CA Unpub Decisions

While walking on the street, Juan U., then 17 years old, made eye contact with an undercover police officer, before entering the officers car and agreeing to engage in oral sex for $100. Juan U. was arrested, and the district attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging Juan U. had committed the misdemeanor offenses of engaging in prostitution (Pen. Code, 647, subd. (b)) and loitering to commit prostitution (Pen. Code, 653.22, subd. (a)). Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied Juan U.s attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124; Peoplev. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The order under review is affirmed.

After a jury determined that defendant Wayne P. DeBerry was a sexually violent predator (SVP) as defined by the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (a)(1),[1]the trial court entered an order recommitting him to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health for a period of two years. On appeal, DeBerry seeks reversal of the recommitment order on grounds (1) the court and prosecutor made assertedly improper comments about the consequences of a true finding, to which his counsel did not object; (2) the court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence concerning an unrelated Washington State case for purposes of impeaching DeBerry's expert witness; (3) the jury's finding that he suffers from a currently diagnosed mental disorder under the SVPA lacks sufficient evidence; and (4) the court made prejudicial evidentiary errors, including the admission of certain expert opinions and testimony into evidence. DeBerry maintains the errors cumulatively require reversal. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, DeBerry repeats some of these contentions, asserting his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective representation.
Though Court agree the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine DeBerry's expert as to matters concerning the unrelated Washington State case, we nevertheless affirm the order on grounds that error, and any resulting improper questioning by the prosecutor, is harmless. Because Court conclude his counsel did not render constitutionally ineffective assistance and Deberry cannot show prejudice in any event, Court deny the petition.

A jury found Frank Sanchez III guilty of murder (Pen. Code, 187)[1](count 1), and two batteries ( 242) (counts 2, 3). With respect to count 1, the jury found true firearm sentence enhancement allegations pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (d), (e) and a section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang sentence enhancement allegation. The jury also found codefendant Javier Ricardo Betancourt guilty of murder ( 187) (count 1), and two batteries ( 242) (counts 2, 3). With respect to count 1, as to Betancourt, the jury found true a section 12022.53, subdivision (e) firearm sentence enhancement allegation and a section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang sentence enhancement allegation.
The defendants raise numerous contentions on appeal. Court find no reversible error. The People concede that the trial court erred in imposing and staying sentence enhancements pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b) on count 1 in light of the defendants' life sentences. Court agree and order the section 186.22, subdivision (b) sentence enhancements stricken. Court affirm the judgment as so modified.

H.T. (H.) appeals from judgments terminating parental rights to her children, R.B. (R.) and K.T. (K.), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. H. asserts the court erred when it did not inquire of K.'s father whether K. is or may be an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), title 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq., as required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.664(d), then rule 1439(d). H. does not raise any issue with respect to R., and Court dismiss the appeal as to R.

P. P. (Mother) appeals following the dispositional hearing in the dependency case of her children, Calvin P. and Kayla P. At the hearing, the court ordered the children placed with a relative; granted reunification services to the children's presumed father, C. P.; and denied Mother reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, 361.5, subd. (b)(10)).
Mother filed a Sade C. brief asking this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952). The brief mentioned two Anders issues (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738): whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying Mother reunification services ( 361.5, subd. (b)(10)), and whether reunification services to her were in the children's best interests ( 361.5, subd. (c)). The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a letter brief requesting the appeal be dismissed. Counsel for Calvin and Kayla filed a letter brief opposing the request to dismiss, arguing the record contains evidence that services for Mother were in the children's best interests and denying services to her would be detrimental to them. The children's counsel suggested this court order the parties to brief the issue whether, considering the children's best interests, the juvenile court erred by denying services to Mother. We requested Mother and the Agency to brief the issues whether the juvenile court erred by not finding reunification services to Mother were in the children's best interests and by denying services to Mother ( 361.5, subds. (b)(10), (c).).
The orders are reversed.

Randall L. (Randall) appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights over Miranda L. and choosing adoption as the preferred permanent plan. Randall contends insufficient evidence supports the court's findings the beneficial parent child relationship and the relative placement exceptions to adoption are inapplicable. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A) & (D).) Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Michael B., was charged in a petition filed on May 3, 2007, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, with misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)). At the conclusion of a contested jurisdictional hearing on June 12, 2007, the juvenile court found the allegation true. At the dispositional hearing on June 26, 2007, the juvenile court placed Michael on probation not to exceed three years, and placed in him in his parents custody.
Michaels appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, raises no issues, and requests this court to independently review the record. (Peoplev. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) The opening brief also includes the declaration of appellate counsel indicating that Michael was advised he could file his own brief with this court. By letter on October 16, 2007, Court invited Michael to submit additional briefing. To date he has not done so.

