Garcia v. Rhoades
Filed 12/3/12 Garcia v. Rhoades CA1/3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
REGINALD
GARCIA,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
SUSAN
RHOADES,
Respondent and Appellant.
A126939
(Solano County
Super. Ct.
No. FFL076491)
Respondent
and appellant Susan Rhoades (Susan) appeals in propria persona following the
conclusion of lengthy and contentious marital
dissolution proceedings in trial court.
Appellant’s ex-husband, petitioner and respondent Reginald Garcia
(Garcia),
did not file a Respondent’s Brief.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] Finding no merit in any of the contentions
raised by Susan, we shall affirm the trial court’s orders and rulings in all
respects.
Factual and Procedural Background
On
November 14, 2003, petitioner and respondent Reginald Garcia (Garcia)
filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to respondent and appellant
Susan Garcia, now Susan Rhoades (Susan), together with an Order to Show Cause
to appear regarding issues of spousal support to Susan, exclusive use of
community property, allocation of community debts and the issuance of a
non-CLETS restraining order against Susan.
separation was October 24, 2003,
the duration of the marriage was 25 years and 4 months, and there are no minor
children of the marriage.
According
to the declaration filed with the petition and order to show cause, Garcia is a
lieutenant in the Vallejo Police Department and is the department’s community
outreach officer for education on domestic
violence. On October 24, 2003, Susan entered the police
sub-station and, to Garcia’s embarrassment, contacted him over the department’s
communication system by using another officer’s radio. That evening, Garcia and Susan argued and
Susan asked Garcia to leave the home voluntarily. At that point a Benicia Police Officer
arrived at the home; Susan told the officer Garcia had a gun and that she was
afraid. Because Garcia was concerned any
allegation of domestic violence would be detrimental to his career, he decided
to leave the family home immediately.
Garcia has not returned to the family home since that time and is afraid
of meeting or communicating with Susan, fearing that if he does so, she would
claim he threatened her. Based on these
declarations, Garcia requested the court issue a non-CLETS restraining order
that Susan stay away from him and not come to the police station unless on
official police business.
On
November 17, 2003,
Susan filed a Temporary Restraining Order and Notice of Hearing in Contra
Costa County
(case number D-0305291) alleging Garcia shoved her, intimidated her, raped her
and threatened her with a firearm.
However, on November 26, 2003, Susan signed
a Request for Dismissal of the case, and the case was dismissed.
On
December 9, 2003, the
parties filed a “Stipulation and Order Re: Mutual Stay Away Orders and to
Continued Hearing.â€
title="">[6] The parties stipulated that neither party
shall contact, harass or communicate with the other and that each will stay 100
yards away from the residence and place of work of the other. The stipulation noted Susan is currently “on
disability and not employed. Upon being
notified of [Susan’s] return to work, [Garcia] agrees to stay away from the Benicia
High School and Liberty
High School where [Susan] is
employed.†Garcia also agreed to pay
$1,481 per month in temporary spousal support, effective December 1, 2003, without prejudice to argue
for a change in that amount at the continued hearing on the Order to Show Cause
set for December 15, 2003. The parties further stipulated that pending
further orders of the court, Susan would pay the mortgage of $3,342 per month
as long as she had exclusive use of the family residence, retaining the right
to seek any credits for such payments, and Garcia would pay underlying mortgage
debt on the community property vacation home located in Arnold, California,
retaining the right to seek Epstein credits for payments made on this community
debt.
On
December 15, 2003,
the parties appeared before Commissioner Haet on the order to show cause. The issue of temporary spousal support was
discussed. Based on the assumption the
parties would file separate tax returns, the court ran a Dissomaster
software printout based on the parties’ respective net monthly income. Dissomaster calculations showed
owed by either party to the other.
The
parties took up the issue of spousal support at the next hearing on May 20, 2004. The parties stipulated that Garcia would pay
Susan $1,000 per month spousal support, effective April 1, 2004, and Susan acknowledged receipt of $2,000, representing spousal support payments
for April and May. The parties also
agreed to put the family residence in Benicia on the market and to retain
George McCauslan to prepare qualified domestic relations orders (QDROS) for the
purpose of dividing Garcia’s California Public Employees’ Retirement (CalPERS)
benefits, Susan’s State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), and Garcia’s and
Susan’s respective tax sheltered annuities.
The court continued the matter for a further two-hour hearing to address
the issues of temporary spousal support and attorney’s fees.
On
May 25, 2004, Garcia
filed an order to show cause set for a hearing on June 17, 2004.
Garcia sought to modify spousal support to zero pending the outcome of
the case and for an injunctive orders that Susan dismiss with prejudice the
Temporary Order for Protection and Notice of Hearing she filed in Clark
County, Washington (case number
04-2-08326-9). In his request, Garcia
noted that at the hearing held on May 20,
2004, the parties stipulated to mutual stay-away orders and that
Susan raised no “incident of domestic violence,†yet Garcia was served with a
summons in the Washington cases
minutes after leaving the courthouse that day.
Garcia requested orders precluding Susan from filing any further
restraining orders against him in any other court without first seeking the
permission of the Solano County Superior Court and to declare Susan a vexatious
litigant. In addition, Garcia asked the
court to order that Susan release her medical and psychological records to
allow him to counter Susan’s allegations of physical, sexual and emotional
abuse allegations. Garcia also requested
attorney fees for having to defend the Washington
action and attorney fees pursuant to Family Code section 271.
Susan
filed a responsive declaration, contending that “under the California Domestic
Violence Act, there is no mandatory venue or court of jurisdiction in this
state†and that any orders issued by the Washington
state court are enforceable in California
under the Full Faith and Credit Doctrine.
Susan asserted the Washington
court proceedings are related to the divorce proceeding in Solano
County because “I fear for my life
and have been living in shelters.†Susan
argued there was no basis for an award of section 271 fees, stating she “should
not be penalized by having to pay attorney’s fees and costs because I obtained
orders in the State of Washington
where I was residing in a shelter.â€
Susan also objected to Garcia’s request for her medical and psychological records on the basis of privilege
and requested section 271 attorney fees.
