CA Unpub Decisions

D.H. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) D.H. was charged with misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (a)) for lightly pushing his father in an attempt to close a car door. He contends there was insufficient evidence of a harmful and offensive touching to constitute battery. We agree. D.H. touched his father, but the touch was neither harmful nor offensive. D.H.’s attempt to move his father to close the car door was not a criminal battery warranting the prosecution of this 15-year-old boy.

Defendant Marcquise Shirley pled guilty to one count of first degree robbery and sentenced to the midterm of four years. Defendant appealed. We have conducted an independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and conclude that no arguable issues exist. We therefore affirm.

Derek L. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying his request to restore reunification services and the order terminating his parental rights as to his children N.L. and E.L. We affirm both orders.

In July 2016, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition alleging the child’s mother, Sara M. (Mother), had failed to protect the child from harm and the risk thereof, both due to her abuse of drugs, and to her serious mental and emotional problems.

Joseph Hebert pleaded no contest to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and admitted to a prior strike. The trial court sentenced him to six years in state prison. On appeal, Hebert’s appointed counsel has filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Reyes Valenzuela, an attorney, appeals from a judgment in favor of his former clients, defendants and respondents Alma Delia Barnes and 700 So. Broadway Bldg., LLC. The trial court ruled that plaintiff’s claim for unpaid fees and costs was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.

Plaintiff Felipa Blas sought damages individually and as conservator for her husband, Roberto Blas Jimenez, for injuries Jimenez sustained after his bicycle collided with the door of a car driven by defendant Bera Portugal. Blas also sought damages from Portugal’s employer, defendant and respondent Link Group, Inc., dba Allie’s Bridal (“Link Group”), under a theory of respondeat superior. Link Group moved for summary judgment, relying in part on Blas’s concession that Portugal, who was off work on the day of the incident, “did not work for, or conduct any business for,” Link Group that day. The trial court granted the motion, and Blas appeals.

In a “road rage” incident, Keith Wright aggressively pursued a victim in a high-speed chase and intentionally slammed his pickup truck into her car, totaling her car and injuring her. He was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and it was alleged he had suffered two “strike” convictions in 1992 arising out of a similar “road rage” incident during which he chased a driver and his 13-year-old son on a highway, tried to run them off the road, and pointed a gun at them. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(j), 1170.12, subd. (b).)

A jury convicted defendant Chesare Rene Reyes of one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, one count of second degree robbery, three counts of criminal threats, and one count of resisting a peace officer. On the robbery and criminal threats counts, the jury found true that defendant personally used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the crimes. On appeal, defendant contends that insufficient evidence supported his robbery conviction, the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct jurors on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats, and the trial court erred in imposing full one-year sentences for the weapon enhancements on two of the three criminal threat convictions. The People agree that the court erred in its sentence and also point out that the abstract of judgment is incorrect in another respect. We order correction of the abstract. In all other respects, we affirm.

In a putative class action against defendant NorthBay Healthcare Group (NorthBay), plaintiff Joseph Caudle (Caudle) moved for certification of a class of uninsured patients who received medical treatment at a hospital owned by defendant NorthBay, were billed NorthBay’s “chargemaster” rates for their treatment, and did not receive any reductions to their bill or have payments made by a third party. The trial court denied certification, finding Caudle had not demonstrated that the class was ascertainable and that common issues predominated over individual issues. Caudle appeals, contending the trial court erred in requiring ascertainability and predominance because his putative class was a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23(b)(1) and/or (b)(2) (Rule 23) “equivalent” class, neither of which requires ascertainability or predominance. Alternatively, he argues he established both ascertainability and predominance. We conclude the trial court properly required ascertainab

Appellant Patrick Foo Tzeng appeals after a jury found him guilty of committing sexual offenses against a massage client. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motions during jury selection. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).) He also contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument and insufficient evidence supports aspects of the trial court’s restitution award. We reverse and remand regarding one aspect of the restitution award, but otherwise reject appellant’s claims on appeal.

Plaintiff Thomas Lippman sought a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) to compel defendant City of Oakland (City) to have an appeals board or the governing body of the City review his citations for blight and substandard living conditions on his rental property. Lippman claimed the City violated the California Building Code (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, § 1.8.8) (Building Code) by having a single hearing officer, who had been appointed by the very entity that cited him, hear his claims. The trial court determined the City’s administrative appeals process complied with the Building Code. We disagree and will reverse.

The State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission) is the state agency exclusively empowered to license thermal power plants of over 50 megawatts capacity. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 25120, 25500, 25517; see City of Sonoma v. State Energy Resources Conservation etc. Com. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 361, 364–365 (Sonoma).) Indeed, pursuant to section 25500, the Energy Commission possesses “the exclusive power to certify all sites and related facilities in the state, whether a new site and related facility or a change or addition to an existing facility” and “[t]he issuance of a certificate by the commission shall be in lieu of any permit, certificate, or similar document required by any state, local or regional agency, or federal agency to the extent permitted by federal law, for such use of the site and related facilities . . . .” Subdivision (a) of section 25531 provides that Energy Commission decisions “on any application for certification of

Plaintiff Annette Pastorini Aiassa appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained defendant Corinna Pokorny’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. We shall affirm.