CA Unpub Decisions

David Setterberg (Setterberg) and Joanne Setterberg appeal a judgment entered in favor of defendant Metalclad Insulation Corporation (Metalclad), which followed an order granting Metalclads motion for summary judgment. Setterberg contends he made a sufficient showing to withstand summary judgment. As discussed below, Court agree and reverse.

This appeal stems from a breach of contract action to recover on unpaid promissory notes and a finding of liability based on surety law. Defendants and appellants Chong Soo Kim and Myung Ai Kim (appellants) appeal the judgment awarded against them after a bench trial. The trial court found in favor of plaintiff and respondent CHB America Bank (respondent) and held appellants liable for two promissory notes they guaranteed on behalf of their business, Kim Pacific Trading Corporation (Kim Pacific). Appellants contend the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations and respondents claim was time-barred. Appellants also contend the court should have excluded the testimony of a bank employee on hearsay grounds. They assert his testimony was insufficient to admit bank documents under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Court remand for further proceedings.

Two young children, Nicholas K. and Shawna K., were placed in foster care as a result of neglect arising from the substance abuse of their mother, appellant Sharon K. (Mother). Their father, appellant James H. (Father), had similar problems. Over the course of the initial 18 months, the parents maintained intermittent contact with the children while Mother underwent unsuccessful treatment. Eventually, reunification services were terminated for both parents, and the children were placed in separate foster homes. After the children thrived over the course of the next year and their foster parents proved willing to adopt them, the juvenile court terminated parental rights. Court affirm that decision.

Appellant Zena J., mother of Sean H., appeals the juvenile courts orders denying her requests for mandatory therapeutic visitation and renewed reunification services, denying her motion for a continuance, and terminating her parental rights. Court affirm.

The mother and father of the dependent child, Caleb L., have both separately appealed from the trial courts order which terminated parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for the child. They claim that the trial court failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., hereafter the ICWA). Court conclude that the juvenile court complied with all inquiry and notice requirements of the ICWA, and affirm the judgment.

Defendant pleaded no contest to felony petty theft (Pen. Code, 666) and admitted one strike prior ( 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). Subsequently, the trial court denied his motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike a prior. Defendant appeals, arguing that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to strike his prior conviction. Court affirm the judgment.

Matthew H., a minor, appeals from a juvenile disposition entered by the juvenile court on December 8, 2006,[1] disposing of all issues between the parties. Appellants counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this courts attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.
At all times throughout the proceeding appellant was represented by counsel. There was no error in the disposition. The trial courts choice of disposition was supported by substantial evidence. Court have concluded that there are no meritorious issues to be argued or that require further briefing on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant and appellant Javier Antonio Olmos appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for grand theft auto and unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. Olmos was sentenced to a prison term of four years. Olmos contends: (1) the trial court erred by denying his Pitchess motion for discovery without conducting an in camera review of the requested police personnel records; (2) because violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 is a lesser included offense of grand theft auto, he could not properly be convicted of both offenses; and (3) the trial court committed instructional error. As the parties agree, Olmoss second contention has merit, and his conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle must be reversed. Court further hold that the trial court erred by denying in camera review of peace officer records related to dishonesty. Court remand with directions for a limited hearing on that issue.

Armando Zambrano appeals his conviction by jury of one count of sale/transportation/offer to sell heroin. (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a).) Zambrano admitted he had suffered two prior convictions (id., 11370.2, subd. (a)) and had served five prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to four years in state prison for the violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a); imposed and stayed a three-year sentence in state prison for each of the two prior convictions (id., 11370.2, subd. (a)); and struck his prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). Zambrano contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that a police surveillance location was protected from disclosure by the official information privilege (Evid. Code, 1040) and when it denied his motion to represent himself. Court disagree and affirm.

Appellant Robert Collins appeals from judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer to his first amended complaint for libel without leave to amend. Because Collins has not presented a sufficient record to demonstrate error, Court affirm.

Kieran Hardy appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court struck his third amended cross-complaint against Jonathan Paul Eyewear, Ltd., LLP as a SLAPP suit (strategic lawsuit against public participation). (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.) Court affirm and conclude that the libel action is barred by the fair reporting privilege. (Civ. Code, 47, subd. (d)(1); Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 240-242.)

Brooklyn Rae Wiehl appeals from the judgment following her guilty plea to driving or taking an automobile. (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a).)
Appellant entered a 7-Eleven store where she became angry with the store clerk and began yelling at him. She knocked over several displays of merchandise and left the store. The clerk watched appellant drive away in a white pickup truck that had earlier been reported stolen.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellate counsel has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Melody L. Fields appeals pro se from the January 4, 2006 postjudgment order rejecting her claim that certain proceeds from the sale of a business she once owned jointly with her former husband, James E. Fields, constituted an omitted community asset subject to postjudgment division. (Fam. Code, 2556.) Court affirm the postjudgment order.

Following a dispute over theownership and share of profits in a series of real estate transactions, plaintiffs Charco Ventures and Stanton M. Charney (collectively Charco) sued Efren Sandoval for partition, declaratory relief, fraud, deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, dissolution of partnership and an accounting.[1] The Sandovals[2]cross-complained, seeking damages for breach of partnership contract, fraud and waste, and rescission of the conveyance to Charco of a 50 percent interest in the Holiday property. After a court trial in the consolidated actions, the court entered an amended judgment which awarded Charco damages totaling $190,500 for Sandovals breach of fiduciary duty, partitioned the Holiday property by sale and denied Sandoval recovery on the cross-complaints. The court included $21,640 in expert witness fees in its award of costs to Charco. Neither party challenges the courts imposition of liability on Sandoval for breach of fiduciary duty or the partition of Holiday by sale. Sandoval and Charco each appeal, challenging only the amount of damages and costs. Sandoval contends in his appeal that the court erred in awarding Charco $136,500 (the prepayment penalty Charco paid on the sale of Madison), $54,000 (the amount of sales and loan broker commissions Sandoval received on the sale of Holiday), and $21,640 in expert witness fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (d). Charco argues in its appeal that the court erred in failing to order Sandoval to disgorge all or part of the $125,000 Sandoval received from Charco on the sale of Sunrise. Court affirm the judgment.