CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant William Emmitt Goode admitted he killed his former girlfriend, Dahyoh Thomas, and set her body on fire. He claimed to have acted in self defense. Appellant pleaded guilty to arson of an inhabited structure (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (b)), and, following a jury trial, was convicted of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187). The trial court sentenced him to serve 25 years to life in prison. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing expert testimony on intimate partner battering and its effects, also referred to as battered womens syndrome. He asserts the error in allowing the expert testimony was compounded by instructional error and by defense counsels failure to object to the prosecutors alleged misuse of the testimony during closing argument. He further contends the court erred by admitting into evidence as a prior incident of domestic violence testimony to the effect that appellant had forced Thomas to undress and stand outside a car in a deserted area of Oakland. With regard to his sentence, appellant claims the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by modifying the sentence to impose consecutive rather than concurrent terms of imprisonment after he had filed a notice of appeal.
Court find no merit in appellants attempt to overturn his murder conviction. However, because the trial court lacked authority to increase appellants sentence after an appeal had been filed, we have no choice but to modify the sentence to reflect that appellants terms of imprisonment for second degree murder and arson are to be served concurrently rather than consecutively. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment as modified.

Steven J. Krukow (Krukow) appeals his convictions for murder, elder abuse, and arson of an inhabited structure. He challenges a number of evidentiary rulings by the trial court, asserting that it improperly permitted some of his neighbors to offer impermissible and prejudicial character evidence and that it erred in redacting portions of a video recording of his interrogation by police. Krukow also asserts that his defense attorney at trial rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Mindful of the deference that we must accord to the trial court on matters regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence, we reject Krukows claims of error. We also conclude that Krukow has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, Court affirm.

In this personal injury case arising from a collision between a bicycle and an automobile, plaintiff Warren C. Havens (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury verdict in favor of defendant Marvin T. Brown (defendant). Plaintiff, the bicyclist in the accident, challenges the jurys finding that defendant was not negligent. Plaintiff also maintains the trial court erred by declining to give certain proposed jury instructions and by declining to admit certain evidence. Court affirm.

Appellant City of Petaluma and City Council of Petaluma (collectively City) contend the trial court erroneously granted a petition for writ of mandate, setting aside Citys decision under the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code,[1] 66410 et seq.) to issue a conditional certificate of compliance for a parcel owned by respondents Robert Ramirez and Rick Costa (collectively Owners), and ordering City to issue an unconditional certificate of compliance. City also appeals from the judgment granting declaratory relief in favor of Owners with respect to Citys attorney fees incurred in the course of Owners administrative appeal. Court reverse the trial courts order granting the petition for writ of mandate and affirm the judgment on the declaratory relief action.

Marilyn Hudnall-Johnson appeals from a conviction of voluntary manslaughter of her husband. She contends the conviction must be reversed due to the trial courts errors in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter and admitting evidence of the decedents extrajudicial statements regarding prior incidents of domestic violence. She further contends reversal is required because there was insufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of the crime and because Californias corpus delicti rule violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as because of cumulative prejudice from the above errors. Court affirm.

Defendant Thomas Joseph Conforti appeals from a judgment entered after his plea of no contest to one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen (Pen. Code, 288.5, subd. (a)) and imposition of sentence of six years in state prison. He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence taken from his home pursuant to a search warrant. (Pen. Code, 1538.5, subdivision (i).) Court affirm.

A modification decision.

Global Reach Investment Corporation (Global Reach) appeals an award of attorney fees and costs made under Civil Code section 1717 to Burlingame Investment Corporation (BIC). The court dismissed Global Reachs action to collect on several promissory notes after Global Reach failed to post a court-ordered undertaking as security for BICs fees and costs. Global Reach argues that because the dismissal was based on a procedural issue and there was no final determination of Global Reachs contract claims, BIC was not the prevailing party on the contract. We conclude BIC was entitled to attorney fees because it successfully defended Global Reachs action. (See Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877.) Court therefore affirm the trial courts order awarding attorney fees to BIC as the prevailing party.

