CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Stephanie Rene Patrick appeals her conviction of one count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)), one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness from making a police report (Pen. Code, 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). This court appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. Appointed counsel has filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 493] setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues and has requested this court to undertake a review of the entire record. Court have offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, but she has not done so.
The judgment is affirmed.

Kristopher E. (father) and Priscilla E. (mother) appeal an order terminating their parental rights to their son, Oliver E., born May 2003. They contend the juvenile court erred in refusing to find applicable the benefit exception set forth in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother also complains that the court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the permanency hearing to give her an opportunity to confer with her attorney, with whom she had not communicated for some time. Finding no merit to either contention, Court affirm the order.

Appellant Mark Andrew Zavala contends the trial courts determination that he is a sexually violent predator was not supported by substantial evidence. As Court conclude the case is moot, Court dismiss the appeal.

Defendant Ellis Edward Evans appeals from an order committing him to Atascadero State Hospital (ASH), after a jury first found him guilty of one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a)) and one count of driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (b)), and acquitted him of one count of evading a police officer (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a)). The trial court then found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (Pen. Code, 1026). Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erroneously determined that defendant had not fully recovered his sanity under section 1026. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Michael Dwain Weatherwax of arson (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (d); count 1) and attempted arson ( 455; count 2). The trial court found that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (a) and (d), and that he had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 10 years.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on attempted arson as a lesser included offense of arson; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte regarding unanimity; (3) the trial court erred in giving a special instruction, based on a note to CALCRIM No. 1515, which told the jury that burning trash that does not belong to the defendant is arson, and that there is no requirement for arson that the property belong to anyone; (4) the trial court erred in staying rather than striking one of the prior prison term enhancements; and (5) the abstract of judgment contains clerical errors which must be corrected. Court agree with defendants last two contentions, and order the abstract of judgment to be amended accordingly. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Ana D. appeals from orders terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to her three young children.[1] She contends the court erred by denying her earlier petition to regain custody ( 388) and request for a bonding study. She also argues it was error to terminate her rights because: there was no evidence of the childrens wishes regarding adoption ( 366.26, subd. (h)(1)); and there was evidence termination would be detrimental to the children based on their relationship with her ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). On review, Court affirm.

Following Kaylas adjudication for first degree burglary on January 16, 2007, the court adjudged Kayla a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602), placed her on probation in the custody of her grandparents, and ordered her to complete seven days in the juvenile work program, which it then suspended. Kaylas appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Kayla has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional briefing. However, our review of the record indicates that neither the juvenile court nor the prosecutor considered Kayla for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) as required by section 790 and Court remand the matter for this purpose.

A jury found appellant guilty of one count of sale of cocaine base. (Health & Saf. Code, 11352.) Appellant contends his "constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated when trial counsel failed to object to multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments." Court affirm.

A jury found appellant guilty of one count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, one count of criminal threats with the personal use of a knife, and one count of assault. (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a), 422, 12022, subd. (b)(1), 240.) Appellant admitted enhancing allegations of a strike prior, a prior serious felony, and a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 667.5, subd. (b), 667, subd. (a).) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of appellant's prior acts of domestic violence and his possession of knives. Court affirm.

Appellant Valerie T. contends in this dependency appeal that the record does not show proper notice has been given under the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). The respondent San Mateo County Human Services Agency (Agency) concedes error in this regard, and suggests that the proper remedy is to remand the matter to the trial court for proper compliance with the ICWA notice requirements. Court agree, and remand for the giving of proper notice.

The juvenile court (1) sustained allegations that S.K. (appellant) committed a misdemeanor battery and (2) declared him a ward of the court. (Pen. Code, 243, subd. (d); Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] 602.) The juvenile court placed appellant on formal probation for a maximum of one year with conditions. On appeal, appellant contends that his Fourteenth Amendment and due process rights were violated when the juvenile court rescinded its informal probation order and ordered formal probation. Also, appellant claims that the juvenile court erred in imposing as a condition of probation that he refrain from associating with people who are known to use, possess or deal drugs. Court reverse the juvenile courts order rescinding informal probation, declaring appellant a ward and ordering formal probation and Court remand for further proceedings. Court also find that the probation condition is invalid.

A jury convicted appellant Dale Lamar Chester of one count of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, 69),[1] one count of transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)), one count of possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)), and one count of being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11550, subd. (a)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on an additional count of resisting an executive officer. He pled guilty to one charge of child annoyance ( 647.6, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior conviction allegation ( 667, subds. (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)).

Chester was sentenced to the upper term of seven years four months in state prison. Restitution and parole revocation fines were imposed and suspended. He was given 97 days of presentence custody and conduct credit.

On appeal, Chester asserts Batson/Wheeler error,[2] ineffective assistance of counsel, and lack of substantial evidence to support his conviction for resisting an executive officer and transporting a controlled substance. Chester also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging partial denial of his Pitchess motion.[3] At Chester's request, Court consider the petition with the appeal. Court affirm the judgment. Court deny the petition by separate order.

M.A. Raquib appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5), and possession of a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, 11364, subd. (a)). He contends the trial court's delay in giving the jury a written copy of the jury instructions was prejudicial error, and the court's denial of a continuance to obtain new retained counsel was constitutional error. Court affirm.

In July 2005, appellant Rodney Smith pled no contest to petty theft with a prior conviction for that offense (Pen. Code, 666) and admitted to one prior prison term offense within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to four years in state prison, but execution of the sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on formal probation for three years. In June 2006, after hearing, appellant was found in violation of his probation. Probation was terminated and the four year sentence was imposed. Court appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.