On
August 4, 2004, Susan
filed a substitution of attorney. The
following day, Susan’s new counsel filed a Notice of Non-Consent to hearing by
a commissioner. Garcia objected to
Susan’s Notice of Non-Consent,
arguing it was untimely under the local rules of court because it was not filed
within 15 days of the party’s first appearance in the action. In August 2004, Susan also filed an
ex-parte request that the court enter a Wage Assignment Order because Garcia
had not paid stipulated spousal support of $1,000 per month for the months of
July and August, 2004. The court
issued an earnings assignment order in the amount of $1,000 per month on August 24, 2004.
Susan
appeared with her new counsel before Commissioner Haet on September 27, 2004. Susan’s counsel did not reference the Notice
of Non-Consent previously filed, or otherwise object to appearing before the
commissioner. Susan’s counsel informed
the court that the current spousal support order was based on Susan’s being
employed full-time at the Benicia School
District, but Susan is now on disability and
seeking an increase in pendente lite spousal support. Garcia’s counsel asked the court to continue
the matter and set it for a full hearing on the bifurcated issue of permanent
spousal support because “[i]t has been made clear at this point in time that
[Susan] contends that she is incapable of working†due to “alleged domestic
violence†and is seeking increased spousal support as a consequence. Yet there’s no records or documentation to
support any of this, and we’re going around in circles.†Ultimately the parties stipulated to
bifurcate the issue of permanent spousal support and to continue the current
pendente lite support order, under which Garcia
agreed to pay Susan $1,000 per month, effective April 1st, 2004, subject to retroactive modification if
necessary. The parties estimated 20
hours to try the issue of spousal support, which the trial court granted with
the observation, “If you can’t do a bifurcated issue in 20 hours then we have
problems.†Thereafter, presentation of
evidence commenced on the bifurcated issue of spousal support.
B. Bifurcated Spousal
Support Proceedings
Garcia
was the sole witness to testify at the September 27 hearing. Garcia stated he has been a police officer
with the City of Vallejo since
1974, and has held the rank of lieutenant since 1990. He testified he and Susan were married on June 24, 1978, and have two
adult children, a daughter, Cheryl, aged 23, who lives at an apartment in Benicia,
and a son, Sean, aged 20 who currently resides in the family residence. Garcia left the family residence on October 24, 2003, and has not
been back. During the marriage, Susan
worked full-time for the Benicia Unified
School District as a special
education instructor and resource specialist.
Garcia testified that post-separation, he paid $835 per month for an
apartment and made monthly mortgage and impound payments of $1,010 on the
holiday cabin in Arnold. He also testified he had to take time off
work on administrative leave due to restraining orders filed against him by
Susan in Contra Costa
County and Washington
state. As to spousal support, Garcia
testified he made payments of $1,000 per month for the months of April-July,
2004, but did not make payments in August and September because he
had to make the mortgage payments on the family residence for those months and
had no funds left for spousal support.
The
bifurcated proceeding on spousal
support continued on November 4,
2004, with the resumption of testimony by Garcia.
testified the sale of the family residence closed in October and netted
proceeds of $628,000; he received $200,000, Susan received $200,000 and the
remainder had been deposited in a trust account. After Garcia’s testimony concluded, the court
ordered the parties to confer with the calendar clerk to determine future
hearing dates after agreeing to a date for Susan’s deposition.
On
November 24, 2004,
Garcia filed an order to show cause, asserting that Susan, without consulting
her counsel, had unilaterally revoked authorization for release of medical
records, thereby obstructing his counsel’s ability to complete Susan’s
deposition. Garcia requested attorney
fees pursuant to section 271. Susan
opposed the release of her medical records.
A
hearing on this discovery issue was held on December 22, 2004.
Garcia’s counsel reiterated the relevance of the records to Susan’s
request for increased spousal support, due
to the many years of domestic violence
she suffered. The court ordered Susan to
provide the records of treating physicians to the court for in camera
review. The court reserved on Garcia’s
request for section 271 fees.
At
spousal support. City of Vallejo
Police Captain JoAnn West testified that in April
2004, the Attorney General’s Office (AG) contacted the Vallejo Chief of Police
indicating the AG was investigating a complaint against Garcia by Susan. West received calls from several other
agencies informing her Susan had contacted them with allegations and complaints
against Garcia, including police departments in Clark County, Washington,
Benicia and San Francisco. Vallejo
Police launched an Internal Investigation (IA) against Garcia. As part of that investigation, West met with
Susan and listened to telephone calls recorded by Susan. On the recordings, West heard no sounds like
a gun being racked. The IA found no
evidence of stalking, domestic violence or sexual abuse by Garcia. West subsequently heard the AG closed its
investigation against Garcia. The IA
investigation determined Susan’ allegations were unfounded and the IA determination
had been reviewed through the chain of command.
West testified Garcia was required to take time off during the IA
because where a restraining order is in force, Garcia is not permitted to carry
a service weapon.
Testimony
continued the following day, April 7, when the couple’s 24-year old
daughter, Cheryl Garcia, took the witness stand. Cheryl testified she left the parental home
in May 2004. She was home on October 23, 2003, the day her
parents separated.
name="_ftnref10" title="">[10] Her father was not angry when he came home
that day. Cheryl saw her mother and
father go into the study to talk; they did not appear agitated. Shortly thereafter, a Benicia Police Officer
came to the door and asked her father to leave the property. Cheryl fetched a small suitcase with some
clothes for her father before he left.
Cheryl testified that she did not ask to be included in the
against her father in Contra Costa
County after separation. She further testified that she had never
witnessed any domestic violence in the home or suffered any abuse by her
father. There was also further testimony
from Garcia, who stated he had used 283 hours of annual leave staying off work
due to restraining orders filed by Susan.
At
the next trial session on April 18,
2005 Garcia again resumed his testimony. Garcia sought Epstein credits on the Arnold
property of $13,178, covering the period from December 2003 to February
2005. He also sought credit for payments
made on the family residence prior to its sale, for the period Susan had sole
occupancy of the home. Garcia denied all
allegations of domestic violence, abuse and spousal rape made against him by
Susan.
