CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395.) Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the minor was adoptable. Disagreeing with this claim, Court affirm.

Aaron Marcel Palacios was convicted by a jury of attempted murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 664, 189),[1] two counts of kidnapping for robbery ( 209, subd. (b)(1)), two counts of kidnapping for carjacking ( 209.5, subd. (a)), and two counts of carjacking ( 215, subd. (a)). True findings were made that he discharged a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the attempted murder, the kidnapping for robbery and the kidnapping for carjacking of victim Brian Jones ( 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.7, subd. (a)). True findings were made that he was armed and personally used a firearm in the kidnapping for robbery ( 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and was armed with a firearm in the kidnapping for carjacking of victim Grant Carr ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). He was also convicted of robbery in a dwelling involving the personal use of a firearm ( 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), robbery involving the personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury ( 211, 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.7, subd. (a)), two aggravated assaults involving the use of a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)), assault with a deadly weapon involving a knife ( 245, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)), and burglary of a dwelling involving the use of a firearm ( 459, 460, 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
Court now conclude the court erred by failing to stay either the kidnapping for robbery or kidnapping for carjacking as to one of the victims, strike the carjacking convictions, and properly calculate the determinate portion of Palacios's sentence. Court remand for correction of the sentencing errors. In all other respects, Court affirm the judgment.

This action arises out of the 1994 purchase for $550,000 of a four story office building (the building) in San Diego by plaintiff David Oranen and his mother Diane Bruckman. In March 2004 Bruckman sold the building for $2,925,000 without Oranen's knowledge or consent. When Oranen discovered the sale and demanded one-half of the sale price, Bruckman denied that he had any interest in the property and refused to provide him any proceeds from the sale.
Oranen sued Bruckman for breach of contract and fraud. A jury found in favor Oranen and awarded him (1) $1,462,500 (one-half of the sale price of the building), (2) $100,000 for additional funds that he had loaned Bruckman and that she had not paid back, and (3) $200,000 in punitive damages.
On appeal, Bruckman asserts that the court erred by (1) granting several motions in limine that excluded testimony relevant to the honesty and veracity of the witnesses testifying at trial, and (2) denying her motion for new trial based upon irregularity in the proceedings and insufficiency of the evidence. Court affirm.

This case is before us for a second time, after transfer from the California Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of that court's recent decisions in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 (Black II) and People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825. In our original opinion, we affirmed Rico Lamar Little's convictions, but vacated his sentence on count 1 on the ground that the trial court's imposition of the upper term violated Little's constitutional rights because the trial court relied on facts that were not found by a jury nor admitted by Little to impose the upper term, in violation of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham). On reconsideration, Court conclude that under the principles announced by the California Supreme Court in Black II, the trial court did not err in imposing the upper term sentence on count 1.

Candace G., the mother of Edward K., appeals the judgment terminating her parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Candace contends the juvenile court erred by finding Edward was likely to be adopted and by not applying the parent child beneficial relationship exception to adoption ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). The judgment is affirmed.

jury convicted defendant of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, 10851) and five other related offenses. The court found true the allegations of two prior prison terms, two serious felony priors, and two strike priors. The court sentenced defendant to 27 years to life. On appeal, defendant claims two errors: first, the trial court erred in denying his Marsden motions; second, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of defendants prior convictions for automobile theft. Court reject both contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant James Marcus Coronado appeals from judgment entered following a jury conviction for second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)).[1] The jury found defendant not guilty of first degree murder, and found not true the allegations of defendant lying in wait and the gun use and gang allegations ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 190.2, subd. (a)(15), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), and 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in state prison. Defendant contends the prosecutor committed numerous acts of prejudicial misconduct throughout the trial. Defendant claims such misconduct included argumentative examination of witnesses, editorial comments during examination, improper reference to a polygraph exam, asking defendant during cross examination if witnesses were lying, and failing to produce before the trial an informants letter. Court conclude that either the acts complained of did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct or the misconduct was harmless error. Court thus affirm the judgment.