Hamilton S. appeals from an order sustaining a petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777.[1] He contends that: (1) The juvenile court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, when it permitted his probation officer to testify about what his teacher and his grandmother told the probation officer. (2) There was insufficient evidence that he was in violation of two of the probation conditions. (3) Two of the conditions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, so they must be modified to include a knowledge requirement. Court modify the two conditions to include a knowledge requirement, and otherwise affirm.

After a three-day bench trial, respondent Jade Alliance, Ltd. (Jade) obtained a $213,039.89 breach of contract judgment against appellants Universal Metals, Inc. (Universal), Pan Metals Company (Pan Metals), Sonny Nguyen (Nguyen) and David Pan (Pan) (collectively suppliers). The suppliers challenge the $83,200 awarded for Jades lost profits and the $53,520.25 awarded to Jade for out-of-pocket costs due to breach of contract. Court find that the awards for lost profits and out-of-pocket costs were not supported by substantial evidence. Court reverse and remand for a new trial.

In this bail bond forfeiture case, the International Fidelity Insurance Company (appellant) seeks relief from an order denying its motion to vacate the summary judgment entered against its bail bond. By its motion to vacate, appellant sought to have the trial court also vacate a prior order that declared a forfeiture of the bail bond, and that served as the basis for the summary judgment. Our review of the record shows there is no merit to appellants contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare the forfeiture and enter the judgment. Therefore, Court dismiss the appeal since, as discussed below, the summary judgment is a consent judgment and not generally subject to appeal unless entered in excess of the courts jurisdiction.

Sonny Despain (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial resulting in his conviction of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder with true findings that defendant used a firearm and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing death. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 50 years to life, consisting of a 25 years to life term for first degree murder, enhanced by a term of 25 years to life for having personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing death.
He contends that (1) the evidence of deliberation and premeditation is insufficient to support his conviction of first degree willful, deliberate and premeditated murder, (2) an erroneous jury instruction on voluntary intoxication precluded jury consideration of whether defendants delusional thinking and paranoia resulting from his long-term and current substance abuse caused him to harbor an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force in self defense against the victim and of whether he acted with malice, and (3) imposing the discharge of a firearm enhancement violated principles of merger and constituted multiple punishment.
The contentions lack merit, and Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Terrance Robinson (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrer filed by defendants Los Angeles Unified School District, Chief Wesley Mitchell, and Officer John Taylor (school district, Chief Mitchell, and Officer Taylor, and collectively, defendants). Defendants demurrer was based on the doctrine of res judicata, with defendants asserting, and the trial court so finding, that the claims plaintiff asserts in this case are identical to those asserted by him in a federal case that was dismissed with prejudice when the federal district court sustained defendants general demurrer to the complaint in that suit.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial courts in the federal case and the instant case lacked jurisdiction over the defendants and therefore the order of dismissal in the federal case and the judgment in the instant case are void, and the judgment must be reversed. Court disagree. Court affirm the judgment because plaintiffs position conflicts with basic rules of civil procedure.

On August 6, 2004, following a denial of his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code[1]section 1538.5, appellant pleaded no contest to one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). The matter was set for an eligibility determination pursuant to Proposition 36. On July 7, 2005, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation for a period of 36 months under the terms and conditions of Proposition 36. On May 18, 2006, the court found, pursuant to section 1210.1, subdivision (b)(4), that appellant was in violation of Proposition 36 and terminated him from the program based on his refusal to undergo treatment. The court placed appellant on terms and conditions of probation for an additional 36 months and ordered him to serve 365 days in the Los Angeles County jail.
Appellant appeals on the ground that he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to due process because the trial court erroneously refused to reinstate him on Proposition 36 probation when the evidence was insufficient to prove that appellant voluntarily refused treatment under the drug program.

Defendants and appellants Cal-State Development & Electrical Construction Corp. (Cal-State Development) and its president, Isaac Brook (Brook), appeal an order denying their special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution filed by plaintiffs and respondents Claude E. Atkins Enterprises, Inc., a California corporation (Atkins), and its attorneys, Braun & Melucci LLP, a California limited liability partnership (B&M). (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.)
The essential issue presented is whether Cal-State Development and Brook lacked probable cause to bring the underlying action against Atkins and B&M. Court conclude the underlying action by Cal-State Development and Brook was not supported by probable cause. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Cal-State Development and Brooks special motion to strike the malicious prosecution complaint. The order is affirmed.