Shawn
Garcia, the couple’s 20-year old son also testified during the April 18
session. Shawn testified he was at home
the night his parents separated.
name="_ftnref11" title="">[11] There was nothing unusual about his father’s
behavior that night. Shawn did not need
protection from his father as stated in the Contra Costa restraining order
filed by Susan, nor had he been assaulted by father as asserted by Susan in the
Washington restraining
order. Shaun never saw his father
physically abuse his mother. Shawn
testified his father never forced Shawn to report Susan’s whereabouts to father
after separation, as alleged by Susan, and his father had never interrogated
him about where his mother was living or what she was doing.
After
Shawn, the court heard testimony from Dorothy Hackler, Susan’s mother.
in Moreno Valley,
in Southern California.
During Susan’s marriage, Garcia obtained Hackler’s unlisted phone
number. Since October 2004, when
Susan came to stay with her, Hackler has received numerous hang-up calls. On one call she heard someone say, “Shawnee,
Shawnee,†which is a nickname for
her grandson Shawn. On other calls, she
hears static noises or the clicking of a phone hanging up. On a couple of calls, she heard the “pop-popâ€
sound like a gun chamber clicking.
The
court also heard testimony that day from Doctor John Chartier, a family
practitioner and Susan’s treating physician from 2000-2004. In September 2002, Susan presented to
Chartier with symptoms of anxiety, depression and insomnia, and he prescribed
Paxil. When Susan first consulted
Chartier, she had already been diagnosed with fibromyalgia and took Elavil for
that condition. Susan’s medical history
includes an anxiety disorder and recurrent major depression. When Chartier saw Susan on October 30, 2003, she was very
distressed and had lost 25 pounds in the prior six months. She had suffered a relapse in her
fibromyalgia, resulting in difficulty functioning in a social manner, which
prohibited her from working for two months.
Chartier’s notes on Susan from November 3,
2003, read “panic attack/stress syndrome. Advised to apply for state disability
insurance.†Chartier recommended that
Susan consult a therapist regarding her mental health problems for purposes of
applying for long term disability. On
cross-examination, Chartier stated Susan’s symptoms of fibromyalgia, anxiety,
depression and weight loss had waxed and waned between 2000 and 2003, but she
was never under a work release during that time due to her health
problems.
On
April 20, 2005, Susan took
the witness stand. Susan testified she
was employed throughout her 25 years of marriage as a special education
teacher, including 20 years with the Benicia
Unified School District. At date of separation, she earned
approximately $67,000 per year. In 1997,
she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia and depression. Currently, she suffers from fibromyalgia,
chronic fatigue syndrome, depression, anxiety, carpel tunnel syndrome and
interstistitial cystitis (IC), a bladder condition. IC was recently diagnosed by Dr. Silver,
who also recently diagnosed her with hypoglycemia, a low blood sugar condition,
which causes her to become confused at times.
Susan submitted an application to receive state disability insurance
through STRS. Susan stated she also
suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Susan
further testified that during the marriage she was subjected to physical
abuse. Garcia forced her into having
sexual intercourse throughout the marriage.
Susan also suffered emotional abuse throughout the marriage because
Garcia has a short fuse and gets irritated when people don’t do what he
wants. Susan described two incidents in
October 2003; Garcia raped her on October 16; on October 5,
while they were cleaning the garage, Garcia shoved her with his arm and knocked
her into her son. During the week before
she and Garcia separated, Susan was afraid Garcia might kill her and felt
intimidated when he brought his service weapon into the kitchen. Susan was afraid and terrorized by what was
happening at that time and had difficulty sleeping; she could not eat or keep
fluids in her body.
Also,
Susan testified that after the protective order issued by the Contra Costa
Superior Court was overturned in December 2003, she has been receiving
anonymous, threatening phone calls. Most
traumatizing to Susan are calls where she can hear the sound of a clip being
inserted into a gun. She also gets calls
where she hears the noise of a police scanner in the background. No matter where she went, Susan continued to
receive these threatening calls. Susan
kept a log of the calls and the log contains 130 entries. She never received calls like this before her
separation from Garcia and they continue to this day, leaving her in a constant
state of fear. Currently, she is
receiving psychiatric care from Dr. Chatz in Moreno
Valley, which began in
January 2005. Susan’s last day at
work as a teacher was April 1, 2004,
and her employment with the School District terminated
on March 15, 2005. Susan stayed at the family residence from
October 2003 to April 4, 2004,
and left after receiving a threatening phone call in which she heard the sound
of a gun being racked.
At
the trial session the next day, on April
21, 2005 the trial court received jurisdictional facts regarding
the petition for dissolution of marriage, and the court deferred on the
effective date of the dissolution pending Susan filing her preliminary
declaration of disclosure and further argument of counsel.
Garcia’s interest in the holiday home by June 21 using the appraised value
of $359,000 to determine the equity in the home at $224,000. The court reserved the issue of Epstein
credits on the holiday home.
Testimony
then resumed with Virginia Mosby, a marriage and family therapist intern
testifying for Susan. Mosby met with
Susan 12 times for one on one counseling from March 2004 to
December 2004. At the first
meeting, Susan presented as very distressed, tearful and anxious, and “had
experienced a traumatic experience in her marriage.†These are cluster symptoms associated with
PTSD. Mosby authenticated a disability
report she prepared on Susan’s behalf and sent to CalSTRS. The disability report diagnoses major
depressive disorder (single episode, severe) and PTSD (chronic). The report states the patient presented with
persistent re-experiencing of traumatic events and reports multiple trauma
associated with domestic violence and stalking.
Also, the report states client continues to experience PTSD symptoms as
well as major depression manifested by depressed mood, decreased interest in
activities, weight loss and insomnia, psychomotor agitation, fatigue,
diminished ability to concentrate and feelings of worthlessness. In regard to Susan’s functional capabilities,
the report states she has difficulty getting out of bed and takes several hours
to complete basic self-care activities like brushing teeth and eating. She can do some light housework but is
frequently too fatigued to do grocery shopping.