Susan Carol Anderson (Susan) appeals an order partially denying her motion to vacate and set aside the dissolution judgment entered pursuant to a marital settlement agreement relating to her divorce from Roger Earl Anderson (Roger).[1] Pursuant to the agreement, the parties waived their rights to be served with a Final Declaration of Disclosure, as well as Income and Expense Declarations, and their rights to spousal support, and disposed of three parcels of real estate, household furnishings and other personalty, including two vehicles. Susans motion to vacate and set aside the judgment or portions thereof, or, in the alternative, to adjudicate omitted assets, was brought pursuant to Family Code sections 2122 and 2556, on the ground of fraud, duress, undue influence and mental incapacity. The trial court found there was substantial failure to comply with the Family Code section 2104 disclosure requirements, and partially granted Susans motion to vacate the stipulated judgment as to the division of community assets and obligations. However, it concluded her claims that the waiver of spousal support was the result of duress and/or mistake were not credible, and denied the motion as to that issue. Susan contends that the trial court erred in denying her request to present live testimony at the hearing, in severing the issue of spousal support from the rest of the judgment, and in denying the motion as to waiver of spousal support. Court disagree and affirm.

Appellants Amy R. and Jeremy P. (hereafter mother and father or the parents) appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to two of their children, C.R. and J.P. They contend that the court abused its discretion in denying mothers petition for modification and that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) applied to preclude freeing the children for adoption. Court affirm the order.

Three children are the subject of this appeal, Emily B., born in June 1992, Erin B., born in March 1994, and Megan R., born in May 2004. The children have different fathers, Scott B. and Michael R. Mothers appeal challenges the orders of the dependency court, continuing the detention of Emily and Erin and maintaining the same visitation schedule with all three children. Court treat the appeal in part as a petition for writ of mandate and deny it. To the extent any issue is appealable, Court affirm the orders of the dependency court.

Appellant appeals from the judgment in an action based on a combined petition for writ of administrative mandamus and complaint for damages. The writ petition portion challenged respondents decision, after administrative hearing, to demote appellant from his employment as a bus mechanic and, when appellant did not accept the conditions of demotion, to terminate his employment. The complaint portion sought damages for wrongful termination and for racial discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).[1] The court bifurcated the writ petition from the remaining claims. After hearing, it denied the writ, finding that appellant had been properly terminated for incompetence and discourteous treatment of others. Respondent then filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, arguing that the ruling on the writ petition effectively disposed of the remaining claims. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered. Appellant appeals the entire judgment, contending substantial evidence did not support the denial of the writ petition and summary judgment was improperly granted because triable issues of material fact remained, even after the denial of the writ petition.

Defendant Robbie Refugio Hull, Jr. was convicted by jury trial of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, 10851) and sentenced to three years of felony probation with 365 days in jail. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred (1) by failing to hold a Marsden hearing when defendant made a Faretta motion and voiced his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, (2) by failing to offer defendant an investigator to locate and subpoena defense witnesses, and (3) by excluding defendant from the jury instruction selection process and refusing to grant his request for an attorney to represent him during that process. Court affirm.

On July 14, 2006, the court found appellant, Ulises O., was a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,[1]after he admitted allegations charging him with felony vehicle theft (count II/Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), felony receiving stolen property (count III/Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor vandalism (count IA/Pen. Code, 594, subd. (a)). On appeal Ulises contends: 1) the court erred by its failure to declare the character of his vehicle theft and receiving stolen property offenses; and 2) the court committed Cunningham error. Court agree with Ulisess first contention and will remand the matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings. Court reject Ulisess second contention and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Appellant Alvin R. Ross, an inmate at Corcoran State Prison, appeals from the denial of a petition for writ of mandate in which he sought to compel respondents, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Darral G. Adams, Warden, to credit his trust account in the sum of $737. According to appellant, he received a letter from a female friend that included a U.S. Treasury check in the amount of $737. Corcoran State Prison staff removed the check from the envelope and purportedly returned it, on request, to the U.S. Treasury Department. When appellants internal remedies proved unsuccessful, he petitioned for writ of mandate alleging that respondents had a clear, present and ministerial duty to credit his account in the amount of the check. The trial court denied the petition because appellant failed to demonstrate that respondents had a duty to credit appellant with a check that was returned at the request of the issuer. Appellant contends the trial court erred. Court affirm the judgment.