Defendant Mary Wooten, as personal representative of the estate of Merlee Dowe, appeals the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Sandra Shewry, Director of the California Department of Health Care Services (the Department). After a bench trial, the trial court awarded judgment to the Department on its claim, filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 14009.5,[1] for reimbursement of expenditures on health care services provided to Dowe before she died. The trial court awarded judgment to the Department on the ground that its claim was timely because Wooten failed to provide notice of Dowes death to the Department as required by Probate Code section 9202. Wooten contends that: (1) the trial court should have barred the Departments evidence on the issue of notice under the doctrine of collateral estoppel; (2) she was prejudiced by the admission of the Departments evidence regarding notice; (3) the trial court misapplied the law and ignored applicable sections of the Probate Code governing the Departments claim; (4) the trial court was predisposed to rule in the Departments favor because it is a state agency. Having thoroughly considered each of appellants contentions of error, Court affirm.

The juvenile court of Alameda County declared A.T. a ward after sustaining an allegation that he committed felony murder while armed with a firearm. (Pen. Code, 187, 12022, subd. (a)(1).) It then directed him to make restitution to the murder victims family in the amount of $28,867.66. Having timely appealed from the dispositional order,[1] A.T. contends that (1) there is not substantial evidence that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct, and (2) the restitution order is defective because it includes items that are not authorized by the governing statute. Court reject both contentions and affirm.

The juvenile court of Alameda County declared D.L. a ward after sustaining an allegation that he committed felony-murder while armed with a firearm. (Pen. Code, 187, 12022, subd. (a)(1).) It then directed him to make restitution to the murder victims family in the amount of $28,867.66. Having timely appealed from the dispositional order,[1] D.L. contends that (1) there is not substantial evidence that the killing occurred during the commission of an attempted robbery, and (2) the restitution order is defective because it includes items that are not authorized by the governing statute. Court reject both contentions and affirm.

On December 13, 2007, the San Francisco County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant with possession of cocaine base for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5.[1] Defendant was arraigned the following day and pleaded not guilty. On December 18, 2007, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, seeking to suppress evidence of the cocaine base found on his person when he was arrested. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on January 3 and 4, 2008. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied defendants motion to suppress. Subsequently, a jury trial ended with the jury deadlocked and the court declared a mistrial. On March 28, 2008, the parties entered a negotiated disposition by which the prosecution agreed to amend the information to charge the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance ( 11350) and defendant agreed to plead guilty to that charge on the understanding he would receive a suspended sentence and probation pursuant to Penal Code 1210.1.[2] On April 30, 2008, the trial court imposed sentence reflecting the terms of the plea agreement. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 1, 2008.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first, we considered and rejected various objections to a jury verdict awarding dying mesothelioma plaintiff David Bakkie[1] $3,223,450 for medical and economic damages, and $1,200,000 in non-economic damages for the one-year period between Bakkies diagnosis and the verdict. The only claim of error that we upheld was the contention of defendant Union Carbide that the $14,100,000 of future non-economic damages for the period of Bakkies remaining life expectancy was excessive and the consequence of improper argument by Bakkies trial counsel. We ordered a new trial solely on this item of damages unless Bakkie accepted a reduction to $3,100,000.
Bakkie accepted the reduction and submitted a proposed judgment for a net total of $4,451,814.75. Over repeated objection by Union Carbide that this amount was inflated by approximately $650,000 because it was based upon an incorrect calculation of settlements received by Bakkie from other defendants, the trial court filed Bakkies proposed judgment. Union Carbide appeals. Court conclude that Union Carbides objection is well taken. Court further conclude that the matter can be resolved here, without need for a remand to the trial court. Court therefore modify the judgment by reducing the amount of net economic damages from $2,779,601.22 to $2,130,652.06, and affirm.

Defendant Robert Barron, III, appeals from a judgment and sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one count of grand theft from a person. He contends the court abused its discretion when it (1) denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) failed to establish that there was a factual basis for the plea. Court find no abuse of discretion or prejudicial error.