The report concludes Susan’s “current impairment is due to trauma; there
does not appear to be etiology prior to traumatic experience.â€
At
the next trial session on September 21,
2005, Garcia presented expert testimony from Dr. Mark Levy in
the field of forensic psychiatry. Levy
testified he has completed more than a thousand vocational rehabilitation
examinations to determine if persons qualify for the California Department of
Vocational Rehabilitation Services on psychiatric grounds. Levy conducted an independent psychiatric
examination of Susan on March 31, 2005,
in order to diagnose her mental condition and render an opinion on whether she
is employable or disabled. Levy
interviewed Susan for over two hours, then sent her for independent testing by
a forensic psychologist, in this case, his partner, Dr. Saul
Rosenberg. Rosenberg
ran a battery of psychological tests on Susan, including the Personality
Assessment Inventory; the Rorschah ink blot test; the Thematic Apperception
test; the Sentence Completion test; the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems;
and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.
These tests showed an Axis 1 somatoform disorder, a mental condition
causing a person to express emotional pain in physical forms. The second Axis 1 disorder identified in the
tests was “depressive disorder (NOS),†meaning Susan evidenced depression, but
not a depression falling into a sub-category of
depression. The Axis 2 diagnosis
from the test results was personality disorder (NOS) with histrionic,
borderline and paranoid features.
Levy
testified that the test results were “highly confirmatory of my own clinical
impressions.†Levy’s own clinical
diagnosis was Susan had an “adjustment disorder, mixed type†on Axis 1,
displaying elements of depression, anxiety, and a dysthymic disorder, meaning
she has a “low-level, chronic tendency to depression, which may wax and wane in
relation to life experiences, but which is not . . . profoundly
disabling. The other explicit Axis 1
diagnosis Levy arrived at was “undifferentiated somatoform disorder.†A person with this condition has “complaints
in many organ systems of their body . . . that either are not
substantiated by objective findings, objective pathophysiologic findings, or,
if they are, the complaints are in excess of what would be expected for a given
physical diagnosis.â€
Furthermore,
Levy stated that when he interviewed Susan, she was not, in his opinion,
psychiatrically or psychologically disabled.
Levy stated his opinion was borne out “during my deposition, when I witnessed
her coming in, like today, with a legal briefcase on wheels, assisting her
attorney, taking notes, talking to him, providing documents, just as she’s been
doing here today. [¶] She’s a very
competent, functional woman, from a cognitive point of view, except under some
very particular circumstances. And that
is certainly consistent with being employable.â€
Levy
testified that Susan attributes her disability to the threat of domestic
violence. A prevalent theme during
Levy’s interview with Susan was “victimhoodâ€â€”Susan feels victimized, violated
and abused by Garcia, physically and psychologically, and identifies with
abused spouses of police officers. Susan
told Levy she could not go back to work after March 2004 because Garcia posed a
threat to her physical safety in the classroom; however, Susan did not offer
Levy any medical reason why she could not return to work.
Levy
concluded that Susan does not have PTSD.
Levy opined Susan lacks “the A criteria†for PTSD—a major
life-threatening traumatic experience.
Levy also testified he reviewed Susan’s medical records compiled by
Dr. Chartier. The records contain
no evidence of spousal rape. Levy
questioned Susan’s allegation of spousal rape because psychologically she is
given “to hyperbole,†meaning she exaggerates and goes to extremes in
describing events. In this regard, Levy
observed that Susan’s reports of abuse escalated over time, culminating in the
allegation she was raped by Garcia on October 16,
2003, and her report to Dr. Rosenberg that Garcia raped her
with an inanimate object on that occasion.
Dr. Levy
was followed to the stand by Dr. Ronald Huff, testifying for Susan as an
expert in the field of clinical psychology and disability evaluations for
purposes of state and federal disability benefits. Susan was referred to Huff after she applied
for state disability benefits. When Huff
assesses an applicant, he takes a brief history and asks the applicant to
describe the problems they are currently experiencing, makes a clinical evaluation
based on observations during the interview and administers certain
psychological tests. Huff interviewed
Susan on February 18, 2005. After the interview, Huff prepared a report,
which he submitted to the Division of Disability Evaluation within the
Department of Social Services. In his
report, Huff’s diagnostic impressions on Axis 1 were major depressive disorder
and PTSD. Huff reported Susan presented
as anxious, hyper-vigilant, avoidant and feeling estranged from others. Also, Huff found Susan was in need of
psychiatric care; her thinking was “saturated with anticipation that her
husband might find her†and she described “a fairly long history of feeling
like she was being stalked or . . . pursued by . . . her
husband.†Huff was convinced her
symptoms were “real and deserved the attention of a psychiatrist.†It also appeared Susan’s description of her
physical symptoms, such as fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome, were
“consistent with her behavior and the history, as well as the test results.†Huff concluded Susan was unable to maintain
attention and concentration sufficiently enough to maintain reasonable
persistence and pace on the job and was disabled from working as a special
education teacher.
On
cross-examination, Huff stated Susan did not complain of any physical
discomfort during the two hour interview.
Based on what Susan reported, the triggering events for her PTSD were
related to stress she was under in her family relationships. Susan told Huff she was being stalked by her
husband, that she has a bullet proof vest, and the she believes her husband is
capable of tracking her by using police equipment. Before adjourning for the day,
the court addressed counsel: “[T]he two
of you keep complaining about the time this is taking, and you two keep adding
time. [¶] I also would state to you
both that on three separate occasions ─ so the parties hear this ─
I have offered the full day on a Monday . . . when the Court had a
case go away. You two had priority on
those [occasions]. . . . [T]he Court has attempted, at great efforts,
to get this case concluded, because it needs to be concluded. . . .
So I hope you can be a bit more flexible, because if not, you are going to be
back probably in 2006.â€
Within
days of the above trial proceedings, on September 28,
2005, Susan filed a motion to modify temporary spousal
support. In a declaration in support of
the motion, Susan asserted Garcia initially paid stipulated temporary spousal
support of $1,000 for April and May 2004, and then did not pay again, and his
wages were garnished in October 2004.
