult with numerous
crimes allegedly committed on three separate occasions after the murders in
this case. Those crimes included gang-related crimes, sex offenses, and a
group assault that Alberto allegedly participated in while in juvenile custody
that resulted in the victim suffering a broken jaw.
The juvenile court also reasonably discounted the opinions of Dr. Malek
and the probation officer that the previous-delinquency factor weighed in
favor of amenability. As the juvenile court explained, the probation officer
was not aware of certain evidence related to this criterion supportive of
transfer. In addition, the juvenile court reasonably found that Dr. Malek’s
discounting of the significance of some of Alberto’s delinquency history
described above to be “unpersuasive.”
While Alberto asserts that “California courts analyzing this factor have
found that more significant prior contacts with the juvenile justice system
than appellant’s weigh[ed] against transfer to adult court,” as discussed
above, the juvenile court was not limited to considering Alberto’s prior
contacts with the juvenile court system in analyzing this criterion. In any
event, such comparisons are of little value in determining whether there is
substantial evidence to support a court’s finding given the totality of the
evidence in any particular case. In sum, when considered in toto, the juvenile
court reasonably determined that Alberto’s prior delinquency supported
transfer.
Alberto next asserts that the juvenile court should have given “greater
weight” to its finding that the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile

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court to rehabilitate the minor” supported a finding of amenability. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(D).) Again, however, it was the juvenile court’s role to weigh the
various statutory criteria and determine their relative importance with
respect to the court’s overall determination of whether to transfer Alberto.
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.) Further, while Alberto notes
that “appellant had not been given any prior opportunity to rehabilitate and
show his potential for growth and maturity,” the juvenile court expressly
acknowledged that there had “not been previous attempts by the juvenile
court to rehabilitate Alberto” and it was on this basis that the juvenile court
found that this factor supported amenability. In sum, the court properly
summarized the lack of prior rehabilitative efforts by the juvenile court and
Alberto has not demonstrated the juvenile court committed any error in
failing to give this factor greater weight.
With respect to the “circumstances and gravity of the offense” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(E)), the juvenile court reasonably determined that the evidence
surrounding Alberto’s personal commission of two gang-related murders
and the harm that his actions caused supported transfer. While Alberto
points out that Dr. Malek concluded that Alberto was “impulsive and
immature” and that he was a “follower,” the juvenile court considered both
Alberto’s “mental state and his mental and emotional development,” as well
as Dr. Malek’s opinion. Nevertheless, the juvenile court reasonably
determined the state of the evidence concerning the offenses supported a
finding that their circumstances and gravity supported transfer.
Finally, Alberto contends that “[a] review of the totality of the evidence
indicates appellant is amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court.” As we stated above, we do not “reweigh the evidence
and we do not substitute our discretion for the discretion exercised by the

15
[juvenile] court.” (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.) We have carefully
reviewed the entirety of the record and conclude there is sufficient evidence
on which the juvenile court could reasonably “find by clear and convincing
evidence that [Alberto] is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)2
DISPOSITION
The May 2, 2025 order transferring Alberto from juvenile court to a
court of criminal jurisdiction is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

2 In addition to the arguments presented in his brief, Alberto filed a
notice of new authority alerting this court to the recent decision, In re O.F.
(2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133. In In re O.F., the Court of Appeal concluded that
the November 2022 transfer order at issue in that case had to “be reversed in
light of subsequent retroactive changes in the law that have renewed the
focus of section 707’s inquiry on a minor’s amenability to rehabilitation.” (Id.
at p. 140.) Alberto makes no claim that there have been retroactive changes
in the law requiring reversal of the May 2025 transfer order at issue in this
case.
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