CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from a domestic violence restraining order. Court affirm.

Reno Rockey Mesa appeals from judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to the middle term of two years and contends the denial of his request for probation was an abuse of discretion where the reason for the denial was his election to have a jury trial. For reasons stated in the opinion, Court affirm the judgment.

Jennifer E. (mother) and Christopher D. (father) appeal from an order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights and declaring their child adoptable. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Court affirm.

Manuel Zepeda was convicted of carjacking, robbery, assault with a firearm, assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and burglary. The jury also found true sentence enhancement allegations relating to his personal use of a deadly weapon, that a principal was armed with a firearm, and his prior serious felony convictions. After finding that certain aggravating factors justified high-term sentences, the trial court imposed a combined sentence of 27 years and 8 months. In an unpublished decision filed February 22, 2007 (No. B188754), we affirmed the convictions but reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial courts fact-finding when imposing the high-term sentence violated Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. The judgment is affirmed.

Gina M. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1]and purports to appeal from an order denying her petition for modification under section 388. On appeal, she challenges various findings by the juvenile court and claims a failure to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1902 et seq. (ICWA)). We hold the notice of appeal is untimely as to the order denying mothers section 388 petition and dismiss as to that order. Court affirm the order terminating parental rights.

H.S. (Father) appeals from a July 18, 2007 order terminating parental rights to his son, J.P., born in November 2004. Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts rejection of the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights (former Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A), see now 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)), Court affirm the order.

Lisa Dawn Thomas appeals the judgment entered after she pled guilty to grand theft by embezzlement (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (a)). Imposition of sentence was suspended, and Thomas was placed on probation for 36 months. As a condition of her probation, she was also ordered to serve 90 days in jail. Court appointed counsel to represent Thomas in this appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and requesting this court to independently examine the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. The judgment is affirmed.

In 1984, Justo Avalos was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life. In 2006, the Board of Parole Hearings found Avalos suitable for parole and set a parole date. The Governor reviewed the Boards decision and reversed it, finding Avalos was not suitable for parole. Avalos challenges that decision by way of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus now before us, contending the Governors decision is not supported by some evidence. Court agree, and therefore grant the petition as prayed.

By petition for extraordinary writ, Julia C. (Mother) challenges a December 6, 2007 order terminating family reunification services with respect to her daughter, S.R., born in March 2006, and setting a permanency planning hearing. Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts order, Court deny the petition.

A jury found defendant Timojene Watson guilty of possessing cocaine base and marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5, 11359). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations defendant had two prior convictions for selling cocaine base ( 11370.2, subd. (a)) and sentenced her to 11 years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of five years for possessing cocaine base for sale, a concurrent two years for possessing marijuana for sale, plus a consecutive three years for each of the two prior convictions. The court also imposed a $2,400 restitution fine (Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a $2,400 parole revocation fine (Pen. Code, 1202.45) that is suspended unless parole is revoked, and ordered defendant to pay the mandatory laboratory fees, the drug program fees, the court security fee, the main jail booking fee, and the main jail classification fee. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court (1) prejudicially erred in instructing the jury that the prior crimes evidence could be used to establish her motive for committing the charged offenses; (2) abused its discretion in admitting evidence that [she] may have committed welfare fraud; and (3) erred in failing to itemize and record the fines and fees in the abstract of judgment. She also claims that imposition of the upper term violates her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that she received a concurrent middle term of two years (not eight years) for possessing marijuana for sale. Court reverse the trial courts imposition of the mandatory laboratory fees, the drug program fees, the court security fee, the main jail booking fee, and the main jail classification fee; remand the matter to the trial court with directions to separately state all fines, fees, and penalties imposed, with the appropriate statutory basis for each; and affirm the judgment in all other respects. We shall further direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to separately state all fines, fees, and penalties imposed, with the appropriate statutory basis for each, and to reflect that defendant was sentenced to a concurrent middle term of two years for possession of marijuana for sale.

The matter at hand is a sad case of a former spouse of a wealthy entrepreneur being unable to accept repeated claims that the sky was falling and that wealthy entrepreneur being unwilling to accept his duty to support his children in accordance with his earning ability. Both of the parties appear to live in a world of alternate realities and can only see the world through their narrow prisms. In reality, the sky did fall (the businesses failed) and the entrepreneur made no attempt to seek employment or start a new business, focusing his entire efforts to avoid having provable income available to pay support. . . . The one state of affairs that can be objectively determined is that the case is now on volume 20.
Fathers motions to strike mothers brief and her appendix are denied, as we have disregarded any inappropriate portions of those materials. The child support order is affirmed. Steven K. Zinnel shall pay Michelle M. Zinnels costs of this appeal.

A jury found defendant Donald Lavern Harned guilty of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)), possessing methamphetamine for sale (id., 11378), and possessing psilocybin mushrooms (id., 11377, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant had two prior drug convictions (id., 11370.2, subd. (c)) and served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). Sentenced to 10 years eight months in state prison, defendant appeals, contending (1) there is insufficient evidence he possessed methamphetamine for sale; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the People to use poverty and lack of a job as evidence of motive that he possessed drugs for sale; (3) the trial court and the People failed to properly instruct the jury regarding how to consider simple possession, the lesser included offense of possession for sale; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal. Disagreeing with each of defendants contentions, Court affirm.

After a jury trial defendant Lonnie Dale Robinson was found guilty of three counts of robbery of the second degree (Pen. Code, 211, 212.5).[1] In a second phase of the trial the jury also found true allegations that defendant had previously been convicted of five serious felony counts of robbery. Sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 105 years to life, defendant appeals. Defendant contends that (1) there is not sufficient evidence to uphold the convictions of robbery and that the trial court erred prejudicially in: (2) denying a motion to sever three other counts of robbery (as to which the jury was ultimately unable to agree and which were dismissed); (3) denying a motion in limine to bar evidence of his identification by two victims at a show up shortly after the robberies of which he was convicted; (4) failing to instruct on attempted robbery as a lesser included offense; (5) accepting the guilty verdicts; and (6) mistaking the scope of its discretion at sentencing.

The Attorney General of the State of California appeals from a superior court order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Lennie Parker. (Pen. Code, 1506 [an appeal may be taken by the People from a trial court order granting a petition for habeas corpus]; undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The superior court determined the evidence did not support the decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) denying Parker parole (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, 2402, (regulation 2402)). The court directed the Board to grant parole. The Attorney General argues the trial court erred in failing to defer to the Boards decision and in ordering the Board to grant parole. We shall conclude (as did the trial court) that the Boards stated reasons for denying parole (gravity of commitment offense, prior criminality, and unstable social history) did not provide evidence that Parkers release would pose a present risk to public safety under section 3041. However, we shall conclude the trial court erred in directing the Board to grant parole rather than allowing the Board to exercise its discretion in reconsidering the matter. On remand, the Board retains its discretion to grant or deny parole. On remand, Court leave it to the Board to exercise its discretion.