Citing new evidence, Susan stated she vacated the family residence in
April 2004 and spousal support should have increased at that time; she was “disabled
from October 24, 2003,
per social security and now permanently retired as disabled through CalSTRS;
and, she has no income aside from $1,000 per month in temporary spousal
support. Further, Susan claimed expenses
of $7,000 per month, including support of her son, who is in college. Susan concluded that based on her “current
income of $0 and the Petitioner’s income of roughly $14,000 per month,
temporary spousal support needs to be increased accordingly.â€
In
response, Garcia filed a declaration asking that Susan’s motion for
modification be denied and requested section 271 fees on the ground’s Susan’s
motion was frivolous and included misrepresentations to the court. Garcia noted the parties are currently on the
eighth day of trial on the issue of permanent spousal support. Garcia also averred Susan had intentionally
avoided receipt of approximately $4,300 per month she could have received in
benefits in 2005 by failing to claim her community share of Garcia’s CalPERS
retirement account upon her 50th birthday.
Garcia averred Susan is receiving undeclared CalSTRS disability payments
and CalSTRS income totaling between $7,684 and $9,098, plus temporary spousal
support of $1,000 per month. Garcia
argued Susan’s motion was filed to harass, annoy and be vexatious. Also, Garcia set forth 18 instances in
Susan’s motion where she misrepresented facts to the court.
Susan
filed a supplemental declaration attesting that the community property portion
of Garcia’s CalPERS has yet to be paid to her and her claim for full disability
under CalSTRS had not been decided. She
declared she had to exist throughout the summer and fall on $1,000 per month in
temporary spousal support, “while it takes 18 months to try this issue.†She stated she had spent $76,000 on attorney
fees and costs from the money received from the sale of the family home and the
remainder (of the $200,000 she received in October 2004, see
i.e., food, clothing, shelter. I have no
funds left with which to support myself.â€
At
a hearing on the modification motion held on November 30, 2005, the court
noted the hearing was on “a request to modify a temporary stipulation as to
spousal support pending the final four hours of this trial,†and that the next
trial date had been set for June 19, 2006.
In order to dispose of the issue sooner, the court offered the parties
two-hour trial times on January 17 and January 24, 2006, which the parties accepted. Also, the court noted that since filing her
modification motion, Susan had received $25,149 in backdated CalSTRS disability
payments and going forward would receive $3,353 per month. Using the Dissomaster program, the court
calculated when Susan begins to receive payments from Garcia’s CalPERS pension
in addition to her CalSTRS benefits, the spousal support figure “comes up
zero.â€
Apparently,
trial hearings were heard as scheduled on January 17 and January 24, 2006; however, the
parties did not complete the presentation of evidence on the issue of spousal
support.
title="">[15] The final trial session on the issue of
spousal support was held on June 19,
2006, and commenced with Susan’s continued cross-examination. Susan testified she is currently in the
process of purchasing a new home at a price of $787,000, and borrowed $100,000
against her Arnold home (the holiday
cabin) to use as a down payment on the purchase. To qualify for the loan, Susan declared a
monthly income of $9,100, which includes $1,000 in spousal support. Susan testified she is willing to spend
two-thirds of her total monthly income servicing the mortgage on her new home,
stating “I deserve to have a house.â€
Susan has nothing left of the $200,000 she received in October 2004
as proceeds from the sale of the family home.
She receives income from CalSTRS, CalPERS and spousal support. Susan testified that she wants the court to
continue spousal support, that her monthly expenses are $14,000 and that Garcia
should provide spousal support to that level.
Susan
further testified that she has not lived at the Arnold
property for 10 months, nor has she rented out the property. Susan testified that Garcia has been stalking
her since December 2003. In March
2006, Susan contacted Newport Beach Police and filed a complaint against
Garcia. She files complaints with the
police as the death threats arise, and has contacted the Moreno Valley Police
Department, the San Bernadino Sheriff’s Department and the Benicia Police
Department.
After
Susan completed her testimony, Garcia again took the witness stand. Garcia testified that he re-married in
December 2005. He and his wife are
in the market for a new home and expect to make home payments in the region of
$3,700-4,400 per month. Garcia testified
that he has been contacted by about 18 different law enforcement agencies about
Susan’s allegations of threats and stalking, and told them all that the
allegations are “totally spurious.â€
Following Garcia’s testimony, the court entertained argument of counsel,
took the matter under submission and ordered the parties to set a trial date on
the remaining issues.
C. Statement of Decision
The
trial court issued a ruling from the bench at a hearing held on
January 23, 2007, and a “Statement of Decision and Judgment on Bifurcated
Issue of Spousal Support†(SOD) was subsequently filed on May 2,
2007. In its SOD, the trial court found
that during the course of trial, Susan “obfuscated the issue of her need for
support. . . . [Susan] had a lack of disclosure, [made] inflammatory
and exaggerated allegations with regard to Petitioner and provided information
to the court that was not correct.â€
Regarding Susan’s domestic violence allegations against Garcia, the
court stated it “was tangentially involved in the allegations of domestic
violence as alleged by [Susan] and the testimony presented therein by the
parties and various witness [sic].
However, [Susan] never made a request to this Court of domestic violence
and Petitioner has never been charged or convicted of any domestic
violence. [¶] There is no finding
of domestic violence against Petitioner.â€
In
regard to the parties’ income, the SOD stated:
“Both parties were employed during the marriage and lived off a combined
annual income of approximately $200,000. . . . [¶] [Susan] did
not apply for “PERS†benefits [from Garcia’s pension] when she became eligible
to do so at age 50. Her delay in
applying for “PERS†benefits resulted in irremediable loss of said benefit of
$40,000 to $45,000 which would have been available . . . for her own
support. [¶] [Susan] while claiming
to be destitute failed to disclose that she had applied for disability benefits
from [CalSTRS]. [¶] The issue of
[Susan’s] disability became moot with the receipt of her “STRS†disability
retirement in 2005. [¶] . . .
[¶] The court finds [Garcia’s] monthly net adjusted income is
$8,906.†Depending on the adjustments
applied, Susan’s net monthly income is between $6,630 and $7,790, which in
either case “is higher than it was during the parties’ marriage.†During trial, Susan “utilized a number of
addresses and indicated she was not residing at the Arnold
property. [Susan] also testified she was
not renting out the Arnold property
and her failure to do so is to under-utilize this asset. [¶] [Susan] has further encumbered
herself during these proceedings by purchasing a new home with a substantial new
mortgage obligation of approximately $5,000 per month in addition to the Arnold
mortgage obligation of $1,600 per month.
