P. v. Rennie

Filed 7/17/06 P. v. Rennie CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Nevada)

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A jury convicted defendant William Rennie III of four sex offenses committed against three children and found the charged enhancements to be true (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subds. (a), (c), 1203.066, subd. (a)(7) & (8); unspecified section references that follow are to the Penal Code). The jury acquitted defendant of one additional charge. (§§ 664/288, subd. (a).)

Sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 12 years, defendant appeals, contending that (1) the delay in prosecution violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial, (2) the trial court improperly curtailed jury voir dire, (3) the trial court erred in precluding cross-examination relating to prior complaints of two of the victims, and (4) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, requiring reversal of his convictions. None of these claims has merit, and we affirm the judgment.

Facts and Proceedings

Given the nature of defendant's claims on appeal, a detailed description of the underlying offenses is unnecessary. Suffice it to say that in 1996, defendant orally copulated Kimberly R. on multiple occasions, attempted to fondle Kimberly's sister, Sheila R., and inappropriately touched another young girl, Tanya N.

Prosecution of this case came to a standstill from 1998 to 2004 while defendant was incarcerated in Oregon.

Other facts are discussed as relevant in the context of defendant's contentions.

Discussion

I

Right to Speedy Trial

A complaint was filed in this case June 1997 and an information was filed in August 1997, but trial did not begin until March 2005, in large part because defendant was incarcerated in Oregon during the interim. Defendant asserted this delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and he filed motions to dismiss his case in March 2004, December 2004, and March 2005. The trial court denied each motion.

On appeal, defendant reiterates his claim that this lengthy delay violated constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial. In essence, he contends that the delay was attributable to the prosecution, who failed to seek defendant's transfer from Oregon to California to stand trial. Proper analysis compels a contrary conclusion.

Initially, we note that although defendant makes fleeting reference to the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution, he focuses his arguments exclusively on rights under the federal constitution. Our discussion is therefore likewise limited.

In Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 [33 L.Ed.2d 101], the United States Supreme Court adopted a balancing test for analyzing speedy trial cases under the Sixth Amendment, requiring courts to consider the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant. Among the factors to be assessed are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant. (407 U.S. at p. 530 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 116-117].) None of these factors has â€