CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Henry Cooper, along with a codefendant, received a stolen drivers license and social security card belonging to the victim, Cynthia A. Chaffer. Defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to one count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a); undesignated section references are to the Penal Code) and admitted one of two prior strikes ( 1170.12) in exchange for a stipulated prison sentence of six years, comprised of the three year upper term for the charged offense, doubled pursuant to section 1170.12 for the strike.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, Court find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The judgment is affirmed.

In the criminal proceeding in this matter, the court ordered that a $25,000 bail bond be forfeited when the defendant, Bertha Gines, failed to appear at a hearing on July 13, 2004.[1] The insurer that issued the bond, Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger) moved to set aside the forfeiture, arguing the court lost jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture when it did not order the bond forfeited when Gines failed to appear at previous hearings on May 17 and July 12. The court denied the motion, finding (1) the evidence showed that Gines was present at the hearing on May 17; and (2) the court had good cause to continue the July 12 hearing to July 13 when Gines did not appear at the hearing on July 12.
On appeal Ranger asserts that the bond forfeiture should be set aside because the court was without jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture as (1) the evidence shows Gines was not present at the hearing on May 17; and (2) there was no good cause to continue the July 12 hearing when Gines did not appear.
Court conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the court to find that Gines was present at the hearing on May 17. However, we also conclude that there is insufficient evidence of good cause for the court to continue the July 12 hearing when Gines did not appear and accordingly the court lost jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture and it must be set aside. Court therefore reverse the court's order denying Ranger's motion to set aside the bond forfeiture.

In October 2004 Dierik Pratts entered a negotiated guilty plea to infliction of corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code,[1] 273.5, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor violation of a stay-away order ( 166, subd. (c)(1)). In November the court suspended imposition of sentence, placed him on three years' probation, imposed a $200 restitution fine ( 1202.4, subd. (b)), and imposed a $200 probation revocation fine ( 1202.44) which it stayed pending successful completion of probation. In May the court revoked, reinstated, and modified probation. In December it revoked probation, suspended the execution of a three-year middle term prison sentence, reinstated and modified probation, imposed a $400 restitution fine, and suspended a $400 parole revocation fine ( 1202.45). In October 2006 the court revoked probation, executed the suspended prison sentence, imposed a $400 restitution fine, suspended a $400 parole revocation fine, and deleted the fines imposed in November 2004.
The judgment is modified by striking the $400 restitution fine and reducing the $400 suspended parole revocation fine to $200. The $200 restitution fine remains in force. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Anthony Russell West pleaded guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, 290, subd. (g)(2)), and admitted two prior strike convictions ( 667, subds. (b) - (i)). On March 4, 2005, the trial court struck the two prior strike convictions and placed West on probation for a term of three years on the condition, among others, that he serve one year in the county jail and remain law abiding.
On November 17, 2006, West admitted he had violated the terms of his probation, and the court formally revoked probation and sentenced him to a prison term of 16 months for failing to register as a sex offender.
The judgment is affirmed.

S.P. and Julian P. appeal judgments of the juvenile court terminating parental rights to their twin daughters, J.P. and L.P. Julian also appeals an order summarily denying his petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. Court affirm the judgments and order.

David M. (father) appeals from the termination of his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1]as to his minor children Christian (born 1999), Cynthia (born 2001) and Christy (born 2004).
Father has appealed, and at his request, we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under authority of In re Sade C. ( 1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth an integrated statement of the case and facts, and asking this court to undertake an independent review of the entire record. The orders appealed from are affirmed.

Defendant was convicted by jury trial of robbery. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of theft and (2) the instruction on a witnesss inconsistent statements (CALCRIM No. 318) created an improper presumption. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Cisco Ray Crawford was convicted by jury trial of robbery. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of theft, (2) the instruction on a witnesss inconsistent statements (CALCRIM No. 318) created an improper presumption and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to amend the information with a strike allegation. Court affirm the judgment.

During a minor traffic stop, an officer noticed that defendant Arthur Ray Jones had a hypodermic syringe on his lap and that he appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. After a field sobriety test was administered, defendant was arrested. Before he was booked into jail, a small plastic bag containing a brown sticky substance was found in his sock. When asked what it was, defendant said it looks like heroin. He also admitted to another officer that he had used heroin that day. He was charged with felony possession of heroin and misdemeanor driving under the influence. The information also alleged three prior strike serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (d)),[1]and five prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). When the case was called, defense counsel announced that defendant wished to have a court trial and would waive his right to a jury. However, in obtaining a jury trial waiver from defendant, the judge inadvertently asked if he was willing to waive a court trial, to which defendant responded yes. The mistake was immediately pointed out by defense counsel, the judge corrected his misstatement, and the case proceeded to trial by the court. Defendant was convicted on the drug possession count, and due to his prior serious felony convictions, he was sentenced to 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends as follows: (1) there was never an express waiver of jury trial, (2) there was insufficient chain of custody evidence regarding the heroin, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant defendants motion to strike prior convictions, and (4) the sentence was in violation of constitutional safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment. Court reject each of these contentions and affirm the judgment.

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition filed March 14, 2006,[1]as follows: appellant Donte Luther Smith, Jr. committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211, 212, subd. (c)), unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)) and failing to stop at the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, 20002, subd. (a)); appellant personally used a firearm in committing the robbery (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (b)); and appellant was born in 1990, and therefore was 15 years of age at the time of the alleged offenses. On April 7, the juvenile court found appellant unfit to be tried in juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code,
707). On April 10, a criminal complaint was filed, charging appellant with the same offenses and alleging the same enhancement as in the wardship petition. On April 11, appellant pled not guilty to the charged offenses and denied the enhancement allegation.
On July 11, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant withdrew his not guilty plea, pled guilty to the robbery charge and admitted the accompanying enhancement allegation, and the court dismissed the remaining charges. One of the terms of the plea agreement was an indicated sentence of 12 years. On August 22, the court imposed a prison term of 12 years, consisting of the two year lower term on the substantive offense and 10 years on the firearm-use enhancement, and recommended that appellant be housed at the California Youth Authority. The instant appeal followed. The judgment is affirmed.

Alleged father Thomas J. appeals from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to Serenity J. He contends a lack of notice prevented him from evaluating his paternity status and participating in the underlying dependency proceedings. On review, Court affirm.

Petitioner Suzanne S. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450-8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her son I. Court deny the petition.

Petitioner in pro. per. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 8.452 (rule)) from the juvenile courts order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her son R. Court deny the petition.

Sometimes lawyers seem to forget that, in their professional capacities, they owe a duty of loyalty to their clients even when they no longer like them. And when a lawyer becomes convinced his client is on the wrong side of a particular legal dispute, the lawyer generally has the option of staying out of that dispute. He does not, however, have the option of switching sides and suing a client on behalf of a third party, alleging that the very settlement he obtained for the client in prior litigation actually belongs to the third party. And when the client objects to such an attempt, and sues the lawyer for breach of his professional obligations, the lawyer probably shouldnt cross complain back against her, apparently outraged that she has dragged him into the controversy and caused him to expend money to defend himself.
Court reverse the courts order denying the clients anti-SLAPP motion, and remand the case with directions to grant the motion as to the law firms causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Court also direct the court to reconsider the issue of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute in light of that changed circumstance.