It is not Husband’s responsibility to subsidize Wife’s further
encumbrances through spousal support.
[¶] . . . [¶] Based upon [Susan’s] Income and
Expense Declaration and tax returns, [Susan’s] charitable donations by check to
charities in 2005 which averaged $239 per month belie [her] request for spousal
support. [¶] [Susan] during the marriage
had $6,250 per month gross income. Currently
she has $8,120 per month gross income from which there are no deductions for
state disability, for Medicare or social security. Her adjusted net income is $6,630.00.†Based on these findings, the court denied
Susan’s request to increase spousal support and reduced the spousal support due
to Susan from Garcia to zero, effective January 1,
2007, with no retroactive modification of support prior to that
date.
D. Remaining Issues
The
court held hearings on July 9, 2007, January 10, 2008, and August 18,
2008, during which the court received evidence and further testimony from the
parties on the following issues:
Garcia’s claim for credits for mortgage payments he made on the family
residence for the months of July-September, and November 2004; Garcia’s
claim for Epstein credits on the Arnold property; the assignment and valuation
of vehicles; the distribution of proceeds from bank accounts held by the
parties at the time of separation; Susan’s claim for reimbursement under
section 2641 for a Masters in Public Administration obtained by Garcia during
the marriage; and assignment of accrued benefits from Garcia’s employment
following his retirement.
During
these hearings the court ruled piecemeal on discrete issues after receiving
evidence on the issue in question.
Specifically, the court ruled Susan owed Garcia $4,786.89, representing
one-half of mortgage payments Garcia made on the family residence in 2004. Also, following the parties stipulation that
between November 2003 and September 2005, Susan paid $10,302.92 and
Garcia paid $12,089.44 toward mortgage payments on the Arnold property, the
court ruled the parties were jointly responsible for said mortgage payments
through August 2005, that Garcia “doesn’t have any responsibility beyond
August 30th,†after Susan assumed sole ownership, and instructed the
parties “you need to do the math†to determine how much Susan owed Garcia on
that item. Further, the court ruled on
the assignment and value of the family vehicles and ruled that Susan received a
total of $12,284.44 in community funds held in joint bank accounts at the time
of separation.
On
December 30, 2008,
the court issued its “Amended Order After Trial (August 18, 2008)†(order), ruling on other issues
presented during 2007 and 2008 trial sessions.
In this regard, the court denied Susan’s request for reimbursement under
section 2641. Also, the court determined
that “the total amount of community interest of sick leave, compensation time
and annual leave is $73,044.65, reduced by 35% taxes for a net value of
$47,479.02, which is credited to Husband.
Also, the court noted there is a remaining community interest of 841.72
hours of sick leave not paid due to the City of Vallejo’s
bankruptcy proceedings, and ordered the parties to file a creditor’s claim for
that with the bankruptcy court.
The
final trial court session in the case was held on April 20, 2009, during which the court addressed the
remaining issues of Susan’s claim for Epstein credits and attorney fees. On the issue of Epstein credits, the parties
stipulated that Susan has $1,000 of Epstein credits for non household expenses
and Garcia will pay Susan $500 for one half of the Epstein credit. Thereafter, the trial court entertained
argument of counsel on the issue of attorney fees. Garcia asked the court to order that Susan pay
him $50,000 in attorney fees pursuant to section 271. The court stated the matter would be deemed
under submission on May 11, upon receipt of Susan’s latest income and
expenses declaration. Also, the trial court
suggested the parties prepare a judgment on reserved issues incorporating the
court’s various rulings and orders issued during the course of trial
proceedings in 2007 and 2008.
On
August 17, 2009, the
trial court filed a “Ruling†addressing the issue of attorney fees. Based upon the relative incomes and assets of
the parties, the court concluded that neither party should be awarded attorney
fees pursuant to section 2030 based on need.
Additionally, the Ruling stated:
“The Court however does realize that much of the monies expended by the
parties as fees and costs (the previously estimated $200,000 as combined
expenditures) were generated by a no-holds-barred litigation stance by [Susan],
and an unreasonable expectation as to the outcome. There was little if any compromise on the
issues by [Susan]. Her desire to inflict
damage on Husband was evident and her conduct was certainly not one of an
attempt to minimize fees. As a result
the parties spent far more in attorney fees than this case should
present.†Pursuant to section 271, the
court ordered Susan to contribute the sum of $25,000 to Husband’s attorney fees
and costs, with interest at the legal rate until paid. On October 13,
2009, Susan filed a Notice of Appeal.
Discussion
Susan
contends the trial court’s section 271 fee order against her in the amount of
$25,000 was an abuse of discretion and should be reversed. We find no abuse of discretion on this point.
Section
271 provides an independent basis for sanctions in
was enacted in recognition that the
“ ‘policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation’ †has special
application to domestic relations cases, which tend to be more emotionally
charged than most other forms of civil
litigation. (In re Marriage of Hargrave (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1323-1324;
Cal.App.3d 757, 765.) Courts award
sanctions under section 271 to punish attorneys or their clients for litigation
tactics that frustrate the goal of resolving family law litigation. (See In
re Marriage of Abrams (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 979, 990-991.) A party requesting a section 271 award is not
required to show any financial need for the award or any actual injury. (In re
Marriage of Corona
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1225.) The
only stricture is that the sanction may not impose an unreasonable financial
burden on the party sanctioned. (
1226.) In sum, section 271 authorizes a
fees and costs award as a penalty for obstreperous conduct. (Robert
J. v. Catherine D. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1520.)
A
section 271 sanctions order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re
Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470.) Accordingly, the appellate court will
overturn such an order only if, considering all the evidence viewed most
favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor,
no judge could reasonably have made the order.
(In re Marriage of Corona, supra,
172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1225-1226.)
The burden is on the party sanctioned to show error. (Id.
at p. 1227.)
