CA Unpub Decisions

Barry Gene Covington, Jr., pled guilty to one count of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(4))[1] (count 1). Covington also admitted having suffered one strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12) and one prison prior (§§ 667.5, subd (b), 668). The trial court sentenced Covington to four years in prison, consisting of the middle term of two years on count 1, doubled due to the strike prior. The court struck the prison prior pursuant to section 1385. We affirm.

Michael Coulter signed a settlement agreement in which he agreed to dismiss and release all his claims and causes of action against the estate of his deceased brother, and agreed an arbitrator would determine if the release barred any future pleadings he might propose to file concerning the estate. Thereafter, Coulter filed a "Petition for Revocation of Probate" which sought to set aside his brother's will and trust, and an arbitrator ruled the filing was barred by the provisions in the settlement agreement.
Representing himself on appeal, Coulter challenges the trial court's orders compelling arbitration, confirming the arbitration award, and dismissing with prejudice his revocation petition. Coulter argues these rulings were erroneous because he was mentally incompetent at the time he signed the settlement agreement. The record supports the court's finding that Coulter did not establish his mental incompetency. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's orders. However, we deny respondent's motion for sanctions against Coulter for filing a frivolous appeal.

A modification decision.

Plaintiff Javier Bedolla-Reyes appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Garry T. Vallier, M.D., in a medical malpractice action. Bedolla-Reyes asserts that the trial court prejudicially erred by declining his request to instruct the jury with Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 405 on comparative fault. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
As we explain, the trial court appropriately declined to give the requested instruction because Dr. Vallier did not claim any negligence on the part of Bedolla-Reyes contributed to his harm. We also conclude that any error was harmless because the jury found in favor of Dr. Vallier on the basis of causation. Thus, we can reverse only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the jury been instructed that it could reduce Bedolla-Reyes’s damages by the percentage of fault attributable to him, this would have changed its finding as to whether Dr. Vallier’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm in the first place. The jury was properly instructed on causation. We must presume it followed these instructions and find no reasonable probability of a different result absent the asserted error.

Rosalie A. (Mother) and Jose A. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s November 16, 2011 and January 30, 2012 jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. The court adjudged minor Nicolas A. a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b) (failure to protect) against Mother and pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) against Father.[1] Mother and Father challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders as to Nicolas. Nicolas’s half sisters Elisa R. and Laura R. are not subjects of this appeal because Mother’s notices of appeal pertain only to Nicolas. We conclude that substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding that Elisa and Laura engaged in violent altercations. But substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings as to the other allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). We affirm the jurisdictional findings with directions to the court and affirm the dispositional orders.

Plaintiff Julie A. Goldberg (Goldberg) is a California attorney apparently living and practicing law, on at least a part-time basis, in New York. In March 2011, defendant Elite Collateral Recovery, Inc. (Elite) repossessed Goldberg’s car in New York and towed it to New Jersey. Goldberg sued Elite and others in California for a variety of torts arising out of the repossession; Elite moved to quash service of the summons and complaint on the grounds that it lacked “minimum contacts” with the State of California. The trial court entered an order granting the motion to quash, from which Goldberg appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiffs/appellants Donald and Joan Burnett (the Burnetts) sued several of their neighbors, including defendant/respondent Gale Maiwandi (Gale),[1] for damages and to determine who owns a gate and adjoining wall at the eastern end of the gated community in which plaintiffs and defendants live. The trial court granted summary judgment for Gale, concluding that there were no disputed issues of fact as to any cause of action asserted against her. The Burnetts appeal the grant of summary judgment, as well as the award of attorney fees in Gale’s favor. We reverse with directions.

Appellant Reginald Gibson was convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon following a bench trial. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), appellant’s counsel filed an opening brief requesting that this court review the record and determine whether any arguable issues exist on appeal. We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issue. We affirm.

A jury convicted Israel Lopez and co-defendant Alfred Rodriguez of first degree murder and found firearm and gang allegations true as to both defendants. On appeal, each defendant raises evidentiary and sentencing errors and Rodriguez challenges the amount of his custody credits. We affirm Lopez’s conviction. We affirm Rodriguez’s conviction and remand his case for correction of his custody credits.[1]

Eduardo Luis Alvarez was convicted by jury of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236). The jury found, as to the robbery count, that Alvarez personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and, as to both counts of conviction, that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Alvarez argues that: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by ruling that a former codefendant, whom Alvarez sought to call as a witness, could assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by introducing expert testimony about Alvarez’s character that opened the door to impeachment, and by failing to introduce exculpatory evidence; and (3) the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on a less serious firearm enhancement (personal use of a firearm; § 12022.53, subd. (b)). We affirm the judgment.[2]

Capital One N.A., as successor to Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. (jointly, Chevy Chase) appeals the trial court’s entry of judgment, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (section 664.6), in favor of defendants and respondents Dennis Meurer et al. (collectively, the Meurers).[1] We affirm.

Defendant Luis Martinez was charged with two counts of lewd acts on a child under age 14 committed on or about July 15, 2004 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).[1] He was alleged to be ineligible for probation because the crimes involved substantial sexual conduct (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)). A jury convicted Martinez of two counts of attempted lewd acts on a child under 14, as lesser included offenses. (§§ 288, subd. (a), 664.) He was sentenced to the midterm of one year and six months in prison on one of the counts, and the sentence on the other was stayed pursuant to section 654.
Martinez argues that the judgment must be reversed because: the evidence did not support attempt findings as to the charged offenses; the jury instructions erroneously permitted him to be convicted of attempting offenses other than those charged; the court abused its discretion in denying his new trial motion; and a taped interview of the victim was erroneously admitted into evidence. We conclude that these contentions lack merit.
The parties agree that the sentence conduct credits were erroneously calculated, but disagree on the proper method for recalculation. We remand for recalculation of the credits, but not under the formula suggested by Martinez.

Respondent and appellant Susan Rhoades (Susan) appeals in propria persona following the conclusion of lengthy and contentious marital dissolution proceedings in trial court. Appellant’s ex-husband, petitioner and respondent Reginald Garcia (Garcia),[1] did not file a Respondent’s Brief.[2] Finding no merit in any of the contentions raised by Susan, we shall affirm the trial court’s orders and rulings in all respects.[3]

In December 2010, pursuant to a negotiated plea, defendant Jaime Ayala, pleaded no contest to two counts of car theft and admitted that one of the offenses was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. His sentence was suspended and he received three years’ felony probation. After twice violating the terms of his probation, the court revoked probation and sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of four years. Defendant filed a timely appeal. We will affirm.