CA Unpub Decisions

Desiree F. appeals the order placing her on six months probation without wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602, 725, subd. (a)) after the court found she committed battery on a peace officer (count 1) and resisted a peace officer (count 2). (Pen. Code, 242/243, subd. (c); 148, subd. (a)(1).) She contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain the finding because the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when appellant committed the offenses.
The February 24, 2006 and April 5, 2006 orders are modified to reflect a finding that appellant committed a violation of section 242 only. As so modified, the orders are affirmed.

Ryan B., appellant, appeals the termination of his non wardship probation and the juvenile courts order of wardship. He claims that the court failed to provide proper notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to changing his status. Court agree and reverse.

Appellant Edward John Kelleher appeals from an order following a jury trial extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, 2970, 2972.) He contends the judgment must be reversed because (1) the evidence was insufficient to show that he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others, as is required for an MDO extension; (2) the court should have instructed the jury sua sponte that the People had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he would not take his psychotropic medications if unsupervised and that in an unmedicated state, he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury instruction to that effect. Court affirm.

Ronald Lee Keopke, Jr. argues the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights and abused its discretion when it excluded evidence he sought to admit to impeach the victim witness. Court affirm.

Plaintiff Jay Patterson appeals from an order denying his request for an award of reasonable attorney fees as a prevailing party in a contract action under Civil Code section 1717. Court affirm.

M. M., minor mother of C. M., appeals the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional order. The juvenile court concluded the welfare of the minor, C. M., required he be removed from the custody of appellant. Court affirm.

Appellants Hayward Dodge, Inc., Triad Financial Corporation (Triad), and AutoNation, Inc. (appellants) appeal the trial courts order finding respondent to be the prevailing party and awarding him attorney fees and costs. Court reverse.

On January 23, 2006, we filed an initial opinion in this case (People v. Smith (Jan. 23, 2006, A106965) [nonpub. opn.]) reversing appellants conviction for making criminal threats against a police officer (Pen. Code, 422)[1]and remanding the case to the trial court to conduct an in camerareview of the personnel records of Sergeant James Creekmore of the San Pablo Police Department. We stated, in the conclusion of that opinion, that if that inspection reveals no relevant information, i.e., with regard to prior relevant misconduct by the officer, the court should reinstate the judgment of conviction. The trial court conducted the required inspection, found no relevant information, and reinstated the judgment of conviction under section 422.
Appellant again appeals and asks this court to independently review the same personnel records, supplied us of course under seal. Court have done so and agree with the trial court that those records contain no relevant discoverable evidence. Court thus affirm the judgment of conviction.

Chris Dwyer appeals a restraining order issued in favor of Pamela Tarango pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Court find sufficient evidence satisfied the statutory requirements for issuance of the order, and affirm.

After, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree in September 2005, appellant was placed on probation for a period of three years. After two prior motions to revoke probation ultimately resulted in reinstatements of probation, as a result of the third such motion probation was revoked in September 2006, and appellant sentenced to the midterm of two years in prison on the original second degree burglary count the following month. Pursuant to People v. Wende(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, he asks this court to examine the record in this case and determine if the record before us suggests any issues deserving of further briefing. Court have done so, find none, and hence affirm the judgment.

Appellant Gregory Burgos was sentenced to two years in state prison after pleading guilty to making criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422. Appellants court appointed counsel has briefed no issues and asks this court to review the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Court have done so and find no issues that merit briefing. Court modify the judgment to correct an error in the calculation of appellants presentence custody credits. Except as modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant and respondent Jared Jacob Standish was charged with a variety of offenses. On the ninth day of the 10-day statutory period within which the preliminary examination was required to be held, the People moved for a continuance on the ground that a necessary witness was unavailable. The trial court found good cause existed and granted the continuance. In violation of Penal Code section 859b,[1] however, the magistrate did not release Standish on his own recognizance (O.R.). Standish subsequently moved to set aside the information pursuant to section 995, on the ground his substantial rights had been violated at the preliminary hearing. The trial court granted the motion. The People appealed the trial courts ruling to this court. Standish argued that the trial courts ruling was proper, and, in any event, dismissal was required on the alternative ground that good cause had not existed for the continuance. In a published opinion, we affirmed the trial courts ruling, concluding that the failure to grant Standish the statutorily mandated O.R. release denied his substantial rights and entitled him to relief under section 995. (People v. Standish (Oct. 29, 2004, B166344), review granted Feb. 2, 2005, S129755.) In light of our holding, we found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether good cause existed for the continuance.
Court agree with the People that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding good cause existed. To the extent the Peoples good cause showing was defective, Standishs challenge is forfeited because he failed to object below. Court therefore reverse the superior courts order setting aside the information.

A jury found defendant and appellant Gregory Saulsberry guilty of criminal threats (Penal Code, 422, count 1),[1]assault with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2), and corporal injury to a cohabitant. ( 273.5, subd. (a), count 3.) Defendant admitted that he had served two prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced him to a term of seven years eight months in state prison, consisting of the upper term of four years on count 2, eight months on count 1, and one year on count 3, plus two consecutive one year terms on the prior prison enhancements. On appeal, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of making criminal threats, and that the court the court erred in imposing the upper term on count 2, pursuant to Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403] (Blakely) and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham). Court affirm.

Petitioner Brenda D. (mother) is the mother of Brianna M., born in 2000. Mother appeals the juvenile courts orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights to Brianna under section 366.26. Briannas father, Mark M. (father), joins in mothers arguments, as they apply to him, and seeks reinstatement of his parental rights. Father does not raise any arguments apart from those asserted in mothers appeal. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her a full evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition for modification. She also argues the parental bond exception ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) applies and claims she did not knowingly waive the exception. Alternatively, she argues that her attorneys failure to raise the exception in the trial court constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Court reject mothers contentions and thus affirm the judgment as to both parents.