This
record contains substantial evidence of irresponsible conduct by Susan that
prolonged the proceedings and vastly increased the cost of litigation. For example, throughout the entirety of the
proceedings, Susan persistently pressed allegations that Garcia stalked her
using police equipment and made death threats against her. Also, she persistently alleged Garcia
inflicted domestic violence, domestic abuse and spousal rape upon her during
the marriage. However, the evidence
showed these allegations were baseless.
As noted above, Cheryl and Shawn Garcia, the couple’s two children,
testified they had never witnessed any domestic
violence by Garcia and that statements made by Susan about Garcia in her
applications for a restraining order were untrue. Captain West testified that an internal
investigation conducted by the Vallejo Police Department found no evidence to
support Susan’s allegations. In its SOD,
the trial court noted that Susan “never made a request to this Court of
domestic violence and Petitioner has never been charged or convicted of any
domestic violence.â€
Moreover,
despite the fact that Susan was already under the protection of a mutual
restraining order filed in the trial court, she sought a restraining order in Washington
state court. In this regard, Susan appeared
in court on May 20, 2004,
and stipulated to receiving $1,000 per month in temporary spousal support;
however, she did not allege any breach by Garcia of the mutual restraining
orders already imposed by the trial court.
that day Garcia was served with a summons from the Washington
state court on a temporary order for protection within. In response, Garcia sought an injunction from
the trial court and section 271 attorney fees for having to defend the Washington
action. And Susan continued to file
complaints against Garcia with law enforcement agencies throughout California,
despite the fact that he had been cleared by the Vallejo Police Department’s
internal investigation. Additionally,
Susan’s claim she could no longer work on account of domestic violence, spousal
rape, stalking and death threats necessitated extensive discovery and testimony
by competing medical experts, thereby vastly increasing the cost of the
litigation.
Indeed,
what the trial court characterized as Susan’s “unreasonable expectation as to
[] outcome†and “desire to inflict damage†on Garcia is evident throughout the
record. For example, as noted above,
Susan, unilaterally and without consulting her attorney, revoked an earlier authorization
for release of her medical records and obstructed the taking of her
deposition. Also, during trial on the
bifurcated issue of permanent spousal support, Susan sought a modification in
September 2005 to increase temporary spousal support, claiming expenses of
$7,000 per month and zero income, despite the fact she received $200,000 from
the sale of the family residence less than a year beforehand. Several months later, the court rejected
Susan’s request for modification, noting that she had received over $25,000 in
backdated CalSTRS disability payments.
Susan inflated her expenses by purchasing a house in 2006 at a cost of
$787,000, and minimized her income by leaving the Arnold home empty and
unrented, and delaying her application for pension benefits under Garcia’s
CalPERS plan, resulting in “an irremediable loss†to her of income in the
amount of $40,000 to $45,000.
In
sum, the parties to these divorce
proceedings were a husband policeman and teacher wife with no minor
children and relatively modest community assets, yet between them they expended
over $200,000 in attorney fees in exceedingly protracted and contentious
proceedings spanning several years. On this
record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by imposing section
271 sanctions on Susan in the amount of $25,000.
B. Denial of Attorney Fees
to Susan
Susan
asserts the trial court erred by failing to award attorney fees in her favor
and by failing to sanction Garcia.
Specifically, Susan contends she incurred $109,378 in attorney fees
mostly because she had to “defend against . . . unfair trial tacticsâ€
by Garcia. The record does not support
her contention. For example, Susan
asserts that as a result of Garcia’s threats, she dismissed the Contra Costa
TRO and overturned the protective order issued by the Washington
state court. In fact, the parties agreed
to voluntarily dismiss the Contra Costa TRO with prejudice and stipulated to
the entry of mutual restraining orders in trial court. As for the Washington
state court proceedings, they were dismissed with prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction.
Similarly,
Susan complains Garcia pursued “fee-churning†discovery by deposing her,
seeking medical records, and making her undergo an independent psychiatric
examination in response to her allegations of domestic violence. However, Susan placed her mental state
squarely at issue by claiming she was unable to return to work and required
spousal support due to mental health issues arising from domestic violence,
abuse, threats and spousal rape perpetrated by Garcia. In sum, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by failing to sanction Garcia pursuant to section 271. (See In
re Marriage of Burgard (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 74, 82 [a trial court’s
section 271 ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the ruling].)
C. Due Process
Susan
contends the trial court “abused its discretion and committed reversible error
that led to due process violations†because (1) her case was assigned to a
commissioner for all purposes; (2) the commissioner should have disqualified
himself due to an inherent conflict of interest; (3) the commissioner “became
embroiled outside his jurisdiction†; and, (4) the trial court erred by
ordering the mutual stay-away order without a hearing. These contentions are meritless.
In
regard to assignment, Garcia filed his petition for dissolution of marriage in
November 2003 and the case was assigned to Commissioner Haet for all
purposes. Susan, represented by attorney
Weisinger, appeared before the commissioner without objection during the
initial phase of the case. Only after
attorney DeRonde substituted in as her attorney some nine months later in August 2004
did Susan file a notice of non-consent to a hearing by a commissioner. Although Garcia opposed the notice of
non-consent as untimely, no ruling was issued on it, and Susan, assisted by
attorney DeRonde, continued to appear before Commissioner Haet for the
remainder of the proceedings through
issuance of trial court rulings in 2008.
Accordingly, on this record, we conclude the doctrine of tantamount
stipulation clothed the commissioner with judicial authority through the
conclusion of proceedings. (See
1221, 1227 [the rationale behind the doctrine of tantamount stipulation “is
simple: ‘An attorney may not sit back, fully participate in a trial and then
claim that the court was without jurisdiction on receiving a result unfavorable
to him.’ [Citation.]â€].) No due process
violation occurred on this point.
name="_ftnref17" title="">[17]
We
now turn to the issue of judicial disqualification. Susan contends Commissioner Haet had a
conflict of interest and should have disqualified himself because Garcia’s
attorney is married to a Solano County Family Court judge and because Garcia
“often came before the Solano County
court system, as a law enforcement officer and as his department’s domestic
violence coordinator.
