CA Unpub Decisions

Shaun Gregory Field (appellant) was convicted by a jury of two counts of carjacking (Pen. Code, 215, subd. (a)), evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a)), and second degree commercial burglary ( 459). In a subsequent court trial, the court found that he had suffered three prior convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). He was sentenced to 85 years to life in prison. He appeals, contending that the court failed to properly instruct the jury on the target offenses of the burglary, there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction for evading a peace officer, and the court improperly imposed consecutive sentences for the carjacking and burglary counts. Court reverse the conviction for evading a peace officer, but affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The minor, Keli P., appeals from the April 5, 2006 order declaring her a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) and the disposition order of April 12, 2006, placing her in a short-term camp community placement program. The juvenile court sustained the allegations of a delinquency petition filed December 27, 2005, and amended February 22, 2006, charging the minor with misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, 242) and criminal threat. (Pen. Code, 422.) The juvenile court ruled that the criminal threat was a felony. The minor argues: the motion to amend should have been denied; there was insufficient evidence that she made a criminal threat; and she should not have been placed in a short term camp community placement. Court affirm.

Defendant was convicted of mayhem (Pen. Code, 203) after biting off the top portion of Allison Artiagas left ear during a fight initiated by defendant. Defendant waived trial on the prior conviction and prior prison term allegations. He admitted suffering a prior serious felony conviction for robbery in case No. BA186555 ( 667, subd. (a)), which also qualified as a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i) and 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). Defendant also admitted prior prison term allegations for the robbery and a section 666 conviction in case No. GA044009 within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 15 years, calculated as the midterm of four years for mayhem, doubled under the three strikes law, plus a five year enhancement for the prior serious felony and two additional years for the prior prison terms.
Court hold defendants admissions were voluntary and intelligent. As conceded by the Attorney General, it was not proper to enhance the sentence for five years under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and one year under section 667.5, subdivision (b), since both enhancements arose from a single conviction. The finding that defendant served a prior prison term in case No. GA044009 must be reversed as defendant never admitted to serving a separate prior prison term. Accordingly, Court affirm the admissions as voluntary and intelligent, but the two years imposed for the two prior prison terms must be vacated.

Plaintiff and appellant Simi Soltani, D.P.M., a podiatrist and Medi-Cal provider, appeals a judgment denying her petition for writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., 1094.5), wherein Soltani sought to overturn a decision by defendant and respondent California Department of Health Services (Department) determining that Soltani owed the Department $179,229 for overpaid claims.
Court conclude Soltani has failed to show any error in the disallowance of her claims. Therefore, the judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate is affirmed.

Defendant and respondent Long Beach Unified School District (the District) suspended, and then initiated proceedings to expel, plaintiff and appellant MJ Kevyn Gliane (MJ) from an eighth grade middle school. Before conducting an expulsion hearing pursuant to Education Code section 48918, the District implemented a procedure to transfer MJ involuntarily to a new middle school. In addition, the District maintained documents in MJs official file indicating that he committed an expellable offense. In response, MJ filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to have the trial court order the District to provide MJ with a statutory expulsion hearing pursuant to section 48918 and to expunge MJs records of any reference to the allegedly expellable offense. The trial court denied MJs petition. Court reverse.

After his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 was denied, defendant and appellant David Bachtel (defendant) pleaded no contest to possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). The trial court placed defendant on formal probation for three years under various terms and conditions. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence. Court affirm.

Cross-complainants, Taft Corporation, Kamyar Lashgari, and Benedict Canyon Villa, LLC, appeal from a judgment in favor of cross-defendants Bernard Lax and Lynda Lax (the Laxes). The Laxes have easement rights on a hillside. Cross-complainants are developers who sought damages for interference with prospective economic advantage once they could no longer grade on the hillside. Court affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from an order made pursuant to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, terminating contact between appellant Billy H. and his son M. (born October 1998). Court affirm.

This case arises out of the relationship between an investment advisor and individual investors. Defendants, Venus Capital Management, Inc. (Venus Capital) and Vikas Mehrotra, appeal from an order denying their motion to compel arbitration of the claims brought by plaintiffs, Devadatt (Dr. Mishal) and Surekha Mishal. We conclude there is no written arbitration agreement between plaintiffs and defendants. Accordingly, Court affirm the order.

Craig W. (father) appeals from the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders, contending (1) there is insufficient evidence fathers history of substance abuse has caused or would cause any harm to his daughter, C.W., (2) there is insufficient evidence supporting the courts decision to remove C., (3) the court erred in concluding he was not the presumed father of C., (4) the court erred in concluding he was not entitled to reunification services, and (5) the court erred in failing to ensure the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) complied with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).[1] For reasons set forth below, we reject fathers first and second contentions, find his third and fourth contentions to be moot based on subsequent proceedings in the juvenile court, and agree with his fifth contention. Based on a failure to comply with the ICWA, as conceded by DCFS, Court reverse and remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions.

Frederick B. (father) and Melissa B. (mother) (hereinafter collectively referred to as parents) appeal the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to S.B. and setting adoption as her permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code[1], 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Their sole contention on appeal is that the court failed to ensure compliance with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) Court agree, and accordingly reverse and remand with directions to the juvenile court to ensure proper ICWA notice. If there is no response to such notice indicating that S.B. is an Indian child, the order terminating parental rights reinstated.

In this appeal from an order of the juvenile dependency court,[1] Alicia R., the mother of the minor children Jennifer C. and M. R. (Mother, Jennifer, and M., respectively), challenges the courts final order whereby the respective fathers of the minors were given legal and physical custody of the children, Mother was granted monitored visitation, and jurisdiction over the minors was terminated. Mother contends the dependency court should not have terminated jurisdiction over Jennifer because Mother and Jennifer have not established a positive relationship yet and therefore continued supervision by the court was necessary. Mother also contends the record does not support the courts decision to order that Mothers visits with the minors be supervised. Court's review of the record and pertinent law shows Mother has not presented cause to reverse the challenged order.

Defendant and appellant Raul Anthony Gamera pled no contest to possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and admitted suffering a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) and 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Pursuant to an agreed upon disposition, defendant was sentenced to four years in state prison, comprised of the midterm of two years on the heroin charge, which was doubled as a result of the prior strike conviction.
No brief has been filed by defendant. Court have reviewed the record and find no arguable issues arising from the sentence or matters occurring after trial. The judgment is affirmed.

Gina D. (mother) and James E. (father) have filed writ petitions pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 challenging the juvenile court's order terminating their family reunification services with their son, Ashton E., and setting the underlying dependency proceeding for a hearing to consider the termination of their parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.)[1] We find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's order. We also reject mother's contention that the respondent court should be recused from hearing further proceedings in the case.
While this proceeding on the rule 8.452 petitions was pending, mother, father and the child, joined by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), filed mandate petitions challenging the court's orders regarding the child's placement and visitation with his paternal aunt in Oklahoma. We issued an alternative writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate these orders. The court complied with the alternative writ on June 29, 2007. Accordingly, Court dismiss the petitions as moot.