CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

Appellant, James Howard Foster, pled no contest to inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))[1] and was sentenced to a two-year prison term. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 we affirm.

Appellant/defendant Bonnie Elizabeth Guevara (defendant) was arrested after she entered a department store, placed merchandise in bags, handed the bags to two companions, and they returned the merchandise for store credit. Defendant was charged and convicted of count I, conspiracy to commit commercial burglary (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 459); count II, second degree commercial burglary (§ 459); and count III, petty theft with 10 prior theft-related offenses (§§ 484, 666). She was sentenced to three years in prison.
On appeal, defendant argues the court did not properly instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy to commit commercial burglary; the court failed to properly respond to the jury’s questions about conspiracy; and her attorney was prejudicially ineffective for failing to object to the court’s alleged errors and request supplemental instructions on that count. Her arguments are based on the assertion that the jury was never instructed that defendant could only be convicted of conspiracy if defendant and her confederates agreed to commit commercial burglary before they entered the department store. As we will explain, the entirety of the instructions demonstrates the jury was repeatedly instructed on that precise point. Defendant also challenges the court’s calculation of the restitution fine. We affirm.

Defendant Daniel Navarro Alvisar was charged by information with murder involving the personal use and intentional discharge of a firearm, proximately causing death (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d); count 1) and child abuse involving the personal use of a firearm (§§ 273a, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a); count 2). A jury acquitted him of murder, convicted him on count 1 of involuntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (b)), convicted him as charged on count 2, and found the firearm use allegation true as to that count.[2] Sentenced to an aggregate term of 17 years in prison and ordered to pay restitution and various fees, fines, and assessments, he now appeals. We affirm, but order a minor correction to the abstract of judgment.

Defendant and appellant Erik Mario Sanchez was convicted of a single count of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child, in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (c)(1). On appeal, he contends the trial court improperly denied his request to be represented by retained counsel of his choice in violation of his constitutional rights. Defendant also argues that several of the probation conditions placed upon him are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, are not related to the offense of which he was convicted, or are overly burdensome. The People respond that defendant’s request to substitute retained counsel was properly denied as untimely, and that the challenged probation conditions are valid, albeit with some modifications. We agree that some of the probation conditions should be modified, but otherwise we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Edwin Orlando Quir Villagran[1] appeals after he was convicted of various offenses arising out of sexual abuse of three victims. He contends that the trial court should have stayed punishment on some of the counts under Penal Code section 654, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same act. Defendant also challenges his conviction for possession of child pornography as time-barred. He seeks a reduction of the sex offender fees based on the provisions in effect at the time he committed his crimes, as well as a modification of the no-visitation order imposed by the court.
We modify the sex offender fine, and remand with directions to hold further proceedings with respect to omitted mandatory penalty fees, and with respect to the no-visitation order entered by the court. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment.

Neil R. Trop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
Robert A. appeals the juvenile court's orders refusing to return his daughter, K.A., to his custody and maintaining dependency jurisdiction of his son, Noah A., at the 12-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f).)[1] Robert contends the court's orders were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Timothy Lam asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant filed a supplemental brief[1] contending (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during plea negotiations, (2) his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance, (3) the prosecutor suborned perjury and knew a witness was going to lie, and (4) the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of a witness the prosecutor knew to be untruthful and failed to correct the witness’s statement. We conclude none of defendant’s contentions has merit.

Two competing factions of a homeowners association filed three lawsuits (which were later consolidated) seeking control of the Gold Strike Heights residential subdivision. The “Weiner Parties” (individuals and entities affiliated with Mark Weiner, who acquired majority control of the association) and the “Homeowners” (individuals owning lots not owned by the Weiner Parties) participated in mediation and signed a written settlement agreement.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 [judgment by stipulation], the trial court entered an order for judgment, dismissed all three lawsuits, and included in the judgment all material terms of the agreement.

Minor and appellant Armando G. (minor) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court entered after the court found that minor had committed a robbery. He contends that evidence of identification, force, and fear was insufficient to support the judgment. We reject minor’s contention, find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings, and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Stephen S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders establishing jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j)[1] over his youngest daughter, Ki. (born September 2012), and removing Ki. from her parents’ custody. Father further contends the juvenile court erred by declining to liberalize his visits with Ki.’s four older siblings, Kai (born June 2004), Ka. (born June 2005), Ke. (born November 2007), and Kal. (born August 2010), who were removed from the parents’ custody in June 2012. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Catherine C., (Mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court summarily denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, subdivision (a)(1), to modify the order denying her family reunification services with her daughter, Cindy G., and terminating her parental rights with respect to Cindy. We reverse.

This is an appeal from an order granting a temporary restraining order pursuant to the Domestic Violence Protective Act (DVPA), Family Code section 6200 et seq.[1] The order precluded Nathalie Polakoff (Nathalie) from contacting or approaching her former husband, Sacha Polakoff (Sacha), and his new wife. Appellant contends the order was not supported by substantial evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

Marsha S. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendants and Respondents Mother Tiffany B. and Father Daniel S. and Respondent Minor C. S.
D.L. and O.L., whom the juvenile court named as de facto parents of C. S., appeal from the order granting the Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petitions of C.’s mother (Tiffany B.) and father (Daniel S.), returning the child to her parents’ care and taking the section 366.26 hearing off calendar. The de facto parents contend that the court erred by granting the section 388 petitions because mother and father did not show a change of circumstances such that the best interests of the child favored a return to their care. They also contend that the court erred by denying their request under section 827 to review the file in C.’s dependency proceeding and by declining to appoint counsel for C. separate from the attorney representing her older sibling and half-sibling. We disagree with the contentions of the de facto parents and thus affirm the order.[2]