The
standard for disqualification is whether “[a] person aware of the facts might
reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be
impartial.†(Code of Civ. Proc.,
§ 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).) The
standard for disqualification under this subdivision “ ‘ “[i]s
fundamentally an objective one.†If a reasonable member of the public at large,
aware of all the facts, would fairly entertain doubts concerning the judge’s
impartiality, disqualification is mandated. The existence of actual bias is not
required.’ [Citations.]â€
(People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 446.)
However,
the grounds for disqualification must be raised at the earliest practicable
opportunity after the disqualifying facts are discovered. (
another ground in Equilon Enterprises v..
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68; Urias v. Harris Farms, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 415,
424-425.) By failing to raise this issue
at the earliest practicable opportunity, Susan has forfeited her right to
object to the trial judge’s qualification.
(Reichert v. General Ins. Co.
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 838; see In re S.B.
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [stating that the correct legal term
for loss of right based on failure to assert it in a timely fashion is
forfeiture, not waiver].) Moreover, even
if we were to reach the merits of the issue, we would reject Susan’s claim of
judicial disqualification. The average
person on the street aware of the fact that the attorney of a local police
officer involved in divorce proceedings was married to a non-presiding judge, would not reasonably or fairly entertain
doubts about the presiding judge’s
impartiality. (People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 446.) Thus, contrary to Susan’s assertion, she was
not deprived of due process on account of judicial bias.
Susan
also contends she was deprived of due process because Commissioner Haet “became
embroiled outside his jurisdiction.†We
disagree.
“ ‘The
term “due process of law†asserts a
fundamental principle of justice which is not subject to any precise definition
but deals essentially with the denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice.’ [Citation.] ‘ “The trial of a case should not
only be fair in fact, but it should also appear to be fair.†[Citations.] A
prime corollary of the foregoing rule is that “A trial judge should not
prejudge the issues but should keep an open mind until all the evidence is
presented to him.†’ [Citation.]†(
Cal.App.4th 281, 290-291.)
Here,
Commissioner Haet did not violate these precepts of due process by speaking
over the telephone with Judge Eiesland, the presiding judge in Susan’s
application for a temporary protective order filed in Clark
County, Washington in
May 2004. Indeed, it appears from
the record that Judge Eiesland was “in a quandary†about whether to issue an
ex-parte restraining order over a California resident and called Commissioner
Haet to enquire whether the California court was aware of the continuing
threats against Susan. Judge Eiesland
recited in court that Commissioner Haet stated “he was kind of puzzled as to
why they didn’t open up and say something when they were in front of him.†Nothing about this exchange demonstrates that
Commissioner Haet had prejudged the issues before him and could not “keep an
open mind until all the evidence†had been presented. (In re
Marriage of Carlsson, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 290-291.) In sum, Susan suffered no due process
violation on his point.
Furthermore,
Susan asserts the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by entering the mutual
stay-away orders in December 2003 without making the findings required
under section 6320.
name="_ftnref18" title="">[18] Assuming the stipulation to mutual stay-away
orders at issue here is subject to section 6305, and assuming, without
deciding, that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by entering stay-away
orders without “detailed
findings of fact†indicating that both parties acted primarily as aggressors
and that neither party acted primarily in self-defense (see
Cal.App.4th 732, 736), the result is that the trial court’s act of entering the
stay-away orders is “ ‘merely voidable’ †and “ ‘is valid until
it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by
“principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata.â€
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]†(
the trial court’s entry of the mutual stay-away orders stipulated to by the
parties because at all relevant times Susan showed legal sophistication and an
understanding of the processes of obtaining restraining orders, was represented
by counsel and entered the stipulation in question with the advice of
counsel. (Cf. Monterroso v. Moran, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 [legally
unsophisticated, non-English speaking wife who appeared without counsel and
through an interpreter was not estopped from challenging mutual protective
orders entered by stipulation where trial court failed to make findings
required by section 6320].)
D. Community Property
Susan
asserts the trial court divided the community property unfairly and erred in
its spousal support rulings. We conclude
Susan has failed to demonstrate reversible error in the trial court’s rulings
on these matters. (Haseltine v. Haseltine (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 48, 62 [“challenger of
a trial court’s findings [must] demonstrate to the reviewing court wherein the
trial court erredâ€].)
Susan
challenges the division of the community property portion of the separation
payment Garcia received from the City of Vallejo
upon his retirement in lieu of accumulated time for sick leave, annual leave
and comp time.
title="">[19] We review the trial court’s division of
community property for any abuse of its broad discretion to award such property
in order to accomplish an equal allocation.
(In re Marriage of Andresen
(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 873, 880.) On
review, all conflicts in the evidence are drawn in favor of the judgment. The
reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or determine credibility. (In re
Marriage of Friedman (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.)
Here,
the record shows that upon retirement Garcia expected to receive a lump sum payment
for 50% of his accumulated sick leave plus 100% of his accumulated annual leave
and comp time—a total of approximately $148,000. However, on March 21, 2008, Garcia accepted a separation payment from
the City of Vallejo (City) in the
amount of $74,363.11, equivalent to 50% of the total separation pay to which he
was entitled. Garcia accepted this
payment on the understanding he would receive the remainder in
December 2008 if the City did not enter
filed for bankruptcy in July 2008.
The
record also shows the City of Vallejo
did not deduct federal or state taxes from the $74,363.11 paid to Garcia. Also that sum included payment for all
accumulated annual leave (475.78 hours), all accumulated comp time (85.18
hours) and part of allowable accumulated sick leave (360.28 hours out of the
total allowable accumulated sick leave
of 1,283.31 hours.) Payment of
$74,371.76 for the remaining accumulated sick leave of 923.03 hours was
scheduled for December 31, 2008,
unless the City filed for bankruptcy.
Further, the record shows that at the time of separation, Garcia had
accum
| Description | Respondent and appellant Susan Rhoades (Susan) appeals in propria persona following the conclusion of lengthy and contentious marital dissolution proceedings in trial court. Appellant’s ex-husband, petitioner and respondent Reginald Garcia (Garcia),[1] did not file a Respondent’s Brief.[2] Finding no merit in any of the contentions raised by Susan, we shall affirm the trial court’s orders and rulings in all respects.[3] |
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